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At the start of the twenty-first century, cooperation amongst international 
navies has once again emerged as an important element of international affairs, given 
new global security challenges, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.  As such, the 
Japan-US naval relationship has been a relatively under-studied topic.  The thesis 
pursues two interrelated objectives.  First, it identifies and discusses the dynamics 
that have driven and in some cases constrained the development and 
institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship over a 25-year period, between 
1976 and 2001.  Second, it examines the relationship between naval cooperation and 
institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship. 
A variety of factors contributed to the development and institutionalisation of 
the Japan-US naval relationship during this time period.  The research indicates that 
the internal dynamics within the naval relationship, combined with external 
influences such as threat perceptions, national leadership influence and domestic 
politics drove and/or constrained the relationship at various times.  The proposition 
advanced by this thesis is that when the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and US 
Navy operate together against a mutually acknowledged security threat or challenge, 
sharing risks and the defence burden, a dynamic is created in which cooperation 
encourages institutionalisation, which in turn facilitates improved cooperation. 
Institutionalisation is characterised in the thesis by the nature and extent of 
internal coordination, operational interaction, external linkages and by the depth of 
the relationship.  The analytical framework uses these four components as indicators 
of progress in the development and institutionalisation of the naval relationship.  A 
mapping technique is employed in the thesis as a tool of analysis to help order issues 
and provide a structure for comparing empirical data at three points over the course 
of twenty-five years.   
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At the start of the twenty-first century, cooperation amongst international 
navies has once again emerged as an important element of international affairs, 
given new global security challenges and the growing relationship between 
maritime security and the globalised economy.  Approximately one century 
earlier, Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American navalist, writer and educator, 
promoted the idea of a transnational consortium to protect a large and growing 
system of international trade, acknowledging that even the strongest great 
powers were incapable of unilaterally defending a worldwide system of 
maritime commerce.  While global conditions are different one hundred years 
from whence Mahan wrote, nevertheless, maritime cooperation has 
encountered renewed interest given new global challenges, such as tensions 
over ocean resources, international terrorism, territorial disputes and 
sovereignty issues, sealane security and the potential maritime transport of 
weapons of mass destruction.  Once again, there is an acknowledgement that no 
one nation can defend the maritime landscape given the myriad challenges that 
exist.   
In an address at the US Naval War College in September 2005, Admiral 
Michael Mullen, then Chief of Naval Operations for the US Navy, expressed 
sentiments similar to Mahan's while discussing the need for global naval 





Today’s reality is that the security arrangements and 
paradigms of the past are no longer enough for the future. 
And today’s challenges are too diverse to tackle alone; they 
require more capability and more resources than any single 
nation can deliver. 1  
 
The need and desire for maritime cooperation and coordination is 
becoming increasingly evident in East Asia, a region in which the confluence of 
interests, growing trade and investment, and economic prosperity are helping to 
unite nations in the region as they look for ways to protect their seaborne trade.  
In many cases, these navies, often with different cultural backgrounds and 
national politics, have had little prior experience working or operating together.  
Operational doctrine, institutional structures, and compatible systems and 
equipment amongst the navies generally do not exist.  While the region lacks an 
integrating security mechanism, there are growing indications that regional 
nations, including China, see the benefits of cooperation to protect their 
economic interests.  Cooperation is also emerging amongst military forces that 
have come together since the events of 11 September 2001 to support anti-
terrorism activities, despite their cultural, political and threat perception 
differences.  In alliance and non-alliance relationships, differences in culture, 
language, domestic politics and government structures can create challenges for 
operational cooperation.  The ebb and flow of cooperation and 
institutionalisation in the Japan - US naval relationship during the Cold War and 
                                                 
1 Admiral Mullen's statement was part of his Keynote Address to the 2005 International 
Seapower Symposium.  See US Naval War College, Seventeenth Annual Seapower Symposium, 
Report of the Proceedings, edited by John B. Hattendorf, 19-21 Sept. 2005, p. 5. The concept of a 
'1,000-ship Navy' emerged at this Symposium.  The concept calls for a global approach to 
international security in which policing and protecting the maritime commons against a wide 
spectrum of threats is a high priority for all nations interested in economic prosperity and 
security.  The term ‘1,000-ship Navy’ eventually evolved into the ‘Global Maritime Partnership’, 
which became a key part of the US Navy’s new maritime strategy (‘A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower’), launched in 2007. 
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post-Cold War periods can provide useful lessons for emerging bilateral and 
multilateral naval relationships in East Asia and elsewhere in the world.   
The Japan - US naval relationship has been a relatively under-studied 
topic in the academic community.  While defence think tanks and technical 
journals have pursued aspects of the naval relationship, scholars have typically 
focused on the Japanese Navy, the US Navy or the Japan - US security 
relationship.  This thesis helps to close the information gap concerning the 
Japan - US naval relationship by highlighting key developments in the 
relationship and by providing an analytical assessment of the critical factors that 
drove and constrained the relationship and its institutionalisation.  The United 
States influenced the strategy, force structure, training and equipping, and many 
other aspects of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).  Of all the 
military services, the two navies have consistently had the closest relationship.  
The naval relationship was re-established relatively quickly after World War II, 
and it grew in the decades that followed.  The Japan - US naval relationship is 
unique because of constitutional and other policy restrictions that limit JMSDF 
activities to an exclusive self-defence oriented posture.2  As a result, the nature 
and scope of Japan - US naval operational interactions are also limited in many 
respects. 
The proposition advanced by this thesis is that when the US and 
Japanese navies operate together against a mutually acknowledged security 
threat or challenge, sharing risks and the defence burden, a dynamic is created 
                                                 
2 Article Nine of the Japanese constitution states that land, sea, and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained.  The establishment of a Japanese defense force was 
based on the notion that Japan would only have a basic defence capability that would 
demonstrate just enough deterrent capability so as not to make the area around Japan into a 
power vacuum.  The United States played a leading role in drafting Japan’s constitution.  See, for 
example, Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, ‘Japan’s Evolving Defense Establishment’. In 
Japan’s New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities, ad Implications, edited by Yuki 
Tatsumi and Andrew L. Oros (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007), pp. 18 and 
76-77. 
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in which cooperation encourages institutionalisation, which in turn facilitates 
improved cooperation.  Scholars have not studied the concept of 
institutionalisation as it applies to military relationships.  As such, the thesis 
thus fills a gap in the literature.  In this thesis, institutionalisation is defined as 
the development of systems, structures, procedures and practices that enhance 
cooperation between navies and ultimately contributes to a more integrative 
naval relationship.  The progress toward institutionalisation highlights the key 
dynamics in the Japan - US naval relationship. 
The thesis is designed primarily as an empirical study that provides 
insights concerning the development of the Japan - US naval relationship and its 
institutionalisation over a 25-year time period—from 1976 through 2001—a 
period of major change for the naval relationship.  The thesis pursues two 
interrelated sets of questions: 1) What are the dynamics that have driven and in 
some cases constrained the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-
US naval relationship between 1976 (the start of formal Japan-US discussions on 
defence cooperation) and 2001?  2) What is the relationship between naval 
cooperation and institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship?  
Institutionalisation serves as the focal point for the thesis.  Military 
relationships benefit from institutionalisation because it contributes to 
improved bureaucratic coordination, interoperability of systems, equipment and 
doctrine and coordination of procedures and operations.  Ultimately, this leads 
to more effective military operations.  Institutionalisation is characterised in the 
thesis by internal coordination, operational interaction and cooperation, 
external linkages and by the depth of the naval relationship.  The analytical 
framework uses these four components as indicators of progress in the 
development of the naval relationship and to help identify the nature and extent 
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of internal and external influences.  A mapping technique is employed in the 
thesis as a tool of analysis to help order issues and provide a structure for 
comparing empirical data from three different times during the 25 years.  
Through this unique approach and broader analytical framework, the thesis fills 
a void in the literature by expanding the understanding of institutionalisation to 
include military relations—specifically naval—within a non-NATO alliance 
relationship. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters.  Chapter 1 includes the literature 
review, research design and methodology discussion.  The concept of 
institutionalisation, international naval cooperation from a historical 
perspective, Japan-US naval relations, Japan-US security relations, and culture 
and societal issues are discussed in the context of existing literature.  The 
analytical framework is also identified.  Chapters 2 through 4 are the empirical 
chapters.  Chapter 2 concerns the institutional foundations for the naval 
relationship, from 1976-1981; Chapter 3 discusses the maturing of the naval 
relationship, from 1987-1991; and Chapter 4 discusses the strengthening of 
institutional links, from 1996-2001.  Chapter 5 summarizes the findings in the 
thesis and provides the thesis conclusions. 
 5
CHAPTER 1:  Literature Review, Research Design 
and Methodology 
 
Multinational military cooperation has been a frequent focus of real-
world operations, particularly since the end of the Cold War.  Historical 
evidence shows that military cooperation amongst nations yields many benefits 
on a political as well as on a military level.  This was the case for the West 
during the Cold War and has become ever more relevant in the post-Cold War 
era.  Despite the acknowledged importance of multinational military 
cooperation, a surprising dearth of academic material exists—beyond technical 
defence journals and material generated by US military commands and private 
research organisations—concerning the nature and evolution of military 
cooperation and relationships in a non-NATO context.  In the naval arena, for 
example, while defence journals regularly highlight issues associated with 
multinational naval operations and exercises throughout the world, few authors 
have attempted to move beyond the 'bonds of seamanship' and explore the 
nature and development of international naval cooperation.  The common 
maritime interests, tasks and shared risks that tend to naturally link navies 
together are only part of a broader equation that also includes national interests 
and differences associated with relations between sovereign nations.  As such, 
the Japan-US naval relationship, as part of the Japan-US security alliance 
relationship, is an interesting case study, with the potential to shed light on how 
military cooperation evolves. 
Institutionalisation is a key dynamic in the relations between military 
forces of different nations.  It provides depth, definition and a degree of 
structure to a military relationship.  Nevertheless, except for the case of NATO, 
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scholars have not focussed on the institutionalisation of military-to-military 
relations, and as such, the institutionalisation of naval relationships remains 
unexplored by the academic community. 
This thesis answers two key questions concerning the Japan-US naval 
relationship:  1) What are the dynamics that have driven and in some cases 
constrained the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval 
relationship between 1976 and 2001? and 2) What is the relationship between 
naval cooperation and institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship?  
The proposition advanced by this thesis is that when the US and Japanese 
navies operate together against a mutually acknowledged security threat or 
challenge, sharing risks and the defence burden, a dynamic is created in which 
cooperation encourages institutionalisation, which in turn facilitates improved 
cooperation.  This causal relationship is contrary to what scholars have 
identified with international organisations, in which institutionalisation drives 
cooperation.   
The thesis draws on a variety of scholarly literature and related theories 
concerning institutions, alliance relations and naval cooperation.  Although none 
of the theories associated with this literature specifically addresses the 
institutionalisation of naval relationships and answers the questions posed in 
this thesis, they do provide some useful insights concerning the dimensions of 
cooperation and institutionalisation from an international organisational 
perspective. 
The relevant literature on Japan-US naval cooperation and 
institutionalisation can be divided into five areas:  1) Institutionalisation, 2) 
International naval cooperation from a historical perspective, 3) the Japan-US 
naval relationship, 4) the Japan-US security relationship, and 5) Culture and 
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related societal issues. The literature discussed is taken from English language 
sources.  While each body of literature provides valuable information and 
insights for the development of the thesis, none, in part or in total, 
comprehensively addresses the question of what drove and constrained the 
development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship.  
Furthermore, while scholars have written extensively about the link between 
cooperation and institutionalisation in terms of international organisations and 
security alliances, they have not examined this linkage in terms of military-to-





One of the notable changes in the Japan-US naval relationship over the 
last 30 years is the increased institutionalisation of the relationship, which 
began to formalise in 1976 and 1977, about the same time as the Japan-US 
security relationship began its own process of institutionalisation.  Greater 
institutionalisation resulted in more formalised relations and regular meetings, 
more frequent exercises and training, a greater sharing of information and 
technology, and ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of the Japanese and US governments, 
which encouraged more open relations.3  While institutionalisation is discussed 
extensively in an international context and in the public policy arena, scholars 
have not generally addressed the institutionalisation of military relationships.  
For example, it is not clear whether the institutionalisation of military 
relationships follows a similar path as that of security alliances, and whether 
                                                 
3 The details of these interactions are discussed in Chapter 2. 
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they are influenced in similar ways.  Nevertheless, information gleaned from 
other policy arenas can be useful in establishing a framework for analysis of 
military relationships in non-NATO alliance settings. 
‘Institutions,’ according to John Ikenberry, ‘specify what it is states are 
expected to do and make it difficult and costly for states to do otherwise.’  
Ikenberry is referring here to ‘institutional binding’, in which states respond to 
potential threats and strategic rivalries by linking together in mutually 
constraining institutions.4  Ikenberry identifies a series of 
mechanisms/processes that help bind states together, such as institutional 
agreements, transgovernmental connections, routines and coalitions, as well as 
reinforcing political activities and institutions.5  Security alliances are the most 
important and potentially far-reaching form of binding, according to Ikenberry, 
but they can vary in the nature and extent of this binding.  The NATO alliance, 
for example, with its intergovernmental planning mechanisms, multinational 
force, and integrated military command is a more ‘binding’ institution than other 
security pacts.  The range of obligations is more extensive, and the institutional 
mechanisms that ensure ongoing commitments are greater within the NATO 
alliance.6
While institutions are the rules of the game, so to speak, 
institutionalisation is the process by which those norms, or shared standards of 
behaviour, are created and developed.  Understanding institutionalisation 
                                                 
i t i ,
t
I
4 G. John Ikenberry, After V c ory: Institutions, Strateg c Restraint  and the Rebuilding of Order 
Af er Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 40-42.    
5 Ibid., pp. 65-69. 
6 Ibid., p. 41.  Douglass North, who writes principally about the nature of institutions and the way 
they affect economic performance, defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society; they 
are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.  Together they define the 
incentive structure of societies and specifically economies.  See Douglass C. North, Institutions, 
nstitutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p. 3 and Douglass C. North, ‘Economic Performance through Time’, the Sveriges Riksbank 
Prize Lecture in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 9 December 1993, p. 2.  
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html , accessed 9 May 
2006. 
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requires consideration of how norms change over time and adapt to each other 
and to their larger environment, according to Michael E. Smith.7  Scholars have 
written extensively about institutionalisation in the international context.  Their 
definitions are broad and diverse.  Samuel Huntington, for example, defines 
institutionalisation as the process by which organisations and procedures 
acquire value and stability.  He notes that the level of institutionalisation in 
political systems can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and 
coherence of its organisations and procedures.  John Ruggie defines 
institutionalisation as a mutual intelligibility of behaviour together with the 
communicative mechanisms and organisational routines that make this 
possible.8  In the international arena, practitioners have used the term in a 
variety of ways; however, generally the institutionalisation of military relations 
is not part of these discussions.9  
Nevertheless, these non-military applications can provide insights that 
are helpful when assessing military relationships.  Michael E. Smith, for 
example, who writes about institutionalisation in the context of member 
cooperation within the European Union (EU), provides a valuable contribution 
in this regard.  According to Smith, institutionalisation means several things.  
Firstly, institutionalisation can indicate that certain behaviours amongst a set of 




7 Michael E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy   the Institutionaliza ion of Coopera on 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 26-27.     
8 See Samuel Huntington, Pol t cal Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968), p. 12, and John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on 
n ernational Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 2-3.  
9 In the international arena, practitioners have used the term in a variety of ways, such as:  to 
advocate a more formalised system of cooperation between states in Latin America (see 
Francisco Rojas Aravena, ‘Toward a Multilateral Security Scheme—Conflict Resolution in Latin 
America: Best Practices in the Southern Cone’, NDU Pacific symposium 2001, pp. 13-15); to 
discuss restraints on the Chinese Communist Party (see Cheng Li ‘Is the CCP Becoming More 
Institutionalized?’ The Carnegie Endowment, Conference on the Future of Political Reform in 
China, 29 January 2004); and to discuss the development of multilateral cooperation in 
Northeast Asia (see Tsuneo Akaha, ‘Non-Traditional Security Issues in Northeast Asia and 
Prospects for International Cooperation,’ prepared for conference at the United Nations: 
Thinking Outside the Security Box: Non-traditional Security in Asia: Governance, Globalization, 
and the Environment, March 15, 2002.) 
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actors persist over time.  These actors thus adapt together—although to 
different degrees—in the face of internal and external challenges.  Secondly, 
institutionalisation also means increasing complexity.  As such, collective 
behaviours and choices are more detailed and closely linked.  According to 
Smith, the complexity can be measured in terms of an increase in the number of 
norms, the clarity of those norms, the change from norms into laws, and the 
extent to which norms tend toward ‘behaviour obligations.’  Thirdly, 
institutionalisation allows actors to apply increasingly broad, general criteria to 
particular norms to make certain decisions.  Decision-making thus becomes 
more automatic than discretionary as the institution develops.10  
Smith examines the relationship between cooperation and 
institutionalisation in his study.  His hypothesis is that institutionalisation helps 
promote greater international cooperation.  As such, he treats 
institutionalisation as the independent variable and cooperation as the 
dependent variable.11   Smith notes that as institutionalised cooperation 
increases and the outputs and outcomes accumulate over time, a dynamic 
process develops in which the outcomes change from effects into causes as 
actors use them to justify additional institutional changes.  This results in a 
dynamic process that influences future cooperation while also helping to 
institutionalise it, according to Smith.  As such, he moves beyond the work of 
other scholars in promoting an understanding of the effects of 
institutionalisation.12  As part of his study, Smith identifies the five stages of EU 
foreign policy institutional development and specifies criteria to measure each  
                                                 
10 Smith, pp. 26-27. 
11 Ibid., pp. 38. 
12 Ibid., pp. 25-30, 32-36 and 57-58. 
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dimension in the process.13  Smith does not indicate whether the dynamic 
process he describes and his framework for measuring institutional 
development could apply to other types of organisations, beyond the European 
Union.  Researchers would benefit from a more comprehensive discussion of 
Smith’s theory, hypothesis and implementation. 
Kirsten Rafferty is one of few scholars who have written about the 
institutionalisation of security alliance relationships and assessed their 
development using qualitative and quantitative measurements.  Her analysis 
covers certain multilateral and bilateral alliances but not the military 
relationships within those alliances.14 Her comparative analysis of bilateral and 
multilateral alliances and their institutionalisation provides a unique 
contribution to scholarly literature.  Rafferty defines institutionalisation as a 
three-stage process that occurs gradually as practices develop into patterns, 
expectations materialise, and in some cases, formal organisations emerge.  
According to Rafferty, states opt to institutionalise their alliances in order to 
facilitate consultation and cooperation in an uncertain environment and to 
                                                 
t  
13 According to Michael Smith, the five stages of EU foreign policy institutional development 
include: 1) Establishing the policy domain as an intergovernmental forum, 2) Sharing 
information, 3) Establishing norms, 4) Creating organisation structures, and 5) Establishing 
governance (e.g., setting goals, devising specific policies to reach them, implementing the 
policies, providing the necessary resources to carry out the policies, and establishing some form 
of policy assessment or oversight).  See Smith, pp. 38-49. 
14 Kirsten L. Rafferty, Alliances as Institutions: Persistence and Disintegra ion in Security
Cooperation, Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, November 2000.  Her analysis of 
twentieth century institutionalised alliances covers the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Australia, 
New Zealand, and US (ANZUS) relationship.  In later papers, her analysis also includes other 
security institutions, such as the Japan-US security relationship, the Five Power Defense 
Arrangement, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). See Kirsten 
L. Rafferty, ‘Institutionalizing Bilateral Security Pacts: An Exploration of the Japan-US Alliance,’ 
paper prepared for the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, 
Canada, March 2003; and ‘Quantifying Security Institutions: Creating a Measure of 
Institutionalization,’ paper prepared for the annual convention of the International Studies 
Association, San Diego, California, March 2006. 
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signal (to one another and to outsiders) the allies’ commitment to the agreement 
by increasing the costs of exit.15   
As with Smith, Rafferty has also developed a way to measure 
institutionalisation.  She identifies three dimensions of institutionalisation--
policy coordination, institutional breadth and institutional depth—which she 
then analyzes using a set of quantifiable components.  While Smith’s concept is 
more dynamic, Rafferty uses a predominantly linear approach and does not 
appear to account for or incorporate feedback loops into her analysis.  
Furthermore, she does not account for or address how one category may affect 
another, as Smith does in his methodology.  For example, it seems reasonable to 
assume that as the nature and extent of policy coordination increases in an 
alliance relationship, institutional depth is likely to increase as well—and vice 
versa. 
Rafferty states that all alliances are institutionalised to some minimal 
degree, with norms, rules and expectations of cooperation, but they are not 
institutionalised at the outset.  Some alliances undergo a deeper, broader form 
of institutionalisation that may or may not be accompanied by a formal 
organisational structure.  Alliances deepen when the allies come to identify with 
the alliance and include its welfare in their calculations of their own self-
interest, Rafferty argues.  They broaden when military cooperation becomes 
linked with cooperation in other areas that are only indirectly linked to the 
military rationale of the alliance but that are seen as providing a valuable 
contribution to achieving the alliance’s over-arching objective—consistent with 
neo-functionalist arguments.16   
                                                 
ti t :
15 Rafferty, ‘Institutionalizing Bilateral Security Pacts’, pp. 3-7. 
16 Rafferty, ‘Institutionalizing Bilateral Security Pacts…’, pp. 3-5.  Ernest B. Haas was one of the 
proponents of neo-functionalism international relations theory.  As applied to the issue of 
European integration, it aimed at integrating individual sectors in hopes of achieving spillover 
effects to further the process of integration.  See Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Na on-Sta e  
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The institutionalisation that occurs in bilateral security alliances is 
different than that in multilateral alliances, according to Rafferty.  In bilateral 
alliances, institutionalisation is more likely to be characterised by patterned 
practices and expectations of behaviour than by formal organisations or 
bureaucratisation.  This is the case, she says, because creating a formal 
organisation or committee to oversee and implement cooperation may be more 
costly for bilateral alliances than using existing intergovernmental channels and 
also because deep institutionalisation is likely to limit political flexibility in 
bilateral alliances, thereby undermining the very nature of the partnership.17  
Therefore, according to Rafferty, institutionalisation is generally stronger in 
multilateral alliances than in bilateral alliances.   
In the case of the Japan-US alliance, Rafferty argues that it underwent 
only a modest degree of institutionalisation and that it could be characterised as 
informal and limited to expectations about how each ally would act in a crisis.  
According to Rafferty, the alliance was largely symbolic in that it has served as a 
signal of the allies’ intentions and not a mechanism to facilitate real military 
cooperation for the defence of either party.  Rafferty does not examine the 
military relationships within security alliances and there is no indication as to 
whether she believes their progress toward institutionalisation is similar to that 
of security alliances.  This may be a reason why her reference to military 
cooperation challenges the empirical record concerning Japan-US naval 
activities during the Cold War.  As identified in Chapter 2, naval scholars and 
practitioners identify substantial military cooperation between the US Navy and 
the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in the 1980s against the Soviet 
                                                                                                                                              
ti tFunc onalism and International Organiza ion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).  Also, 
Michael E. Smith refers to ‘functional spillover’ in his discussion of European Union 
institutionalisation.  According to Smith, it is the result of actors who push for 
institutionalisation in one domain to achieve goals in another domain.  See Smith, pp. 32-33.  
17 Rafferty, ‘Institutionalizing Bilateral Security Pacts’, pp. 8-9 and 17-19. 
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naval forces in the Northwest Pacific.  This was not ‘symbolic’ cooperation, 
according to these scholars and practitioners, even though Rafferty’s analysis 
identifies it as such.  Rafferty does not indicate whether military relationships 
reflect the nature of the bilateral or multilateral alliance of which they are a 
part.18
While Michael Smith is explicit concerning the causal relationship 
between cooperation and institutionalisation, Rafferty is ambiguous.  Her 
analysis seems to indicate that states can and do cooperate without 
institutionalisation.  It is only when the benefits of institutionalisation outweigh 
the costs that states move further in the direction of institutionalisation.  As just 
indicated, Rafferty views deep institutionalisation as less likely in bilateral 
alliances than in multilateral alliances.  But this does not mean that cooperation 
does not occur.  The states will cooperate but without all the formal machinery. 
The issue of ‘threat’ and its effect on states and on alliances is discussed 
frequently in international relations literature and is generally dominated by 
realist theory.  Less attention has been paid to understanding how fluctuations 
in threat levels affect alliance and military cooperation, and in particular, the 
role that institutionalisation may play in this process.  For example, does 
institutionalisation facilitate an alliance’s capacity to survive significant 
transformations in the strategic context?  What role, if any, does 
institutionalisation play in a military relationship? 
John Ikenberry, in writing about Cold War NATO relations and alliance 
institutionalisation, provides observations concerning the role played by 
external factors in the early stages of institutionalisation.  While acknowledging 
the role played by a heightened Soviet threat in the years following World War 
                                                 
i18 Ib d.     
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II, Ikenberry does not appear to consider threat necessary for 
institutionalisation to continue.  He notes that despite the demise of the Soviet 
threat, NATO has not shown signs of decay but has actually undergone political 
renewal and expansion of cooperative relations.  Similarly, in the case of the 
Japan-US alliance, Ikenberry argues that ten years after the Cold War, the 
alliance appears to be as stable as ever and in fact has undergone a renewal in 
recent years in which the US and Japan reaffirmed their security partnership 
and developed more sophisticated forms of military cooperation, contingency 
planning, and burdensharing.19   
Smith refers to a variety of exogenous and endogenous factors that 
initially influenced institutionalisation in the European Union, but he is less 
definitive about the need for an external threat for cooperation and 
institutionalisation to continue.  Michael Smith states that there is no consistent 
relationship between threats and common action in the case of the European 
Union.  For example, Smith states that some crises, such as the 1991 Persian 
Gulf crisis, did not prompt a major collective response and yet in other areas, 
such as Central America and South Africa, EU states acted on the basis of 
common principles and understandings, not fears about external threats.  
Smith’s perspectives address the start of institutionalisation but not necessarily 
its continuation.20
Kirsten Rafferty could not come to a conclusion with respect to the 
Japan-US security alliance and its need for an external threat ‘…because the 
shallow nature of the institutionalisation provides only limited insight into the 
functioning of the Japan-US alliance’.21  It is interesting that Rafferty does not 
                                                 
19 Ikenberry does not acknowledge the turmoil in the Japan-US relationship after the demise of 
the Soviet Union and as such does not identify the resurgence of a threat as a causal factor for 
the changes that occurred in the years thereafter.  See Ikenberry pp. 212, 247-250, 256.   
20 Smith, pp. 240-46. 
21  Rafferty, ‘Institutionalizing Bilateral Security Pacts’, pp. 17-19. 
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reach a stronger conclusion concerning the Japan-US security relationship.  The 
evidence she presents in her argument on bilateral and multilateral alliances 
would certainly lead one to expect her to argue that bilateral alliances, given 
their weaker institutionalisation, are less able to withstand changes in the 
strategic environment than are multilateral alliances.  
In his Ph.D. thesis on alliances and the determinants of their cooperation, 
Geunwook Lee argues that it is the extent of institutionalisation in alliances that 
determines their ability to survive changes in threat levels.  In particular, he 
states that a well-coordinated military membership, including coordinated war 
plans, exchanged military intelligence and an integrated command structure, is a 
key component of this institutional structure.  With a well-coordinated military 
membership, an alliance as an international institution can survive the threat 
that originally built the alliance and maintain itself in the future with new or 
dormant purposes, according to Lee.22  Lee does not, however, examine the 
military relationships in the context of institutionalisation.    Further, Lee’s 
analysis does not distinguish between bilateral and multilateral alliances in 
terms of institutionalisation.  As such, he does not identify whether one or the 
other creates a stronger foundation for institutional processes to advance.  
 
Summary:   
 
Institutionalisation is a familiar concept in international relations and is 
discussed extensively in literature concerning international organisations.  In 
these contexts, institutionalisation provides some valuable perspectives and 
insights for security-related organisations.  Some scholars and defence 
                                                 
i ti I  
t ti
22 Geunwook Lee, Bring ng Institutionalized Coopera on nto Military Affairs:  Alliances and the
De erminants of the Coopera on, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, June 2002, p. 244. 
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practitioners have examined the institutionalisation of security alliances—
chiefly NATO.  Scholars have not examined the institutionalisation of military-
to-military relationships within alliance relationships, except briefly in regard to 
NATO.  As such, there is no empirical evidence about the extent to which the 
institutionalisation process for military relationships parallels that for security 
alliances and whether the external influences are the same. 
While international security literature generally acknowledges that 
security threats are important for the start of alliances, there is less consensus 
about the need for an external threat for cooperation and institutionalisation to 
continue.  Rafferty’s analysis of bilateral and multilateral alliances sets her apart 
from other scholars and academics who do not take the bilateral or multilateral 
nature of security alliances into consideration in their own analyses of how 
changing threat levels affect security alliances.  However, Rafferty does not go 
so far as to attribute the nature of institutionalisation in the Japan-US security 
alliance as determining its capacity to survive changes in the strategic 
environment.  Certain other scholars do make the connection between 
institutionalisation and the strategic resilience of alliances, and one in particular 
states that a well-coordinated military membership aids in institutionalisation.  
Academic literature does not appear to address how security threats—or the 
absence of them—affect institutionalisation in military-to-military relationships. 
Michael Smith and Kristin Rafferty, in particular, contribute to the 
analytical framework and approach for this thesis.  Michael Smith’s work on the 
institutionalisation of the European Union and the dynamic relationship 
between cooperation and institutionalisation is important in establishing the 
hypothesis, despite the fact that Smith views the causal relationship between 
cooperation and institutionalisation differently than does this thesis.  Smith 
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highlights institutionalisation as the independent variable that drives 
cooperation in the European Union.  This thesis views the reverse in the case of 
the Japan-US naval relationship.  This thesis builds on Rafferty’s three 
dimensions of institutionalisation—policy coordination, institutional breadth 
and institutional depth—and expands the application from security 
relationships to military relationships.   
 
International Naval Cooperation—A Historical Perspective 
 
Navies are unique amongst the military services because of their ability to 
operate independently and away from public view and to move fluidly through 
international waters and make port calls in foreign lands.  Navalists in the 
academic and professional arenas often point to a ‘spiritual bond’ that exists 
between sailors throughout the world due to the risks that they all share in 
operating at sea.23  Despite daily interactions between navies at sea, the 
formalisation of international naval cooperation is a relatively new 
phenomenon.24  Of the classic navalists, only Alfred Thayer Mahan dealt with 
international naval cooperation in his writings and gave the subject more than a 
passing acknowledgement.  Mahan distinguished between naval cooperation 
and naval alliances.  This is an indication that he gave some consideration to 
institutionalisation.  The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with a strong naval 




i  i t
23 See, for example, Katzenstein, Cultura  Norms and National Security, Police and Military in 
Postwar Japan, (Ithaca: Cornell Universisty Press, 1996), pp. 142-144,  and Joel J. Sokolsky, The 
Fraternity of the B ue Uniform: Admiral R chard G. Co bert, US Navy and Allied Naval 
Cooperation (Newport, RI: Naval War Co lege Press, 1991) and Admiral J.M. Boorda, US Navy, 
‘Partnership…from the Sea,’ address before the International Sea Power Symposium, Newport, 
RI (November 6, 1995). 
24 Geoffrey Till points to a tradition of rules of the road, behaviour, custom and courtesy that has 
been established over the years between navies.  This falls short, however, of more formalised 
cooperation.  See Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Gu de for the Twenty-F rst Cen ury (London: Frank 
Cass, 2004), pp. 361-68 and 110-111.     
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component, emerged in the late nineteenth century—during Mahan’s lifetime.  
The alliance and the naval relationship had some institutional links and as such 
they provide the basis for useful reflection on the formation and collapse of 
naval relationships within alliances. 
Mahan's ideas concerning naval cooperation centred on the concept of a 
transnational naval consortium.  He believed the security of a large and 
expanding system of international trade in the twentieth century would depend 
upon such a consortium.  He was convinced that even the strongest nations 
were incapable of unilaterally defending a worldwide system of maritime 
commerce for financial and other reasons and as such believed that naval 
cooperation was in the national interest of the United States and of other major 
nations in the world.25  
The American Mahan had a particular interest in naval cooperation with 
the Royal Navy of Great Britain, a navy (and a country) for which he had 
unsurpassed admiration.  His desire for an Anglo-American naval consortium, 
based on shared mutual interests, was part of a larger vision for an ‘Imperial 
Federation,’ composed of ‘English-speaking dominions and colonies mature and 
British enough to warrant inclusion’.26  Initially, Mahan identified Great Britain, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa as part of this federation, 
which Mahan saw stitched together economically by preferential tariffs, or no 
tariffs at all, and in particular by a great navy. 





: l f l i  
l
25 Mahan's view of an Anglo-American Naval Consortium is discussed in Robert Seager II, Alfred
Thayer Mahan  The Man and His Letters (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977) pp. 207-208 
and 502-504. In addition, a number of other sources also discuss Mahan's concept, such as 
Letters and Papers of A fred Thayer Mahan, Vol. III, edited by Robert Seager II and Doris D. 
Maguire (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975),  Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inven ng Grand 
Strategy and Teaching Command  The C assic Works o  A fred Thayer Mahan Recons dered
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), pp. xi-xiv and 82-84; and William E. 
Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, Oklahoma: 1981) pp. 83-98 and 213-217.    
26 Seager, A fred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters, pp. 268-270.   
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Mahan distinguished between naval cooperation and naval alliances in 
his writings and provides a glimpse of what could possibly be considered 
‘institutionalisation.’  Naval cooperation would help link together the English 
speaking world.  Furthermore, he believed that no single power in the industrial 
era was capable of exercising naval supremacy on its own and hence 
cooperation was vital for international stability and for the maintenance of 
international commerce.27  On the other hand, Mahan was against any formal 
union or alliance of any kind--even with Great Britain--stating that ‘the American 
people simply would not accept it.’28  From his writings, equality between naval 
partners appears to be one of Mahan's unstated criteria for a successful alliance 
relationship, and in Mahan's mind, no navy could measure up to the Royal Navy.  
He believed that the US Navy was still far too weak to participate in a naval 
‘alliance’ with Britain on a basis of equality.29 It appears that Mahan may have 
viewed alliances as more institutionalised relationships than the relationships he 
envisioned in naval consortiums.  However, the literature is not completely clear 
about how he distinguished these two relationships.  
Mahan viewed culture and race as important factors in naval cooperation.  
As such, he believed in the importance to the civilised world of Anglo-American 
racial and cultural leadership.  Many of his writings on racial and cultural issues 
are considered controversial and even racist in orientation.  For example, 
Mahan viewed the Asia region as culturally static and its people as inferior to 
the ‘Teutonic’ race. His perspectives on Japan are particularly interesting 
because he did not associate Japan with other Asian countries. He viewed Japan 
as superior to other Asians and included it in the group of important sea powers, 
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27 Sumida, p. 84.   
28 Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters, p. 269. 
29 Ib d., pp. 268-270.   
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along with Great Britain, Germany and the United States, who, if necessity 
arose, would cooperate together to resist aggression from Russia and China.30
Mahan's sea-power doctrine reached Japan during its formative years, in 
the late nineteenth century, when it was beginning to emerge as a world power.  
The government placed translations of Mahan's more important books in all 
schools, and the naval and military colleges adopted The Influence o  Sea Power 
upon History, 1660-1783 as a textbook.  Mahan’s influential book, published in 
1890 when he was President of the US Naval War College, examined the factors 
leading to supremacy of the seas, with a particular focus on Great Britain’s naval 
achievements. Mahan's philosophy of seapower strengthened the economic and 
political forces already stimulating naval developments in Japan.  This 
acceleration in navalism fostered and supported the new imperialism and new 
naval construction.
f
                                                
31 In 1911, however, the political situation in Asia was 
deteriorating and Mahan (as well as the United States more generally) no longer 
viewed Japan as a cooperative partner. 32   
As Mahan was writing, teaching and building his naval and academic 
career, Great Britain was finalising a treaty with Japan for an Anglo-Japanese 
alliance.  This was the first example of substantive naval cooperation in the 
twentieth century.  It was Japan's first alliance with a European power and 
helped boost its international standing and status as a naval power.33  It is not 
clear how Mahan viewed this alliance, given his sentiments against naval 







30 Seager, Let ers and Papers of A fred Thayer Mahan, pp. 206-211 and 499. 
31 William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (University of Oklahoma Press, 1981), pp. 60-63 and 
76-77.  
32 Ib d., pp. 218-223.   
33 The first treaty of 1902 was revised during the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, then revised again 
in 1911 and renewed for one year in 1920.  See Ian H. Nish, The Anglo Japanese A liance: The 
Dip omacy o  Two Island Emp res 1894-1907, (London: Athlone Press, 1966), pp. 374-377, and 
Timothy D. Saxon, ‘Anglo-Japanese Naval Cooperation, 1914-1918’, Naval War Co ege Review, 
Winter 2000, Vol. LIII, No. 1, pp. 79-83. 
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A number of scholars have written about the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
relationship.  It is significant for this thesis because it was one of very few 
alliances during the early twentieth century, and it incorporated a strong naval 
component.  Ian Nish has focussed both on the broader alliance relationship and 
on the naval relationship in his analysis.  The relationship is relevant to this 
thesis because several of the issues Nish highlights in his work parallel those 
developed herein, such as the role of a common security threat in binding allies 
together, as well as the role that political and strategic interests play in building 
and maintaining alliances (security and naval), and eventually, in pulling them 
apart. 
The alliance relationship benefited both nations and both navies.  For 
Great Britain, the alliance was a means by which the burden of maintaining the 
Pax Britannica could be shared with another power.  As such, it enabled Britain 
to add to her own power the naval power of Japan and thereby to help defend 
Britain’s commercial stake in China.34  For Japan, the cooperation of the largest 
naval power in the world would help save it from isolation and was a source of 
prestige for Japan in the international community.  For both countries, the 
alliance helped boost an anti-Russian front in Asia. Nish points out that both 
naval institutions—the British Admiralty and the Japanese Ministry of Marine—
were particularly supportive of this relationship but for different reasons.  The 
Ministry of Marine in Japan wanted to ensure that the strength of British 
battleships and cruisers in East Asian waters was kept superior to that of 
Russia.  The British Admiralty believed that the alliance would enable Britain to 
                                                 
34 Ian Nish, pp. 269, and 373-74.  According to Nish, there was a tendency for Britain to encourage 
Japan's naval building programmes in order to limit British commitments in the region and allow 
British naval building to focus on Europe.  In 1902, for example, the Admiralty wanted to 
concentrate Britain's fleet in European waters and could only do this by entrusting its defence in 
the east to Japan.  Later, in 1905, when Britain wanted to defend the Indian frontier without 
making large-scale increases in its standing army, Japanese assistance was sought to meet the 
deficiency.   
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reduce the size of its fleet on the ‘China Station’.  In addition, British naval 
vessels would be able to use Japanese protected bases for coaling and repairs.35   
A naval conference was held in 1902 to work out the details of the naval 
arrangement.  Clearly, the navies had substantial interests in this relationship 
and decided early on to publish a joint signal book and to freely exchange 
intelligence information through the British and Japanese naval attachés.36  The 
exchange of intelligence, the publication of a joint signal book, the shared threat 
perceptions, active operational cooperation and support by senior leadership in 
both countries suggests that institutional ties of some nature did exist between 
the two navies.  
The Anglo-Japanese alliance reached its prime in the early years of the 
relationship.  Later, many of the common interests that had bound the allies 
together were gradually lost.  Primary amongst these interests was defending 
against the identified enemy, Russia.  When this focus was lost, something of the 
heart of the treaty was also lost.37  Timothy Saxon notes that in the later years of 
the alliance, with the German threat to Britain’s Far East possessions eliminated 
and the nascent Soviet Union no longer threatening India, Great Britain did not 
require Japan’s naval cooperation.38  In addition to the loss of a common threat, 
the United States began to pressure Great Britain about its relationship with 
Japan because the United States was growing concerned about the growth of 
the Japanese navy and did not like Japan's continental expansion in Korea and 
Manchuria.  As part of its broader strategic interests, Britain was attentive to the 
American views.39 Neither Nish nor Saxon discussed the extent to which, if at 





35 Ib d., pp. 251-253. 
36 Ib d., pp. 251-252.  [The archival source cited by Nish for this information is: FO Japan 574, 
Admiralty to Foreign Office, 3 January 1903, containing bridge to Admiralty, 26 November 1902; 
Bridge papers 15, Kerr to Bridge, 2 January 1903.] 
37 Ib d., pp. 373 and 377. 
38 Saxon, p. 83. 
39 Ib d., pp. 83-87. 
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all, the naval relationship and its institutionalisation bolstered the broader 
alliance relationship, particularly in the alliance’s more challenging years.  In the 
end, higher-level political interests carried the day and the alliance broke apart 




The writings of and concerning Alfred Mahan, the nineteenth century 
American navalist, and those on the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the start of the 
twentieth century, provide some interesting perspectives for this thesis 
concerning the factors that contribute to and detract from naval cooperation 
and institutionalisation.  Alfred Mahan is one of few classic navalists who have 
written about naval cooperation.  His ideas centred on the concept of a 
transnational naval consortium to help support a large and expanding system of 
international trade in the nineteenth century.  Mahan distinguished between 
naval cooperation and naval alliances.  Although an ‘alliance’ could be 
considered more institutionalised than mere naval cooperation, Mahan did not 
readily advocate forming alliances.  Equality between navies, including common 
cultures, was an important consideration.  The Anglo-Japanese naval alliance 
was the first substantive example of naval cooperation in the twentieth century, 
and it appeared to be institutionalised to some degree.  The alliance provided 
political, economic and security benefits to both nations, but Japan and Britain 
were by no means equal partners.  Common interests brought them together, 
including a shared threat perception.  The relationship came apart when these 
common interests no longer existed.  Although it is not clear whether, in the 
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end, the two navies wanted to sever their ties, their futures were linked to the 
national prerogatives.  
 
  Cold War and Post-Cold War 
 
The literature concerning naval cooperation in the post-World War II 
years focussed principally on NATO.  But even in this context, naval 
cooperation was not a major alliance concern.  Planning in the post-World War 
II years had as one of its basic assumptions the continuing importance of land 
power because the major threat to Western security was the large conventional 
land army of the Soviet Union.  Maritime operations, therefore, were not as high 
a priority as other operations on the ground.  It was not until the Soviet Union 
developed forces capable of challenging the West for control of the seas that 
attention was drawn to the inadequacies of the allied maritime posture.40  
As the navies began to operate together in the early days of NATO, the US 
Navy, the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom and the Royal Canadian Navy 
began to coordinate their naval planning.  Initial meetings focussed on closer 
standardisation in the field of planning, operations and logistics to secure the 
sea lines of communication between North America and Europe in the event of 
war.41  Allied maritime forces emphasised securing the seas for reinforcement 
and resupply, which meant developing large numbers of anti-submarine warfare 
ships, planes and attack submarines and countermine forces to keep the 
harbours open.  Operating together, the alliance recognised the need for greater 
coordination of their maritime activities and operations and established a 




40 Joel J. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age: the Un ed S ates Navy and NATO 1949-80 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 1-9. 
41 Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, pp. 11-15.  See also Robert S. Jordan, A liance Strategy
and Navies: the Evolution and Scope of NATO’s Marit me Dimension (London: Pinter Publishers, 
1990), pp. 1-29. 
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maritime institutional structure consisting of Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief Channel.  With intensified maritime activities 
and greater attention given to NATO's maritime posture in the 1970s, the 
alliance established additional structures to improve the effectiveness and 
coordination of maritime operations, such as the Standing Naval Forces 
Atlantic, which provided training and practice in allied naval cooperation.  In the 
Mediterranean, a reorganisation of the command structure resulted in the 
creation of a new subordinate command for maritime-air cooperation.42   The 
standing naval force, in particular, marked the beginning of a more significant 
institutionalisation of naval forces within NATO.  
Formality does not always equate with effective cooperation, however, 
especially for navies.  Joel Sokolsky points out that in fact formality may be 
viewed as detrimental to the inherent flexibility usually associated with sea 
power.  Some formality is often necessary, but too much becomes a hindrance 
to operations.  In the case of NATO’s standing naval force, Sokolsky notes that 
formalisation helped familiarise navies with a central set of naval procedures, 
but it operated under a rigid set of political guidelines that did not always please 
the participating navies.  It was the price that had to be paid for getting allied 
governments to agree to it.43
While in the Cold War naval scholars and analysts focussed on naval 
operations within security alliances, in the post-Cold War era, coalition 
operations have received primary attention.  Coalitions tend to be ad hoc, issue 
oriented and short term, and may include nations with widely divergent 
capabilities and interests.  The fundamental element that distinguishes 
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42 Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, pp. 187-190.  
43 Joel J. Sokolsky, Fraternity o  the Blue Un form  Admiral R chard G. Co bert, US Navy and
Allied Naval Cooperation, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991), pp. 62-65. 
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coalitions from alliances is that they usually are not created until the crisis that 
spawns them is evident.44    
Despite the fraternal bonds that may exist between navies of various 
cultures and nationalities, challenges still exist in organising navies for effective 
multinational operations, particularly if they are not part of an established 
alliance.  These include, for example, identifying a leader, agreeing to the 
mission (including the political aims of the exercise), working out the 
operational and tactical procedures, and developing a strategy.  These 
challenges are minimised in highly institutionalised alliance relationships, such 
as NATO, which has profited from many years of combined action against a 
common perceived threat.45   
Admiral William Owens (USN-ret), former Chairman of the US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, states that unlike alliances, the members of coalitions can 
include nations normally less than friendly.  As such, they may have little 
experience working together and must overcome considerable distrust amongst 
their members and do not necessarily start from a common understanding of 
rules of engagement or operational familiarity.  Furthermore, the military 
capabilities of coalition members can also differ greatly, and these differences 
can complicate and hinder effective coordination when military force is used.46
Interoperability is one of the key characteristics of an institutionalised 
relationship and as noted earlier is important to the effectiveness of a naval 
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MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 40-41. 
45 Till, pp. 361-368. 
46 Owens, pp. 41-42.  A 1991 conference on multinational naval cooperation in the post-Cold War 
era points out that coalitions, compared with alliances, are difficult to organise and operate 
without common experience, training, communications and equipment.  See Jeffrey I. Sands, 
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operation, regardless of whether the navies are part of an alliance or a coalition.  
As part of a series of reports it did on multinational operations in the years 
immediately following the end of the Cold War, the Center for Naval Analyses, a 
semi-government organisation that serves as the analytical arm of the US Navy, 
has identified five elements that constitute interoperability.47  The five elements 
include: 
1) The ability and willingness (politically and militarily) of nations to organise 
themselves into a common force, 
2) The ability of force elements to understand and account for each other's 
operational methods in working together as a team, 
3) The ability of a force to exchange information well enough to establish and 
maintain a common picture of the operational situation, 
4) The ability of force elements to support and sustain each other, operationally 
and logistically, and 
5) The ability of the force's equipment to interact appropriately, ideally as the 
result of standardisation programmes. 
The Center’s work was part of a tasking in 1995, from the US Naval 
Doctrine Command, to produce a doctrine-like publication on multinational 
maritime operations that could be released to all the world's navies for use in 
coalition operations.48    The several documents that resulted from this tasking 
provide a US Navy perspective on multinational maritime operations and 
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identify some for the challenging issues that naval forces encounter when 
operating in a multinational maritime environment.  
Shared doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures are fundamental 
in developing interoperability.  Multinational doctrine details how navies intend 
to operate in a collaborative environment.  Formal alliances generally develop 
doctrine, as well as common operating procedures to guide their operations.  
NATO, for example, has developed Allied Joint Publication 1 as a capstone 
doctrinal publication and also has a series of Allied Tactical Publications that 
provide a framework for it operations.  For decades, NATO has operated from 
these publications laying out tactics, techniques and procedures.  The primary 
purpose of these Allied Tactical Publications is to facilitate the dissemination of 
orders and information pertinent to allied maritime operations.  For example, 
they provide a common source of signals and tactical principles, such as how to 
deploy an ASW screen, how to conduct rear area support, and how to 
manoeuvre in formation.49   
One of the most important factors in interoperability is having 
compatible platforms, systems and equipment for more effective operations.  
This includes the systems and technology to help prosecute the threat and also 
critical communications and other types of links that improve the interaction 
between naval forces when operating together.  Command, control and 
communications become more complicated when other navies are involved.  
According to one naval specialist, communications and combat systems data do 
not flow easily between different militaries because these systems typically have 
developed over years in distinct military cultures and operations.50
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Political will and commitment of the national governments is important 
because navies generally do not act independently but are affected by myriad 
other factors.  Significant amongst these is the respective governments that have 
to agree to cooperate and build a mutually reinforcing defence relationship.  
Some naval analysts view the demonstration of political will by governments as 
the first most important demonstration of commitment to naval 
interoperability.51
The US Navy has played an important role in the growth, development 
and operations of other navies, as well as in the institutionalisation of 
relationships with these navies.  The knowledge that it conveys and shares is 
one way in which the US Navy influences the doctrine, structure, technology 
and operations of other navies—as did other navies in earlier eras.  The 
structural power that the US Navy possesses and exercises as a ‘naval hegemon’ 
increases its own power as well as the power of the United States over the 
conduct of world affairs.  According to Susan Strange, power over structures 
means that relations within those structures are affected, even though the 
influence may occur inadvertently.  Joseph Nye uses the term ‘co-optive power’ 
to describe a similar concept—the attraction of one’s ideas or the ability to set 
the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express.52   
Steven Lukes, in his work on the three dimensions of power, states that 
at a very basic level, the concept that underlies the one-dimensional, two-
dimensional and three-dimensional views of power is that ‘A exercises power 
over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests’.53  Although 
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52 See Susan Strange, S ates and Markets, 2d ed. (London: Pinter, 1994), pp. 24-25, and Susan 
Strange, The Retreat o  the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 25-27.  See 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of Amer can Power, (New York: Basic 
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Lukes’ work does not cover military organisations, nevertheless, his ideas are 
interesting to contemplate in the context of the Japan-US naval relationship or 
in fact any military relationship in which a hegemonic power is part.  Such an 
analysis would be difficult, however, given the very evaluative nature of the 




Despite the bonds that exist between navies of various cultures and 
nationalities, challenges still exist in organising navies for effective 
multinational operations, particularly if they are not part of an established 
alliance.  In the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, NATO still stands as the 
example of a highly institutionalised alliance; its navies operate with established 
doctrine, procedures, technology and experience.  Shared threat perceptions 
have helped strengthen the alliance relationship.  However, lessons from NATO 
also show that excessive formality does not always equate with effective naval 
cooperation.  Indeed, in the early days of NATO’s development, navies appear to 
have been most effective with just the minimum amount of structure.  In this 
case, ‘structure’ needs to be distinguished from ‘institutionalisation’.   
Although alliances appear to help foster institutionalisation in military-to-
military relationships, the contemporary literature indicates that in the post-
Cold War era, greater reliance will be placed on building temporary coalitions to 
meet specific situations as they arise.  In these coalitions, institutionalisation 
will be more difficult to achieve since they may be comprised of navies with 
little experience working together and with different equipment and operational 
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procedures.  The US Navy has played an important role in the growth, 
development and operations of other navies and in the institutionalisation of 
relationships with these navies—both within and outside of alliances.  The 
structural power it possesses and the consequent knowledge that it conveys and 
shares are the ways in which the US Navy influences the doctrine, structure, 
technology and operations of other navies, as was the case with other dominant 
navies during earlier periods of history. 
 
The Japan - US Naval Relationship 
 
Academic literature on the Japan-US naval relationship is relatively 
sparse.  Scholars have typically focussed on issues concerning the broader 
Japan-US security relationship, and naval issues sometimes are discussed within 
this context.  The few scholars who have written about the Japan-US naval 
relationship have focussed principally on either the Japanese Navy or the US 
Navy.  Few have focussed on the operational interaction and cooperation 
between the two navies.  As such, primary source documents provided the 
predominant authoritative sources for this section. 
Of all the US military branches represented in Japan, the US Navy has 
maintained the closest relationship with its counterpart, the Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force.  The relationship was re-established soon after World War II 
ended—first, on a personal basis and then more officially as a result of US Navy 
liaison with the Demobilization Liquidation Bureau.  With US and other 
occupation forces deploying to Korea starting in 1950, Japan established the 
National Police Reserve and a maritime counterpart—the Maritime Safety Force 
to provide basic levels of security, in the absence of occupation troops.  The 
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Maritime Safety Force was transferred to the National Safety Agency in 1952, 
after the ratification of the Mutual Security Assistance Agreement between the 
United States and Japan.  In 1954, the National Safety Agency became the 
Defense Agency, with separate land, sea and air forces created for purely 
defensive purposes.55  Initially, the US Navy provided Japan with some of its 
older ships and equipment, since most of the Imperial Navy platforms had been 
destroyed, given to allied navies or put under the control of Naval Shipping 
control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine.  In 1952, US Navy 
instructors began training Japanese officer-instructors who would then provide 
training to new Japanese naval recruits.  This training, on ships lent from the 
United States, occurred quietly, so as not to attract attention from the Japanese 
of US publics.56  
Officers from the US Navy and from the former Imperial Japanese Navy 
generally had a more favourable relationship relative to the other services 
following World War II.  This was due largely to personal friendships that had 
existed prior to the War, the moderation of certain former Imperial Navy senior 
officers, US Navy respect for Japanese naval capabilities and the traditional 
international camaraderie of naval personnel.57  Some of the admirals with 
whom the US Navy re-established relations included those with reputations as 
moderates and who advocated a no-war-with-America policy.  This included, for 
example, Mitsumasa Yonai, who was Navy Minister from 1937-1939 and had 
unsuccessfully opposed the more aggressive and powerful voices of the General 
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Staff arguing for war.  Another Imperial Navy officer, Kichisaburo Nomura, was 
Ambassador to the United States at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack in 
December 1941.  According to Auer, he had sentiments similar to Yonai's, and 
had been close to many US Navy admirals from the time of his active duty.58
One of the key American figures in the post-World War II Japan-US naval 
relationship is Admiral Arleigh Burke who was instrumental in encouraging the 
establishment of a post-World War II naval organisation in Japan.  His decision 
to utilise the expertise of experienced officers from the former Imperial 
Japanese Navy in mine sweeping missions during the Korean War is a key factor 
in the relations that developed between the two navies in later years and in the 
re-establishment of a naval organisation.  Japan provided badly-needed 
minesweeping capability to the US Navy from October-December 1950.  This 
was a sensitive mission for Japan given its post-World War II non-military status.  
The Japanese government was not in a position to ‘order’ the participation of 
Japanese crews nor could the United States ‘command’ such participation.  
Crews were persuaded to participate by Japanese officials in charge of the 
mission.  Most were ex-Imperial Navy personnel.59    
In his oral history, Burke acknowledges his concern that without a navy, 
Japan did not have a way to protect itself—to stop smuggling at sea, detect 
aliens approaching Japan by sea, and protect its fishermen—and would be 
completely dependent on the United States for support. 60  After the Korean War, 
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59 According to Auer, forty-six Japanese minesweepers, one large ‘guinea pig’ vessel used for 
activating pressure mines, and 1,200 former naval personnel were employed in operations at 
Korean ports.  They swept 327 kilometers of channels and anchorages extending 607 miles.  See 
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United States cannot assume the role of protector forever: ‘That’s all right for a year or so or for 
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take on the support of another nation.  It can’t be done.’ US Naval Institute, Rem n scences of 
Adm ral Arleigh A. Burke, pp. 112-114.   
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Burke recognised that there were additional security concerns in the region 
against which Japan had no defence.  As a matter of self-interest, he also 
recognised that what was not provided by Japan would have to come from the 
United States.  It was in the United States’ best interest, therefore, to assist 
Japan in re-establishing a defensive naval capability.  Eventually, Admiral Burke 
recommended to Kichisaburo Nomura that he take ten of the very best officers 
from the former Imperial Japanese Navy and start a new naval organisation.  
Burke notes in his oral history that a small circle of former Imperial Navy senior 
personnel—part of the Demobilization Bureau--had already begun thinking 
about a future navy but had kept their planning very quiet.  These former naval 
personnel were not about to overthrow the government, according to Burke, but 
had recognised many of the realities that Burke himself saw as problematic for 
an island nation without a naval organisation.61
In addition to Admiral Burke, one of the more recent key specialists in 
Japan-US naval relations is James Auer—a practitioner and scholar.  As a naval 
officer in 1973, he published his Ph.D. dissertation on the post-war development 
of Japanese maritime forces and the early Japan-US naval relationship.  In his 
dissertation, he disclosed several facts that had not previously been made public 
about the role of former Imperial Navy officers in clearing mines with the US 
Navy during the Korean War.  Auer also identified rudimentary joint training 
between US Navy and JMSDF units and technical assistance that the US Navy 
provided to the Japanese maritime forces in the early years following World War 
II.62  As with Japan’s assistance in the Korean War, information concerning 
training provided by the US Navy was not publicly acknowledged at the time. 
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Auer also served as the Director for Japan Affairs in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense from 1979 - 1988.  While at the Department of Defense in 
the 1980s, James Auer played an important role in the development and 
implementation of a division of responsibilities between the US Navy and the 
JMSDF for protecting the sea lines of communication in the northwest Pacific.  
The establishment of a division of roles and responsibilities was a key turning 
point for the Japan-US naval relationship and its institutionalisation because it 
meant that the JMSDF was becoming an involved alliance partner, sharing risks 
and working with the US Navy against the growing Soviet naval threat in the 
Northwest Pacific.63
Another scholar, Peter J. Woolley, picked up where Auer left off in 1971, 
although not from an exclusively historical perspective.  Woolley examines 
Japan’s naval development and policies, including the cultural, legal and 
political challenges that surrounded decisions concerning the growth, 
development and deployment of the JMSDF during the period 1971-2000. 
Although his focus is clearly on the JMSDF and not on its relationship with the 
US Navy, he does address the relationship in various contexts.  A notable part of 
his work concerns Japan’s cultural predilection for kata, or form, and its 
relevance to JMSDF development and operations.64   
Published in 2006, Euan Graham’s comprehensive study of Japan’s 
sealane security highlights JMSDF activity, particularly in sealane defence, and 
the political forces that helped drive it.  Graham relates Japan’s sealane security 
to the broader, historical context of its defence policy, alliance relations and 
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national strategy.  The JMSDF-USN relationship is not a primary focus of 
Graham’s work, even though various aspects of the relationship are discussed in 
several parts of his study.65
Relatively little information exists in the literature concerning factors 
that may have influenced the Japan-US naval relationship, such as the nature of 
the threat and domestic politics in Japan and the United States.  The subject of 
external influence is discussed extensively in the context of the Japan-US 
security relationship, but there is no indication as to whether these same factors 
apply to the naval relationship.  This thesis examines some of these unanswered 
questions through an examination of pertinent archival documents, many of 
which were formerly classified, such as cable traffic and memoranda between 
the US Embassy in Tokyo and the US Departments of Defense and State in 
Washington.  In addition, the Command Histories from the US Pacific Command 
and the US Pacific Fleet provide additional information that is not available 
from other sources.  These primary source documents provide unique insights 
into various facets of this relationship, such as threat perceptions, domestic 
politics, and the sharing of sensitive military information and technology 




The Japan-US naval relationship has not received the academic attention 
it deserves.  Scholars have typically focussed either on the Japanese Navy or the 
US Navy, but few have examined the relationship between the two navies, 
including operational interaction and cooperation.  Of all the US military 
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branches represented in Japan, the US Navy has maintained the closest 
relationship with its counterpart, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, with 
members of the US Navy even helping to re-establish a naval organisation in 
Japan not long after World War II.  Significant in this relationship in the early 
days has been the role of particular people, such as Admiral Arleigh Burke, and 
certain Japanese admirals who recognised the importance of the relationship, 
based on their personal and operational experience, and helped move it 
forward.  While the 'bonds of seamanship' may have helped re-establish the 
relationship after World War II and helped maintain it, the existing literature 
indicates that both navies were acting out of self-interest and saw mutual 
advantage to a cooperative relationship.  In this regard, the establishment of a 
division of roles and responsibilities was a key turning point for the Japan-US 
naval relationship and its institutionalisation. 
The literature does not provide extensive treatment of the various 
internal and external factors affecting the Japan-US naval relationship.  Certain 
scholars, such as James Auer, provide some perspectives on the early 
relationship, and Peter J. Woolley provides an indication of the role that culture 
may play in the relationship, and Euan Graham identifies Japan and US 
involvement in sealane defence.  Archival documents and interviews with US 
Navy and JMSDF officers provide the best sources of information on the 
JMSDF-USN relationship and the factors affecting its development. 
 
Japan-US Security Relationship and Its Institutionalisation   
 
The Japan-US security relationship provides a key foundation to 
understanding the naval relationship.  Naval cooperation, as with military 
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relations in general, is integrally linked to the broader strategic and political 
environment.  Ultimately, navies are instruments of state policy, and as such, are 
subject to many of the same influences as the nation itself.  There are several 
examples in the twentieth century in which naval cooperation was foiled by 
challenges in the broader political relationship between nations.  The naval 
relationship between Great Britain and Japan during the early part of the 
twentieth century is one such example, as was discussed earlier in this chapter.  
Naval cooperation during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 is another example of 
cooperation that was terminated as a result of political forces.66    
Many scholars have written about various aspects of the Japan-US 
security relationship, and bookshelves are filled with sources on this topic—
particularly for the post-Cold War period.67  The literature is both analytical and 
policy prescriptive and provides a better understanding of the environment in 
which the naval relationship operated.68  The thesis views the literature on the 
Japan-US security relationship through the lens of institutionalisation, and as 
such, this provides a way to focus the voluminous material on this topic.   
Although the term 'institutionalisation' is not often used to describe 
aspects of the relationship, the progress toward institutionalisation is evident 
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through various ‘markers’ highlighting important events in the alliance 
relationship.  The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between 
Japan and the United States marked the beginning of a relatively loose bilateral 
alliance relationship.  As such, Article V of the bilateral Security Treaty commits 
the United States to assisting Japan should it be threatened or attacked, and 
Article VI grants the US military use of bases and facilities in Japan as a means 
of providing for the peace and stability of the Far East region.  However, under 
the Treaty both Japan and the United States assume an obligation to maintain 
and develop capabilities to resist armed attack in common and to assist each 
other in case of armed attack on territories under Japanese administration.69   
The alliance began a very gradual move toward institutionalisation.  
Scholars and defence practitioners note that the United States and Japan were 
initially satisfied with very limited formal institutionalisation.  The alliance 
created a limited consultative structure under Article IV of the treaty.  While 
there was never a formal secretariat, there were two consultative committees, 
the Security Consultative Committee and the Security Subcommittee that 
provided what analyst considered to be a ‘superficial dialogue’ that generally 
avoided difficult or bilaterally contentious subjects.70  
Both the initial formation of the Japan-US security alliance and its 
gradual institutionalisation was a practical decision that supported specific 
interests in both countries.  For the United States, the alliance was an important 
part of its global containment of communism.  The alliance became part of a 
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broader network of bilateral and multilateral relationships that included NATO; 
the Australia, New Zealand, US alliance; the Southeast Asian Treaty 
Organization; the Central Treaty Organization; and bilateral alliances with the 
Philippines, South Korea, and others.  Most of the US alliance relationships, 
including the alliance with Japan, provided the United States with military bases 
in important strategic areas of the world.  The United States hoped that the 
alliance would stabilise Japan against communist subversion and would allow 
Japan to focus on economic and political development.  Similarly, the United 
States was able to oversee Japan’s ‘rearmament,’ which helped reassure regional 
neighbours that Japan would peacefully reintegrate into the global political and 
economic systems.71
Nevertheless, this is a unique alliance relationship.  The Japanese 
constitution, written with major assistance from the United States and ratified in 
1947, states in Article 9 that the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes.  It further states that land, sea and air forces, as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained and that the right of belligerency 
of the state will not be recognised.72  In 1952, when the US Congress ratified the 
peace treaty that formally ended the US occupation of Japan, it also ratified the 
Japan-US Security Treaty, which allowed the US military to continue using 
important bases in Japan for the defence of the Far East and to intervene in 
Japan to put down internal disturbances should the Japanese government 
request assistance.  As previously discussed, the creation of a 75,000 ‘National 
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Police Reserve’ was the result of US pressure that led to a rearmament of sorts 
in Japan at this time, as the United States found itself increasingly stretched 
with security commitments throughout the world, including the Korean War. 
Japan’s alliance with the United States was based on its realistic 
assessment of the geopolitical landscape and its domestic aspirations--social, 
political and economic.  As the decades proceeded, the growing Soviet military 
threat and Japan’s vulnerability became more evident and was acknowledged in 
official Japanese government publications, such as the Defense Agency's annual 
white papers.  The fear of possible abandonment by the United States was a 
serious concern to Japanese policymakers when, after the Vietnam War, the 
United States began to withdraw forces from Asia and reposition them in other 
parts of the world.  In 1976, when an undetected Soviet MIG-25 landed in 
Northern Japan flown by a pilot seeking asylum, Japan recognised its 
vulnerability to other potentially hostile aircraft.73  As a consequence, developing 
ways—institutionally—to ensure continued US military presence in the region 
became very important to Japan.   
As the Soviet threat increased in the latter 1970s and early 1980s, the 
United States recognised the advantages of closer association and cooperation 
with Japan because it also meant greater access to bases and other support in 
Japan.  The United States needed these facilities to help prosecute the Soviet 
threat in the Northwest Pacific.  Eventually, in the 1980s, the United States came 
to realise that Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force’s anti-submarine warfare 
expertise was a valuable asset and unprecedented cooperation between the two               
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navies continued for the decade.74  Literature on the security relationship 
indicates that there was no strong coordination between the US and Japanese 
military forces during the early years of the alliance relationship.  The alliance 
was frequently characterised as ‘designed to administer bases but not to fight.’75  
Naval cooperation, however, appeared to be an exception.  Daily cooperation 
between US and Japanese forces was known to be ‘…severely circumscribed, 
and reasonably effective only at sea (out of sight, out of mind).’76  Prime Minister 
Suzuki’s pledge in 1981 for Japan to assume sealane defence out to 1,000 miles 
further encouraged Japan-US naval cooperation.  Scholars and defence 
practitioners have not done a more detailed comparison of operational 
mechanics associated with the naval relationship and the other military services. 
Primary source documents from the US Naval Archives provide unique 
insights into various facets of this relationship, such as the sharing of sensitive 
military information and technology between the US Navy and the JMSDF, and 
the extent to which the naval relationship affected the broader security 
relationship and vice versa.  The documents provide some evidence of the split 
in the US Government’s approach to Japan and the role that key civilian figures, 
such as US Senator Mike Mansfield, played in the naval and broader security 
relationship.  Senator Mike Mansfield served as US Ambassador to Japan from 
1977-1989.  His role as a strong advocate of the Japan-US relationship, in the 
midst of heated battles over trade and defence burdensharing, is well 
documented. 
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These documents highlight Mansfield’s interactions with the US Navy 
concerning the Navy’s decision not to release certain sensitive military 
information and technology to the JMSDF.  In the late 1970s, the Navy’s 
submarine community, as well as senior Navy leadership in Washington, was 
particularly concerned about protecting US Navy technology that enabled the 
Navy to detect increasingly quiet Soviet submarines. Primary source documents 
provide this information and highlight other US government differences with the 
US Navy.  These issues are discussed further in Chapter 2.  The material 
highlights three important findings: firstly, the differences, and ultimately 
inequities, in the Japan-US naval relationship compared with other US naval 
relationships, such as within NATO, regarding the sharing of sensitive 
information and technology; secondly, the internal conflict within the US Navy 
concerning the nature and extent of information that should be shared with 
Japan (and the JMSDF in particular); and thirdly, the contradictions between 
official statements made by senior US officials in Washington concerning their 
desire for improved cooperation with the Japanese defence forces and the 
importance of the alliance relationship—and what was really happening behind 
the scenes in the naval relationship. 
The years immediately following the end of the Cold War were 
tumultuous ones for the alliance relationship as the United States and Japan 
worked to redefine their alliance in the absence of the Soviet threat and in the 
midst of other domestic and external challenges.  The first alliance challenge--
the diplomatic repercussions from the 1991 Gulf War--struck a strong blow to 
the Japan-US security relationship in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.  
Japan's $13 billion contribution to the war effort was dismissed outside Japan as 
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‘checkbook diplomacy’ without human contribution.77  Japan learned a hard 
lesson through this experience and ensured that it provided a physical presence 
on the ground in later international crises and peacekeeping operations during 
the decade of the 1990s.  Soon after the 1991Gulf war, the Japanese government 
submitted the UN Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill to the Diet for 
approval.  The government stressed the importance of making international 
contributions and eventually sent its Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia in 1992 
and to Mozambique in 1993. 
This watershed event and its implications sparked a surge of writing on 
the part of scholars and other alliance specialists.78  However, few have written 
about this seminal event in terms of the naval relationship, even though Japan’s 
naval assets were the primary Japanese defence units deployed after the war.  
While the Japan-US security relationship encountered a significant setback 
when the Japanese government turned down the US request for defence support 
during the Gulf War, there is no indication in the literature as to whether the 
naval relationship was similarly affected.   
In addition to the Gulf War, a series of other factors in the early and mid-
1990s served to shake up and eventually reinvigorate the security relationship 
and its institutionalisation. In Japan, the response to the Gulf War, combined 
with domestic political changes and the collapse of the 'bubble economy', called 
into question Japan's role and power in a new era as well as the military 
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operability of the Japan-US alliance. With the demise of the Soviet Union toward 
the end of 1991, Japan's defence policy-making organisations were faced with 
the most fragile conditions in the early 1990s, according to one Japanese 
scholar.  Without a formidable national security threat, Japan lost one of its key 
rationales for the existence of the Self-Defense Forces and the presence of US 
forces in Japan.79  Further, North Korea’s nuclear developments in 1993-1994 
brought into question Japan’s capability to take meaningful joint action with US 
forces, if a war broke out on the Korean Peninsula.  In spite of its shared 
concerns about North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program, Japan 
found itself politically hesitant and militarily incapable of supporting US 
attempts to apply military pressure on North Korea.80   
At about the same time, certain Japan specialists in Washington, DC, 
were concerned that a more ‘independent Japan’ was emerging because they 
saw evidence that Japan had placed priority on a multilateral security 
framework over the Japan-US alliance.   As part of their evidence, these officials 
pointed to a 1993 draft report of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues.  The 
officials pointed to the fact that in the table of contents of this report, Japan’s 
multilateral interests were identified and discussed first, followed by a 
discussion of the Japan-US security alliance.81  A critical event for the Japan-US 
security relationship, which signalled the need to strengthen the alliance 
structure, concerned a tragic incident in 1995 in which US Marines raped a 
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schoolgirl in Okinawa.  As a result, the United States faced strong anti-US and 
anti-base sentiments, particularly in Okinawa.82   
These events, combined with a series of new threats at the end of the 
Cold War, served eventually to help reinvigorate the alliance and its 
institutionalisation.  Significant amongst the regional threats during this decade 
included the North Korea nuclear developments in 1993-1994, Chinese missile 
tests across the Taiwan Straits in 1996—an effort to intimidate Taipei before 
elections and signal the People's Liberation Army's readiness to use force if 
necessary to prevent Taiwanese independence; and the North Korean 
Taepodong missile launch over Japanese airspace in 1998.  Michael Green states 
that the 1996 Chinese missile tests had the effect of elevating the 1996 Clinton-
Hashimoto declaration to a 'strategic' initiative and provided additional 
inducement for the United States and Japan to complete the new Defense 
Cooperation Guidelines.  While the Guidelines were completed in 1997, they had 
not been approved by the respective legislatures.  US officials expected a long-
term delay in Japan due to the entrenched interests and the power of the 
regional districts that would be responsible for implementing cooperation 
agreements between the United States and Japan, but the 1998 missile launch 
served to speed these decisions in Japan.83      
Japan and the United States had been engaged in missile defence 
dialogues since the early 1980s, but the efforts were politically driven—largely 
aimed to ameliorate tensions in bilateral political and economic relations.  In the 
early 1990s, the politically-driven approach shifted to a threat-driven approach 
as the Iraqi use of short-range Scud ballistic missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, 
coupled with the North Korean test of the Nodong missile in the Sea of Japan in 
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1993, presented evidence of the threat to the Japan-US alliance from theatre 
ballistic missiles.  The Japan-US Theater Missile Defense Working Group met 
throughout the 1990s, but it was not until 1998 that Japan agreed to participate 
in cooperative technological research with the United States.  Missile defence 
would require new and unprecedented levels of political and operational 
cooperation and coordination between the United States and Japan and 
between their respective defence forces and as such would contribute to the 
institutionalisation of the security relationship.  The key relationship for 
coordination would be between the two navies, given the shipboard deployment 
of the missile systems.84     
Not all Japan scholars and defence specialists agree about the extent to 
which new security threats and challenges bolstered alliance relations and 
promoted security cooperation and increased alliance institutionalisation.  For 
example, institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, argue that the end of the Cold 
War did not eliminate cohesion and stability amongst the industrial 
democracies, as discussed earlier.  This postwar order was reinforced but not 
caused by the Cold War, according to Ikenberry.  Ikenberry does not discuss 
alliance security initiatives in the context of relations with Japan nor does he 
address the security challenges created by the Chinese and North Korean 
missile launches and nuclear developments in the post-Cold War environment.85 
Proving causal linkages is always a difficult task.  Nevertheless, the predominant 
literature seems to indicate that the compilation of the security challenges 
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involving China and North Korea had an important role in moving the alliance to 
a higher level of cooperation. 
  
 Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines (1978 and 1997) 
 
One of the initial formal markers of institutionalisation was the 1978 
Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation.86  The Guidelines were significant 
because they constituted the first time that the alliance addressed the issue of 
Japan-US defence cooperation—publicly—other than in the bilateral Security 
Treaty, as noted above.  The Guidelines called for joint studies on operational 
issues in three areas: prevention of aggression against Japan, responses to 
military attacks on Japan, and Japan-US cooperation in case of a conflict in the 
Far East.  One of the key studies, with implications for the two navies, 
concerned sealane defence and the operational requirements of this mission.  
The issue raised by this more controversial study was how ‘joint’ US and 
Japanese military operations would be.87
Most scholars and defence practitioners concede that the Guidelines did 
not immediately result in new operational advances and activities, but it is 
generally acknowledged that the Guidelines set in motion a process of joint 
studies and exercises based on the notion of ‘functional integration of 
operations’ versus what had previously been a geographical division of labour 
that restricted Japan’s Self-Defense Force operations to Japanese territory and 
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US military operations beyond.  That said, however, the alliance waited 
approximately two decades before the issue of operations outside of Japan 
could be discussed openly and honestly, due to domestic political constraints in 
Japan.88
A variety of opinions exist concerning the relevance of the 1978 Defense 
Guidelines for the naval relationship.  One perspective maintains that the US 
and Japanese navies had been cooperating since the 1950s and as such did not 
really need the 1978 Defense Guidelines for effective cooperation.89 Others, 
however, have regarded the Guidelines as an opportunity to provide some 
written guidelines and legitimacy to a relationship that had very little formality, 
agreements, or commitments.90  The Guidelines, combined with the political 
commitment made by Prime Minister Suzuki for Japan to assume responsibility 
for sealane defence out to 1,000 miles from Japan, were key elements in the 
institutionalisation of the relationship. 
Just as the 1978 US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines were an initial 
marker for alliance institutionalisation, the revised Guidelines, finalised in 1997, 
marked a step forward in enhancing the security relationship and its 
institutionalisation.  The new Guidelines also provided a subtle shift from 
geographically specific commitments to 'situational definitions' for dealing with 
regional contingencies in areas surrounding Japan.91  Japan’s role and 
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commitment, as defined by the Guidelines, were still confined to non-combat, 
rear area functions.  (Chapter 4 provides additional details concerning the 1997 
Guidelines.)  The literature is not explicit about the significance of the 1997 
Guidelines to the naval relationship or to any of the service relationships, for 
that matter.  An assessment of the extent to which the Guidelines facilitated 
naval operations is generally only found in interviews with Japanese and US 
naval and/or defence officials and analysis of defence documents, which this 




Many scholars have written about various aspects of the Japan-US 
security relationship.  As such, the literature provides useful background to 
understand the environment in which the naval relationship and its 
institutionalisation developed.  Although the term ‘institutionalisation’ is not 
often used to describe aspects of the relationship, the progress toward 
institutionalisation is evident through various ‘markers’ highlighting important 
events in the alliance relationship.   
As with the naval relationship, a variety of external factors played 
important roles in influencing the security alliance, including external threat and 
other alliance crises, domestic politics, and particular people.  There is a general 
consensus in the literature that security threats generated by the Soviet Union 
helped drive the relationship during the Cold War.  In the post-Cold War a 
variety of accumulating regional threats helped Japan, in particular, see the 
advantages of increased defence cooperation with the United States.  As such, 
these security challenges were also instrumental in the gradual 
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institutionalisation of the alliance.  The key markers for alliance 
institutionalisation during this period were the 1978 and 1997 US-Japan Defense 
Cooperation Guidelines and Prime Minister Suzuki’s sealane defence 
commitment.  The Guidelines helped to facilitate cooperation once the two 
countries had recognised it was in their national interest to do so.  The 
Guidelines did not on their own lead to defence cooperation.  For the navies, 
both sets of Guidelines provided ‘legitimacy’ to the cooperation that had already 
been ongoing in the naval relationships.   
 
Culture and Societal Issues 
 
Culture and society have played an important role in international affairs 
and strategic studies literature, particularly since the end of the Cold War.  It is a 
topic that cannot be avoided when discussing security relations between a 
Western and a non-Western nation and as such is relevant to this thesis.  As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, even naval practitioners acknowledge the 
importance of culture and societal issues in terms of their effect on the ability of 
navies to operate effectively together and to institutionalise their respective 
naval relationships.92  Stephen Peter Rosen has cautioned, however, that efforts 
to understand the relevance of cultural differences for strategy have sometimes 
resulted in people jumping to the conclusion that differences in military 
behaviour and outlook are related to cultural differences—whereas after careful 
assessment, they turn out to be either non-existent or just as plausibly explained  
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by non-cultural factors.93
In the social sciences, there are many types of culture—political, 
national, organisational, strategic—as well as other types used in the 
anthropology and sociology disciplines.  While many have argued over the 
meanings and subtleties of these various terms, they share three common 
elements:  1) Culture is shared—that is, it is a collective phenomenon; 2) culture 
is transmitted—it constitutes a social heritage, linking one generation to 
another; 3) Culture is learned—it is not a straightforward result of people’s 
genetic constitutions.  Once programmed, however, it is not easily altered.94
‘Political’ culture was advanced by various members of the political 
science community, such as Sidney Verba and Lucian Pye, in the mid-1960s.95  
Lucian Pye discusses political culture in an Asian context and notes that Asian 
societies share orientations toward authority that significantly differ from those 
held in the West, taking a more passive view toward power.  He notes that in 
most parts of Asia, possession of power is viewed more as a way of avoiding 
having to make a decision—and in fact ‘security lies in having no choices to 
make’.96
‘Strategic’ culture grew out of a need to explain differences in the military 
behaviour of people from European and non-European cultures.  It is applied to 
political-military decision-makers to capture the beliefs and assumptions that 
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frame their decisions about national and international security issues.   Strategic 
culture holds that different countries and regions approach the key issues of 
war, peace, and strategy from perspectives that are both distinctive, and deeply 
rooted, reflecting their different geostrategic situations, resources, history, 
military experience and political beliefs.97
Stephen Rosen focuses primarily on the way in which social structures 
affect military power by studying the dominant social structures of a country 
and the extent to which the military organisations are similar to or different 
from their society.98  In the process, he identifies two principles that are 
important for this thesis.  Firstly, organisations such as the military have some 
ability to isolate their members from society and to develop internal structures 
that govern their members and that may differ from those found in the society 
as a whole.  Secondly, military organisations will be less likely to reflect the 
structures of society as a whole the smaller and more isolated the military 
organisations are relative to society.  He contends that the military, as is the 
case with the church, is a closed, highly organised institution, and as such might 
not resemble its host society as much as other organisations in a particular 
country.  Concerning navies in particular, Rosen contends that the general 
norms and social structures are less likely to affect them (and air forces), which 
are both strongly influenced by the nature of their tasks.99  In addition to Rosen’s 
work, the notion of a ‘strategic personality’, is also relevant to this discussion.  
According to the concept, a state’s historical experience shapes how it sees 
itself, how it views the outside world and how it makes its strategic decisions.  
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The concept has been most frequently used in the context of threats caused by 
weapons of mass destruction proliferation.  In light of Rosen’s work, Japan’s 
‘strategic personality’ is likely different than that of the JMSDF.100
Alastair Johnson warns of the dangers of misusing strategic culture as an 
analytic tool because ‘done badly’ it could reinforce stereotypes about the 
strategic predispositions of other states.  In particular, he warns that care 
should be taken regarding the Asia-Pacific region, ‘an area where US images of 
the "other" have been rife with stereotyped generalisations about particular 
strategic “styles” ’.  It is also an area, he contends, where there have been few 
rigorous behavioural analyses about propositions concerning strategic culture.101  
Colin Gray’s work on strategic culture focuses primarily on the US-Soviet 
relationship.  Of particular relevance to this study of Japan-US naval relations is 
his contention that national differences in strategic culture rarely move the US 
government to take explicit account of how these differences could potentially 
affect policy goals and methods.102
In his 1999 book on Cultures of Antimilitarism, Thomas Berger states that 
Japan's deeply ingrained culture of antimilitarism has imposed powerful 
constraints on the kinds of policies its leaders have chosen to pursue.103  
According to Berger, the power of cultural forces was particularly evident at 
critical junctures in post-war history when a variety of equally plausible options 
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seemed available to policy makers.  At such times, according to Berger, Japan 
invariably opted for policies that were most consistent with established anti-
military patterns of behaviour.  Without these conditions, Japan-US defence 
cooperation in training and military planning, which began in 1978, could have 
been initiated at a much earlier date, according to Berger.104 While Thomas 
Berger discusses the effect of Japan’s culture of antimilitarism on the Japan-US 
security relationship, he unfortunately does not discuss the implications for the 
individual service relationships, including the naval relationship, and whether or 
not they follow a similar pattern as the security relationship. 
Peter Katzenstein has also written about culture and national security in 
several of his books. In 1996, for example, he published a large volume on this 
subject, the result of a project that gathered participants from Cornell 
University, the University of Minnesota and Stanford University.  Katzenstein, 
Elizabeth Kier, Alastair Johnston and other scholars who contribute to the 
volume provide a sociological perspective on the politics of national security 
and argue that security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural 
factors.  The term ‘culture’ is invoked as a broad label that denotes collective 
models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law.105  In 
critiquing this study, Nicholas Onuf argues that it is built on weak definitions of 
norms, identity and culture and that it does not satisfy the needs of other 
scholars who are interested in executing case studies.106  The volume 




104 As noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, naval cooperation occurred before 1978.  However, 
progress in the institutionalisation of this cooperation did not begin to occur until the late 1970s, 
the time period noted by Berger, when the Japanese civilian leadership recognised that it was in 
Japan's best interest to increase its cooperation on defence-related issues with the United 
States. Further, as noted in Chapter 2, the 1978 Defense Guidelines also provided a degree of 
legitimacy to ongoing naval cooperation.  See Berger, pp. 193-197. 
105 Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 6.  See also Cultura  Norms and 
Na onal Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
106 The critique of Katzenstein's collection comes from Nicholas Onuf, ‘The New Culture of 
Security Studies,’ a book review in Mershon International Studies Rev ew 42 (1998), pp. 132-134. 
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nevertheless provides new perspectives that may be useful to scholars and 
practitioners examining Japan's national security environment. 
In one of the articles in the Katzenstein volume, Thomas Berger argues 
that while there will continue to be incremental shifts in Japan’s defence and 
national security policy, a dramatic shift from the core principles of its political-
military culture is likely only if there is a major shock to the system that 
persuades Japan's leaders that their approach to defence and national security 
has been wrong.107  Japan’s national security policy changes in response to the 11 
September 2001 terrorist activities, and the nearly overnight decision to deploy 
JMSDF forces to the Indian Ocean in the fall of 2001 represented a significant 
shift in Japan’s foreign and security policies.  However, the policy shift came not 
as a result of a direct attack or danger to Japan—as Berger predicted--but rather 
from a realistic appraisal of Japanese national interests and its relationship with 
the United States, in light of lessons learned after the 1991 Gulf War when 
Japanese forces did not deploy to the Middle East.  The effect of 11 September 
2001 on the Japan-US naval relationship and the security relationship will be 
discussed further in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Discussion of ‘organisational’ culture is particularly helpful in explaining 
differences in military behaviour between nations, and this relates closely to the 
topic of this thesis.  Elizabeth Kier defines organisational culture as ‘the set of 
basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings and the forms 
or practices whereby the meanings are expressed, affirmed, and communicated 
to the members of an organisation’.108   She maintains that a military’s 
organisational culture is not equivalent to the national character.  Further, while 
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the military’s culture may reflect some aspects of the civilian society’s culture, 
the military’s powerful assimilation processes can displace the influence of the 
civilian society.  Second, Kier argues that while all military organisations can be 
classified according to a basic set of components, not all military organisations 
share the same mixture of values and attitudes.  As such, this affects how they 
respond to constraints set by civilian policymakers, and explains choices 
between offensive and defensive military doctrines.109  
Kier does not address navies and their organisational culture in her study, 
but her broader assessments of military organisations are useful when 
examining international naval relationships.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
a popular perception of navies is that living and operating at sea creates a strong 
fraternal bond that unites all naval personnel who share similar professional 
concerns.110 Kier’s work is a useful reminder that while military organisations, 
including navies, may share a certain amount of common values and attitudes 
with their fellow services in other countries, their organisational culture is likely 
influenced by a range of domestic and other factors. 
The unique elements of the JMSDF are identified in work by Peter J. 
Woolley, who highlights the kata factor as an element of influence that has been 
overlooked when scholars and analysts attempt to explain the low profile of 
Japan’s military contributions to Western security.  According to Woolley, kata, 
or ‘form’, means a clear preference to act only after careful planning and 
rehearsal.  It is emphasised in every endeavour, in stark contrast to the US 
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aspects of problems associated with living and operating at sea creates a strong fraternal bond 
that unites all naval personnel who share similar professional concerns.  See Sokolsky, The 
Fra ernity of the Blue Uniform. 
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predilection for improvisation and innovation.111  In his work on the JMSDF, 
Woolley identifies how the kata factor has affected JMSDF operations, and 
particularly its preparation for deployment to the Persian Gulf in April 1991 for 
minesweeping operations, at the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, in 
which the JMSDF took a series of incremental steps to prepare for an eventual 
deployment.  Woolley’s contribution is unique because he addresses the 
operational implications of kata for the JMSDF.  Woolley, however, did not take 
his analysis a step further to examine the effect of kata on the broader Japan-US 
naval relationship.  The clash between the inherent flexibility of navies and the 
cultural predilection in Japan toward ‘form’ cannot be ignored.  Scholarship 
would benefit from a further examination of this relationship, in light of the 




The academic work discussed in this section provides different 
perspectives that can help explain the relationship that developed between the 
US Navy and the JMSDF in the latter part of the twentieth century.  Much has 
been written about Japan’s unique transition from a military-oriented nation 
during and prior to World War II to a more pacifist nation after the war.  Few 
have examined the transition of the JMSDF and its post-World War II relations 
with the US Navy.  The studies have shed some light on this issue, but no one 
has conducted a thorough examination of this relationship from a cultural 
perspective.  Nevertheless, in their discussions of political, strategic, national 
                                                 
t ll
111 Peter J. Woolley, Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc: 2000), pp. 25-26, and Peter J. Woolley and Commander (USN) Mark S. Woolley, 
‘The Ka a of Japan’s Naval Forces,’ Naval War Co ege Review, pp. 59-69. 
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and organisational culture, various scholars help establish a valuable foundation 
for examining the unique Japan-US naval relationship. 
In his discussion of strategic culture, Stephen Peter Rosen maintains that 
military organisations are closed and highly organised institutions that might not 
resemble their host society as much as other organisations in the same country.  
He further notes that navies, unlike armies, are less likely to be influenced by 
norms and social structures.  Alastair Johnson cautions not to overuse strategic 
culture as an analytic tool, particularly concerning military forces in the Asia-
Pacific region, to avoid reinforcing stereotypes about 'strategic styles'.  Thomas 
Berger, in his specific focus on Germany and Japan, maintains that Japan's 
deeply ingrained culture of antimilitarism has imposed powerful constraints on 
the kinds of policies its leaders have chosen to pursue, including the start of a 
more cooperative defence relationship with the United States.  Elizabeth Kier 
points out that while all military organisations can be classified according to a 
basic set of components, not all military organisations share the same mixture 
of values and attitudes and in fact are influenced by a range of domestic and 
other factors.   
Kier and other scholars provide useful perspectives concerning culture 
and security relationships, and each one provides useful potential insights for a 
further examination of the Japan-US naval relationship.  However, the cultural 




As identified in this chapter, the Japan-US naval relationship is 
understudied.  Scholars have typically focussed on the Japanese Navy, the US 
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Navy or the Japan-US security relationship.  Naval cooperation has been 
discussed primarily in operational terms, chiefly in professional journals and 
other similar publications.  Similarly, institutionalisation is a relatively common 
concept in international relations and some scholars have used it in the context 
of security alliances, but very little has been written about the 
institutionalisation of military relationships—particularly military relationships 
outside of NATO.  Scholars and defence practitioners have provided a useful 
foundation for the examination of naval cooperation and institutionalisation, but 
many questions remain unanswered, as indicated in this chapter. 
Despite the relative sparcity of academic literature on the Japan-US naval 
relationship and its institutionalisation, existing literature on related topics is 
nevertheless useful and provides a valuable foundation for an examination of 
the relationship in this thesis and contributes to the establishment of a 
framework for analysis.  In this regard, sets of criteria for measuring 
institutional development have been created using various case studies, albeit 
non-military in orientation.  Other scholars and naval practitioners have 
examined the concept of naval cooperation and as such have developed criteria 
for effective naval cooperation.  Although the concepts of cooperation and 
institutionalisation share much in common, the literature indicates that 
‘institutionalisation’ requires a deeper connection than ‘cooperation’.  As such, 
institutionalisation recognises the necessity for common norms.  This is not a 
requirement in a cooperative relationship, although common language and 
culture are recognised as contributing to more effective cooperation.   
Common interests, including a shared threat perception, have been the 
basis for initiating security cooperation and eventually institutionalisation in 
alliance relationships.  This is the case for security alliance relationships and 
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likely also naval relationships.  There is no clear consensus from the literature 
as to whether external factors, such as threats, are needed for the continued 
institutionalisation of security alliance relationships and naval relationships.  
However, based on work by one scholar, the answer might lie in the bilateral or 
multilateral nature of security alliances.  As such, the nature of the bilateral 
Japan-US security alliance may likely have contributed to weaker 
institutionalisation in the alliance relationship.  As a result, a security threat may 
have been needed for further progress in institutionalisation. 
This literature review also highlights reoccurring and cross-cutting 
themes that are useful in an examination of the Japan-US naval relationship and 
identifies where there is a lack of clarity and consensus:  1) Despite the 
international ‘bonds of seamanship’, navies are instruments of state policy and 
as such are subject to many of the same influences as the nation itself.  
Evidence exists, however, that navies act out of self-interest and engage in 
cooperative relationships when there are mutual advantages to doing so.  2) The 
1978 and 1997 Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines, the commitment 
made by Prime Minister Suzuki for Japan to assume sealane defense out to 1000 
miles, as well as other government-to-government agreements helped facilitate 
cooperation and progress toward greater institutionalisation.  In the case of the 
naval relationship, in particular, these agreements appear to have provided 
‘legitimacy’ to the relationship and to ongoing naval cooperation. 3) Culture and 
societal issues are important factors that can affect military cooperation and 
institutionalisation.  They can help facilitate cooperation and institutionalisation 
in cases where similar culture and language exists and can slow progress when 
major differences are present.  However, neither the professional nor the 
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academic literature addresses whether the significance of culture and societal 
issues recedes as cooperation and interaction between navies increases.  
 
Research Design and Analytical Framework   
 
This thesis is concerned with the Japan-US naval relationship from 1976 
through 2001 and the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained 
its development and institutionalisation.  Just as there are advantages to 
institutionalised alliance relationships, similarly, military relationships also 
benefit from institutionalisation because it contributes to improved bureaucratic 
coordination, interoperability of systems, equipment and doctrine and 
coordination of procedures and operations.  Inevitably, this leads to more 
effective military operations.   
The central argument in this thesis is that operational cooperation 
between the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in response to 
a mutually acknowledged threat promotes institutionalisation in the 
relationship.  While numerous factors have contributed to the development and 
institutionalisation of the naval relationship, operational cooperation is the 
significant factor that binds the navies together and prompts them to establish 
and/or strengthen institutional links.  Operating under challenging conditions, 
navies recognise that they need to create a system and institute a set of rules to 
coordinate and harmonise their activities and operations.  As such, a dynamic is 
created in which cooperation encourages institutionalisation, which in turn 
facilitates additional cooperation.  If navies only cooperate periodically in joint 
exercises for broadly stated yet unspecific security reasons, the 
institutionalisation process likely will occur much more slowly compared with 
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cooperation against a mutual security threat.  This argument turns on its head 
the international organisation theories of certain other scholars who view 
institutionalisation as a requirement for effective cooperation in their particular 
studies.112
 
Two interrelated sets of questions are pursued in the thesis: 
 
1.  What are the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained the 
development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship during 
the period 1976 - 2001? 
2.  What is the relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation in this 




The thesis is designed primarily as an empirical study that provides 
insights on the development of the Japan-US naval relationship and its 
institutionalisation from 1976 through 2001.  Institutionalisation, as used in this 
thesis, is defined as the development of systems, structures, procedures and 
practices that enhance cooperation between navies and ultimately contributes 
to a more integrative naval relationship.  The progress toward 
institutionalisation highlights the key dynamics in the Japan-US naval 
relationship over a 25-year period. 
                                                 
112 In his work on the European Union, Michael Smith, for example, states that 
institutionalisation helps promote greater international cooperation within the European Union.  
Smith treats institutionalisation as the independent variable and cooperation as the dependent 
variable.  Other academics identify institutionalisation as promoting cooperation but do not go 
as far as Smith in formalising this relationship in a model of international cooperation and 
characterising it as part of a dynamic process between cooperation and institutionalisation.  See 
Michael E. Smith, pp. 25-32. 
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 The thesis uses an analytical framework to obtain a clearer 
understanding of how the Japan-US naval relationship developed and changed 
and the key factors that drove and constrained the institutionalisation process.  
The framework is built around the four elements that characterise 
institutionalisation in a naval relationship, as defined by this thesis:  internal 
coordination, operational interaction, institutional depth and external linkages.  
Using a mapping technique, the thesis tracks the institutional changes in the 
naval relationship and the various factors that influenced these changes, at three 
points during this 25-year period: 1976-1981, 1986-1991 and 1996-2001.  
‘Mapping’ is a useful tool used principally in policy analysis to compare 
empirical data over periods of time through a structured approach.  It is also 
used as a way to analyse policy making processes.113  In this thesis, the approach 
provides a systematic way to examine changes in the nature of the Japan-US 
naval relationship over three points in time, using the four elements that 
characterise institutionalisation.  As such, the approach is a key tool to help 
identify the dynamics that have driven and/or constrained the development and 
institutionalisation of the relationship.  This examination, and the quantitative 
and qualitative data that emerges from it, lays the foundation for a better 
understanding of the role of cooperation and institutionalisation, and the 
interplay between them, in this particular naval relationship. 
                                                 
I t
113 Three papers were particularly useful in the development of the mapping process for this 
thesis:   Thomas J. Volgy, Elizabeth Fausett, Keith Grant, Joanna Detamore and Stuart Rodgers, 
‘Mapping the World Order: Participation in Regional Global Intergovernmental Organizations’, 
prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 2006. 
(The paper identifies the post Cold-War web of global international organizations in 2004 and 
compares it to 1975 and 1989 in the Cold War period.)  Katarina Staronova, ‘Analysis of the 
Policy Making Process in Slovakia’, International Policy Fellow research paper, Woodrow 
Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 2003. (The paper tracks the policy making process in Slovakia 
from a descriptive and normative perspective.)  Etel Solingen, ‘Mapping Internationalization: 
Domestic and Regional Impacts’, nternational Studies Quar erly (2001) 45. (The paper maps 
domestic constituencies according to their position regarding international economic and 
security regimes using an aggregation of data from 98 coalitions in 19 states over five regions 
between 1948 and 1993.) 
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The thesis draws on a variety of scholarly literature and related theories 
concerning institutions, alliance relations and naval cooperation.  None of the 
theories associated with this literature specifically addresses the 
institutionalisation of naval relationships or military relationships more broadly.  
They do provide some useful insights concerning the dimensions of 
institutionalisation from an international organisational perspective.  Through 
use of this framework, the thesis fills a void in the literature by expanding the 
understanding of institutionalisation, to include military relations, and the 
various factors that drive and constrain military institutionalisation within a 
non-NATO alliance relationship.   
In designing the analytical framework, the thesis draws primarily on 
work by Michael Smith and Kristin Rafferty, as well as other scholars associated 
with the study of institutions and alliance relations.  They created their own 
frameworks for discussing institutionalisation, and some of their ideas are 
reflected in this thesis.  However, no scholar or defence practitioner has done a 
comprehensive analysis of institutionalisation in military relations.  Michael 
Smith focuses specifically on the institutionalisation of foreign policy making 
within the European Union. He examines the stages of institutional 
development, which he identifies as intergovernmental forums, information-
sharing, norms, organisations and governance.114 Of particular utility to this 
thesis, Smith examines the relationship between cooperation and 
institutionalisation and argues that institutionalisation helps promote greater 
international cooperation.  He maintains that as institutionalised cooperation 
increases, and the outputs and outcomes accumulate over time, a dynamic 
process develops in which the outcomes change from effects into causes as 
                                                 
114 Michael E. Smith, pp. 25-58. 
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actors use them to justify additional institutional changes.  Although this thesis 
argues that for the Japan-US naval relationship, cooperation drives 
institutionalisation—and thus turns Smith’s hypothesis on its head—
nevertheless, his framework for analysis and his discussion of the dynamic 
relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation have contributed to 
the framework of this thesis.   
Kristin Rafferty’s work on the institutionalisation of security alliance 
relationships provides the most relevant work for the analytical framework.  Her 
case studies include both multilateral and bilateral alliances relationships, and 
include the Japan-US security alliance.  Although she does not specifically 
address military relationships within security alliances, her framework for 
analysis provides useful insights for this thesis.  Rafferty identifies the three 
dimensions of institutionalisation as it applies to security alliance 
relationships—policy coordination, institutional breadth and institutional depth.  
This thesis expands on her dimensions of institutionalisation and uses some of 
these elements in the analytical framework.115   
Other scholars, such as John Ikenberry, have identified a series of 
mechanisms and processes that help bind states together:  institutional 
agreements; transgovernmental connections, routines, and coalitions; and 
reinforcing political activities and institutions.  Ikenberry’s framework is useful 
for determining the presence of institutionalisation in international 
organisations, including security alliance relationships—and potentially military-
to-military relationships.116   
                                                 
 115 Kirsten L. Rafferty, Alliances as Institutions: Persistence and Disintegration in Security
Cooperation, November 2000; ‘Institutionalizing Bilateral Security Pacts: An Exploration of the 
Japan-US Alliance’, March 2003 and ‘Quantifying Security Institutions: Creating a Measure of 
Institutionalization’, March 2006. 
116 Ikenberry, pp. 40-42 and 65-69.    
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In constructing the analytical framework, the thesis also considered the 
work by scholars who have studied the relationship between external threats, 
alliance cooperation and institutionalisation.  While their work acknowledges 
the role that threat plays in initiating alliance cooperation, there is no consensus 
on the effect that variations in threat have on alliance cooperation and 
institutionalisation.  Similarly, scholars differ as to the role, if any, of 
institutionalisation in bolstering alliances during periods of transformation and 
varying threat levels.  As an institutionalist, John Ikenberry does not consider 
threat necessary for institutionalisation to continue.  He maintains that in the 
case of the Japan-US alliance, ten years after the end of the Cold War the 
alliance was stable and was adding to its overall institutionalisation.117 Kristin 
Rafferty acknowledges the struggles that the Japan-US security relationship 
encountered when the Cold War ended, but she does not go so far as to say that 
this weaker institutionalisation in the Japan-US security relationship was the 
reason why the alliance struggled in the years immediately following the Cold 
War.118  The evidence she presents, however, does seem to point to the benefits 
of institutionalisation during times of strategic transition, but that there was 
likely less of this institutionalisation in the Japan-US security relationship in the 
years immediately following the Cold War.  
Indeed, this is the conclusion of Geunwook Lee in his work on alliances 
and the determinants of their cooperation.  While Lee does not distinguish 
between bilateral and multilateral alliances, he states that alliances without an 
elaborate institutional structure can crumble easily.  Part of this structure, 
according to Lee, is a well-coordinated military membership, consisting of 
coordinated war plans, exchanged military intelligence and an integrated 
                                                 
117 Ikenberry, pp. 212, 247-250, and 256. 
118 Rafferty, ‘Institutionalizing Bilateral Security Pact’, pp. 12-20. 
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command structure.119  Lee comes the closest of anyone in examining the role of 
institutionalisation in military-to-military relationships.  The variables he 
identifies are consistent with that presented in this thesis. 
While the literature provides valuable perspectives and various ways of 
assessing the institutionalisation process, it is neither sufficient nor completely 
appropriate for an examination of military relationships.  Geoffrey Till's work is 
helpful in this regard as he identifies the political and operational components 
comprising effective naval cooperation.120  Similarly, work by the US Naval War 
College and the Center for Naval Analysis in the United States have identified 
other ways to examine operational cooperation between navies, focussing in 
particular on elements of interoperability.121  Together, these organisations and 
scholars provide useful insights and tools for analysis, from which this thesis 
draws.   Finally, naval practitioners, such as Admiral William Owens (USN-ret), 
have identified the importance of cooperation between navies as an important 
step to building institutional relationships, even if the navies are not part of a 
formal alliance.122  These perspectives from practitioners help build the central 
argument in this thesis that operational cooperation against a mutually 
recognised security threat contributes to institutionalisation in naval 
relationships.  
In this thesis, progress toward institutionalisation constitutes the key 
dynamic in the Japan-US naval relationship during the years 1976 to 2001.  The 
analytical framework used in this thesis, combined with the archival research 
and interviews, brings together a unique approach that highlights the range of 
factors that influence the naval relationship during this period and helps 
                                                 
i ti it119 Lee, Bring ng Institutionalized Coopera on Into Mil ary Affairs, p. 244. 
120 Till, pp. 110-111 and 361-368. 
121 See previous citations from the Center for Naval Analysis, including work by Johnson, 
Kohout, Swartz, Roth, Hirschfeld and Hayes.   
122 Owens, pp. 40-42. 
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facilitate analysis of the progress in naval cooperation and ultimately 
institutionalisation. 
The analytical framework is built around the four elements that 
characterise institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship:  1) internal 
coordination, 2) operational interaction, 3) institutional depth and 4) external 
linkages.  These elements are derived from work by various academics and 
defence professionals, as discussed throughout this chapter, and by interviews 
conducted with US and Japanese naval personnel and defence specialists during 
the course of this work.123  Some of the elements, such as ‘operational 
interaction’, are more quantitative in nature.  Other elements, such as the ‘depth 
of the relationship’, are defined in qualitative terms.  Kristin Rafferty, in 
particular, provides relevant input with her three dimensions of 
institutionalisation, as it applies to security alliance relationships:  policy 
coordination, institutional breadth and institutional depth.  This thesis builds on 
the dimensions identified by Rafferty and adapts them to a naval environment.  
The following four categories provide the principal structure for the mapping 
process.  Each category description also refers to the quantitative and 
qualitative indicators that are used to assess progress in each category. 
 
Internal Coordination:  Internal coordination connotes a structure for 
cooperation and decisionmaking.  This coordination provides the most visible 
evidence of ‘institutionalisation’ because actual coordination structures can be 
identified.  In the context of this thesis, internal coordination is characterised by 
the development of communication mechanisms, procedures and organisational 
                                                 
123 These elements would likely be applicable to other naval relationships as well.  The relative 
ranking and emphasis of the various elements may differ, but overall they represent the 
important elements of a developing naval relationship.  This broader subject, however, is not the 
focus of this thesis.    
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routines—such as regular high-level and other meetings, and the sharing of 
information and intelligence. 
 
Operational Interaction:  Operational interaction helps bind navies together, 
and it is a theme that consistently emerges in naval literature and in the 
interviews conducted for this thesis.  By sharing defence burdens and risks 
through operational deployments that support the national interests of the 
respective countries, a closer naval bond is created.  It is particularly important 
in the context of institutionalisation because it promotes institutional progress 
in the other categories—particularly internal coordination and institutional 
depth.  In the context of the thesis, operational interaction is characterised by 
the nature and extent of joint training and exercises, operational deployments 
and the capability of the forces operating together. 
 
Institutional Depth:  Identifying the depth of an institution can be difficult 
because the results tend to be qualitative rather than quantitative in nature.  
Some of the depth in a military relationship is generated by the nature of the 
broader alliance relationship, including the shared concepts of security, 
democratic norms and procedures.  It is further characterised in naval 
relationships by shared naval goals and threat perceptions, culture and 
language, and by the degree of trust that has been generated amongst the 
military members.   
 
External Linkages:  Connections with other navies and naval organisations, in 
conjunction with the US Navy, help build stronger Japan-US naval relations and 
organisational coherence by reinforcing the importance of structures, 
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procedures and linkages with other navies.  It is also an effective way of 
influence rendering, particularly by the leading naval power.  These linkages are 
characterised by joint participation in defence conferences, forums and 
symposia; participation in regional security organisations; and attendance at 
respective educational institutions—such as war colleges.   
 
The thesis tracks progress in institutionalisation over the 25-year period 
using these four categories and the qualitative and quantitative elements that 
comprise each one.  The dynamics are captured through a systematic ‘mapping’ 
process that tracks the institutional changes in the naval relationship and the 
various external and internal navy factors that influenced these changes and the 
development of the relationship over the three different time periods.  The 
thesis examines the external and internal sources of influence, priorities them 
based on the role they play in each time period and identifies how they affected 
the progress toward institutionalisation.   
Determining internal and external influence can be difficult given the 
multiple factors that may have affected a particular time period.  Further, an 
unavoidable element of subjectivity is often associated with making such 
determinations.  Nevertheless, taking these qualifications into consideration, the 
trends that emerge from this analysis will be useful when comparing one time 
period to another and establishing the various forces that influenced the Japan-
US naval relationship over time, including whether the influences come 







The unique methodology for this thesis contributes to the originality of 
the thesis.  First, the thesis utilises a ‘mapping’ technique to track the changes in 
the relationship over a 25-year period, as discussed above.  The technique 
assesses the relationship at the beginning, middle and end of this time period 
using the four categories that characterise institutionalisation—operational 
interaction, internal coordination, external linkages and institutional depth—
and a set of quantitative and qualitative elements that help to further identify the 
extent of institutionalisation in the relationship.  Essentially, a picture is taken 
of the relationship at three time periods, each covering 5 years.  The mapping 
begins in 1976—the start of formal discussions to develop joint guidelines for 
defence cooperation in the Japan-US security relationship and ends in 2001 with 
the JMSDF’s operational deployment to the Indian Ocean in response to UN 
anti-terrorism initiatives following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
United States.  The time periods covered include 1976-81, 1986-91 and 1996 to 
2001. 
The thesis relies principally on official documents and interviews as 
primary sources of information.  Given the sensitive nature of the Japan-US 
naval relationship and the security relationship, many documents concerning 
Japan-US naval relations and surrounding issues are classified, particularly 
those concerning policy decisions, sensitive communication concerning naval 
capabilities, and other important operational information.  Some of this material 
has been declassified and offers an exceptional perspective concerning what 
drove and constrained the naval relationship during this time period.   
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The thesis relied extensively on official documents obtained from US and 
Japanese officials and from the US Naval Archives, located at the Navy Yard in 
Washington, DC.  The Archives maintains copies of many pertinent 
documents—classified and unclassified.  They provide valuable insights 
concerning the nature of Japan-US security relations during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.  In accordance with US regulations, most classified documents 25 
years or older can be declassified.  The documents reviewed as part of this 
thesis included personal memos from senior US political and naval officials, 
documents concerning political-military affairs and associated memoranda.  In 
addition, command histories from the US Pacific Command and US Naval 
Forces Japan were also reviewed.  These documents were particularly useful for 
Chapter 2, which covers the period 1976-1981.  Through these documents the 
chapter provides enlightening historical insights concerning the early stages of 
institutionalisation in the naval relationship. 
When key documents were not available due to their classified status, the 
thesis relied on interviews with officials who had taken part in policy and/or 
operational decisions.  This was particularly the case for Chapters 3 and 4, 
which covered the later periods in the relationship.  To the extent possible, 
interviews were corroborated by other interviews and by publicly available 
documents, such as the annual Defense White Papers (De ense of Japan) 
produced by the Japan Defense Agency and the Annual Reports to Congress 
from the US Secretary of Defense.  These documents were very useful because 
they provided information concerning exercises and training, various defence 
statistical data, and summaries of defence policy decisions.  Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
also contain data compiled by Japanese naval officials that identify and quantify 
certain types of education and training that occurred in Japan and the United 
f
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States involving USN and JMSDF personnel.  The data also identifies JMSDF 
staff liaison positions at US Navy commands and when they were established.  
During the course of the research, nearly 100 interviews were conducted 
with mid-and senior-level US and Japanese civilian and military officials and 
non-government representatives.  Except in certain cases, the thesis does not 
identify the names of individuals interviewed in the body of the thesis.  Instead, 
to maintain anonymity, a coding system is used that is referenced back to each 
interview.  The list of interviews is available for review. 
The interviews in this thesis covered five categories: interviews with 
JMSDF officers, US Navy officers, civilian officials at the Japan Defense Agency 
and at the US Department of Defense, civilian officials at the US Department of 
State and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representatives from think tanks and 
private research organisations.  Interviews with the JMSDF included the Chief 
of the Maritime Staff (in 2002) and many of his senior officers.  They provided 
excellent perspectives concerning the nature of USN-JMSDF relations and the 
challenges facing the relationship.  The detail of the discussions and the candour 
of these officials helped facilitate a better understanding of the naval 
relationship and the key factors driving and constraining its growth.  Interviews 
were also conducted with many mid-and senior-level JMSDF officers attending 
the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo as well as with other 
Japanese officers attending conferences and study group meetings in Tokyo and 
in Washington, DC.  These interviews provided essential details concerning 
USN-JMSDF operations at the unit level.  The officers represented air, surface 
and subsurface specialties. 
Interviews with US Navy officers included admirals and senior staff 
(active and retired) who held key positions within the US Pacific Forces, US 
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Navy headquarters or Department of Defense headquarters in Washington, DC 
during one or more of the periods examined in this thesis.  These interviews also 
included USN officers who conducted active unit-to-unit training with the 
JMSDF, such as anti-submarine warfare.  As with the JMSDF, the interviews 
covered the major warfare areas—air, surface and subsurface and the 
information provided was key to understanding developments at the unit level.   
Interviews were also conducted with senior and mid-level civilian 
officials (active and retired) from the US Department of Defense in Washington 
and the Japan Defense Agency in Tokyo.  These officials provided insights 
concerning policy decisions and the various influences affecting defence policy-
making in the context of the Japan-US security alliance.  Included in this 
category are interviews with members of the research staff from the National 
Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo.  In addition to defence civilians, 
interviews with senior and mid-level officials at the US Department of State in 
Washington, DC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo provided valuable 
insights concerning how external influences in the area of foreign policy and 
international affairs affected the naval relationship.  Representatives of the US 
legislative branch, such as the US Congressional Research Service and the US 
Government Accountability Office, were also interviewed and some of their 
documents were used in the course of the research. 
 Representatives of US and Japanese private research organisations and 
think tanks were also useful sources of information.  Many of these officials had 
previously held positions within the US and Japanese governments and played 
important roles in formulating policy concerning the Japan-US security 
relationship.   
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In addition to personal interviews, research sources for the thesis also 
included the oral histories of prominent US and Japanese officials, such as 
Admiral Arleigh Burke, produced by the US Naval Institute, and those of US and 
Japanese officials who were interviewed as part of the National Security 
Archives’ Japan Project at the George Washington University in Washington, 
DC.  These oral histories provided valuable perspectives concerning the 
environment in which decisionmaking was taking place, as well as the rationales 
for decisions taken. 
I effectively mitigated any impact from my lack of fluency in the Japanese 
language by conducting extensive interviews with Japanese officials from the 
JMSDF, the Defense Agency, the Foreign Ministry, and Japanese think tanks.  
Some of the interviews were conducted in English and others required 
interpreters.  In addition, a majority of JMSDF tactical manuals are the same as 
those used by the US Navy, and as such are in English.  Numerous important 
Japanese primary source documents, such as the annual defence white papers, 
have also been translated into English.  As a visiting research fellow at the 
National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo in 2002, I established many 
professional relationships with a wide range of Japanese research analysts at 
the Institute.  We regularly exchanged information and these analysts helped 
corroborate and validate information obtained through other sources.     
Many aspects of the Japan-US naval relationship are unique compared 
with other military relationships.  The thesis does not attempt to use the 
experiences in this relationship to explain other international military 
relationships nor does it attempt to compare the Japan-US naval relationship 
with the experiences of the ground and air forces.  The thesis conclusions are 
specific to the Japan-US naval relationship.  However, during the course of the 
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research for this thesis, discussions were held with US Army and Air Force 
officers with an expertise in the Japan-US security relationship and with their 
counterparts in the Air and Ground Self-Defense Forces in Japan.  While not 
part of the formal interviews for this thesis, these discussions were useful in 
that they confirmed the unique aspects of the naval relationship and its 
development compared with the other services.  Further research, however, 
would provide a better understanding of how the air, ground and maritime 
forces have developed over the last 30 years and the various influences that 




The thesis derives its originality from various sources.  Firstly, the 
selected methodology—a mapping technique—combined with the broader 
analytical framework provides a unique analytical approach not replicated by 
other scholars.  Secondly, while numerous historians have examined various 
aspects of the Japan-US security relationship, few have examined the 
relationships and interactions between the US and Japanese military forces—
and none has used this particular approach and methodology.  Thirdly, in 
previous studies concerning the institutionalisation of international 
organisations, institutionalisation has served as the dependent variable and 
cooperation as the independent variable.  In this study of Japan-US naval 
relations, institutionalisation is the independent variable in relation to naval 
cooperation, which is the dependent variable.  This turns on its head previous 
analyses and provides a new perspective on the role of institutionalisation in 
international relationships.  Moreover, by further qualifying the type of 
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cooperation necessary for institutionalisation, the thesis provides an additional 
unique element not explored by other scholars. 
Finally, access to archival documents, recently declassified, revealed new 
perspectives concerning the nature of the Japan-US naval relationship (as well 
as the security relationship) during the heart of the Cold War.  Few, if any, 
scholars have focussed on this material, in part because until recently the 
documents were classified.  The documents reveal differences within the US 
Navy and the US government more generally over what information and 
technology should be given to Japan versus other allies.  Previously, much of 
this information was protected by security classifications.   
 
Summary of the Key Questions and Argument: 
 
1. What are the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained the 
development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship during 
the period 1976 - 2001? 
2.  What is the relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation in this 
particular naval relationship?   
 
The key proposition in this thesis is that operational cooperation 
between the US Navy and the JMSDF in response to a mutually acknowledged 
threat promotes institutionalisation in the relationship.  While a number of 
different factors affect the USN-JMSDF relationship, the nature and strength of 
the relationship rests on the ability of the two navies to operate together against 
a common threat or major security challenge.  The hypothesis turns on its head 
certain international organisation theories that view institutionalisation as a 
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requirement for cooperation in international organisations.  As these two navies 
work together and share risks, familiarity increases, trust grows and the effect 
of culture and language differences is reduced.  As these navies cooperate, they 
recognise the need to establish structures to facilitate more effective 
cooperation.  As such, a dynamic is created in which cooperation encourages 
institutionalisation, which in turn facilitates additional cooperation.  While the 
thesis focuses on the Japan-US naval relationship, the central proposition of the 
thesis could likely apply to all naval relationships, but further research would 
have to be conducted to better understand the causal factors. 
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CHAPTER 2:  Institutional Foundations for the Naval 
Relationship:  1976-1981 
 
The years 1976-1981 are important and significant for both the Japan-US 
naval relationship and the broader security relationship between Japan and the 
United States.  For the first time in the history of the Japan-US security 
relationship, defence cooperation was now attractive to both Japan and the 
United States, as it served national interests in both countries.  In Japan, 
perceptions of the international situation, and Japan’s security in particular, had 
begun to shift.  With the long-term presence of the United States in the region 
becoming less certain, the threat from the Soviet Union increasing, and with 
Japan’s own economy in turmoil, Japan began to reconsider its security 
relationship with the United States and desired greater cooperation.  Similarly, 
in the United States, the end of the Vietnam War, economic pressures, and a 
growing Soviet threat drove the United States to re-examine its alliance 
relationships throughout the world, with a greater emphasis on sharing the 
international defence burden. 
As such, leaders in both countries undertook initiatives to facilitate 
defence cooperation.  After extensive joint discussions on this subject, in 1978 
the governments formalised their decisions in the Guidelines for Japan-US 
Defense Cooperation and agreed to conduct follow-on discussions.  Although 
they had been training and cooperating with each other for over two decades, 
the defence cooperation initiatives helped legitimise joint naval activities and 
cooperation, which had never been publicly acknowledged in Japan, and 
allowed the US Navy and the JMSDF greater freedom to conduct their activities.  
With this cooperation eventually came greater institutionalisation in the naval 
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relationship as both navies recognised that more routinised training and 
additional arrangements and structures were needed to facilitate more effective 
cooperation.  
For the naval relationship, the period 1976-1981 included a number of 
important 'firsts' that were evidence of gradual institutionalisation, such as 
regular navy-to-navy meetings, scenario-based joint training, system acquisition 
decisions for improved interoperability and changes in arrangements for access 
to classified information and technology.  While both navies may have wanted to 
raise their level of cooperation in the past, the political support from both 
governments ultimately enabled the changes to occur, demonstrating that navies 
cannot exist independently of their national governments.  The defence 
cooperation initiatives and Japan's 1981 commitment to extend Japan’s sealane 
defences to 1,000 miles provided the foundation and political commitment for 
naval institutional improvements.  The precedents established during this five-
year time period provided the foundation for an increasingly robust naval 
relationship in later years. 
 The first part of this chapter focuses on the naval relationship itself and 
on the various factors that drove it and helped define its development during 
these formative years.  The latter part of the chapter focuses on other factors--
political, economic and diplomatic--that in some way influenced the naval 
relationship.  These factors were particularly significant in driving the Japan-US 
security relationship, as well as the naval relationship, during this period.  First, 
however, a brief review of the naval relationship prior to 1976 is helpful in 




THE NATURE AND BASIS OF THE JAPAN-US NAVAL RELATIONSHIP  
PRIOR TO 1976 
 
In the 1970s and earlier, operational contact between the two navies, 
including joint training and exercises was periodic, not continual.  The JMSDF’s 
lack of operational training and experience meant that it was limited in what it 
could do with the US Navy.  Despite the influx of former Imperial Navy 
personnel at the founding of the JMSDF, the lack of operational training and 
experience was a problem that affected the service for at least two decades.  
According to James Auer, Admiral Sadayoshi Nakayama was surprised to learn, 
upon taking command of the JMSDF, how little sea experience many of his 
commanding officers had, and thus instituted new procedures whereby officers 
were selected for command by experience rather than by rank. Many of the 
former navy officers were very young prior to 1945 and few of the middle-level 
officers had previous command experience.  In the early 1960s, a series of ship 
collisions and air accidents occurred as the JMSDF increased its operational 
tempo with newly-built ships, as well as ships and aircraft received from the 
United States.124    
The lack of operational training and experience also affected the number 
and sophistication of joint training events with the US Navy. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the JMSDF-USN joint training that took place in the vicinity of 
Japan during the early part of the 1970s.  The training emphasised anti-
submarine warfare (ASW), an important mission for protecting the sealanes 
surrounding Japan.  For the first 20 years of the naval relationship, the United 
States viewed technical assistance and training as a way to help Japan defend 
                                                 
i  124 For further details, see James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Marit me
Forces, 1945-71, (New, York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 203-213.     
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itself.  This slowly began to change in the latter part of the 1970s when the 
United States (and the US Navy) saw its own national interests best served by 
exercising with Japan’s maritime and air forces and incorporating Japan’s 
defence forces into its broader regional strategy.125   
 




Location Description Participating Units 
    Japan              US 
1973  (11-14 April) ASW From west of 
Kyushu to south 






6 vessels  
51 plane-




1973  (10-12 July) ASW South of Kii 
peninsula 






1973  (24-28 
November) 
ASW East of Izu 
Islands 






1974  (25-29 May) ASW East of Mikura 
Island 






1975  (20-24 
February) 
ASW East of Izu 
Islands 






1975  (21-24 July) ASW South of Kii 
Peninsula 






      Source:  Japan Defence Agency, De ense of Japan, 1976, pp. 154-155. f
                                                
      *Note: no data is available prior to 1973.   
 
In addition to joint training activities with the US Navy, the JMSDF 
initiated ‘Ocean Cruise Training Activities’ in 1957 to provide an opportunity for 
newly commissioned junior officers who had recently graduated from the 
Maritime Officers Candidate School to participate in professional exchanges 
 
125 See Sheila Smith, ‘The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the Japan-US Alliance’, The Japan-
US Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, edited by Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 80.   
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with other navies.  The fact that only three years after the formation of the 
JMSDF and a little over a decade after World War II, Japanese naval ships could 
sail into US and other foreign ports was significant and testified to the support 
that existed in the United States for the JMSDF.  The JMSDF’s first ocean cruise 
took place in 1957—to Midway Island and Hawaii.  Deployments continued 
annually to Hawaii and then to the mainland USA, Canada and Mexico.  By 1965, 
these deployments expanded to other international locations.126
One of the most important decisions made by the US Navy during the 
1970s was the stationing of the USS M dway aircraft carrier in Yokosuka, Japan, 
in 1973.  The naval presence was very visible and provided evidence of the US 
defence commitment to Japan, as well as strengthened the security 
relationship.
i
                                                
127  The presence of the carrier, however, did not automatically 
mean that there was robust naval cooperation.  Indeed, the most active 
cooperation during the mid-1970s occurred between ASW patrol aircraft—which 
were land-based, not carrier based.   
 
MAPPING THE JAPAN-US NAVAL RELATIONSHIP: 1976-1981 
 
The year 1976 marked the start of an era of cooperation between the 
defence forces of Japan and the United States.  For the naval relationship, it was 
a period characterized by new opportunities and challenges concerning the 
nature and extent of their cooperation.  Although the two navies had conducted 
 
126 John Downing, 'A Japanese Navy in All But Name’, Jane’s Navy International Fleet Review, 
April 1999, vol. 104/issue 003, p. 2.   
127 James Auer provides a very good discussion of the decision-making process, including 
domestic politics and influence behind the scenes in Japan, which resulted in the eventual 
homeporting of the USS Midway.  See James Auer Oral History Interview, conducted by Koji 
Murata, March 1996, National Security Archives Japan Project, George Washington University, 
pp. 1-4.    
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joint training during the previous 20 years, the latter part of the 1970s marked 
the start of a more formalised relationship—with regular meetings, more 
formalised operational procedures and routines.  This period established the 
foundation for enhanced naval cooperation, which flourished in later years—
along with a more robust institutional framework. 
A mapping process provides an effective way to examine the evolution of 
the relationship during this period, in a structured manner.  The thesis examines 
four particular elements of the Japan-US naval relationship in order to obtain an 
understanding of the nature of the relationship, progress in naval cooperation, 
and ultimately institutionalisation during this particular time period.  These 
elements include: internal coordination, operational interactions, external 




The USN and JMSDF made progress toward a more coordinated and 
formalised relationship during this time period.  The Japan-US security 
relationship now recognised the navies as an important part of alliance strategy 
and as such, the navies for the first time were able to formalise navy-to-navy 
contact and coordination, as well as increase the substance of their encounters.  
In some cases, such as formal naval meetings, this was the first time the navies 
had sat down together and discussed important strategic and procedural issues 
that affected both navies.  Furthermore, as the navies worked to coordinate 
their relationship and associated more closely with each other, disagreements 
naturally arose between them.  Of particular significance during this period 
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were the disagreements concerning JMSDF access to classified information, 
systems and equipment.  
 While high level contact between the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and 
the US Department of Defense increased during this time, important lower level 
contact did not occur consistently.128  For example, during the latter part of the 
1970s, the JDA did not have direct and regular contact with US officials in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs—the key 
Department of Defense office for Japan policy issues.129  In addition to minimal 
contact with Washington officials, JDA Directors and Deputy Directors dealt 
with fairly low-level officials at the US Pacific Command, US Forces Japan, and 
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff—not their rank equivalents, according to a former 
JDA deputy director.130  The lack of a closer working relationship was one of the 
factors that likely contributed to challenges in the relationship at this time, such 
as concerning the sharing of sensitive information and technology.    
In the naval context, the JMSDF maintained a close relationship with US 
Naval Forces Japan (USNFJ).  However, USNFJ was not an operational 
command, and hence had little influence over naval operations in the region.  
The role of the Commander, US Naval Forces Japan—a two-star Admiral—was 
limited generally to ‘housekeeping’ issues with the US Navy and liaison 
responsibilities with Japan and the JMSDF.131  The US Seventh Fleet, 
                                                 
128 As will be discussed later, the JDA was not an actual ministry but an agency that reported to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  As such, the JDA had limited autonomy, particularly in matters 
affecting broader defence policy.  This had certain practical implications for the JDA during a 
period when it needed to engage more closely with the United States on defence policy issues.  
See Takashi Maruyama Oral History Interview, conducted by Akihiko Tanaka, 12 April 1996, 
National Security Archives Japan Program, George Washington University, p. 11. 
129 Interview 5A (21 March 2000) and 5E (8 April 2005), with a former official from this 
Department of Defense office. 
130 See Keiji Ohmori Oral History Interview, conducted by Koji Murata, 20 December 1996, 
National Security Archives Japan Project, George Washington University, p. 6.   
131 USNFJ provides shore installation management, including base and logistics support for 
surface, subsurface, aviation and amphibious elements of the US Seventh Fleet that operate 
from Japan, and provides liaison with the JMSDF. See mission description in 
http://www.cnfj.navy.mil/mission.html, accessed 7 September 2005. 
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commanded by a four-star admiral, was the key US Navy operational fleet in the 
Northwest Pacific.132  The JMSDF often had the impression during this time 
period that its communication with the Commander and/or staff of US Naval 
Forces Japan was a direct link to Navy headquarters in Washington.  However, 
this was not the case, and these false assumptions often resulted in JMSDF 
disappointment.133   
 
t
                                                
Regular High-level Mee ings 
 
Even though the US Navy and the JMSDF had been interacting with each 
other since 1955, they had not conducted formal navy to navy policy meetings, 
similar to what was done on an annual basis between navies within the NATO 
alliance, as well as with Australia and New Zealand.  The first formalised 
meeting, known as ‘Navy-to-Navy Talks’ between the US Navy and the JMSDF 
were held in December 1977.  (The United States held talks with the South 
Korean Navy immediately after those with Japan.)  
The 1977 naval talks were significant because they showed that the two 
navies were institutionalizing their relationship and that the JMSDF was part of 
the international naval 'club', with the USN.  Further, they were an 
acknowledgement that the navies were working toward strategic alignment—a 
key element in close naval relationships--with common goals and strategies.  In 
a letter to the meeting participants, the US Chief of Naval Operations 
 
132Established in 1943, the US Seventh Feet is the largest of the Navy's forward-deployed fleets, 
with forces that operate throughout Asia and further west to the Arabian Sea.  The Commander, 
US Seventh Fleet, is embarked on the USS Blue Ridge—the Seventh Fleet flagship since 1979—
and forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan.  Seventh Fleet forces spend more than half of each 
year taking part in operations, exercises and port visits to nations within their area of operation.  
See http://www.c7f.navy.mil/Pages/Forwardpresence.html, accessed 4 April 2004. 
133 See, for example, interview 5E (8 April 2005), with USN officer who had spent several 
deployments in Japan.  
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summarised his expectations for the naval talks and emphasized the importance 
of a shared strategic perspective.  He stated that while there was a history of 
cordial relations between the two navies over the previous two decades, it was 
time that the navies shared a common strategy and ensured that their policies 
and missions were complementary.  This was only logical, he said, since both 
Japan and the United States shared common interests in Northeast Asia and the 
Western Pacific.134
The 1977 talks covered a wide variety of topics of both short and long-
term policy interest to the navies, including security assistance programmes, 
mutual exercises, interoperability of weapon systems, bilateral security plans, 
and standardisation of procedures and equipment.135  However, given the nature 
of the discussions, it was clear that this was the first time the two navies had 
talked about and shared information concerning some fairly basic naval 
concepts and conditions.  For example, during the talks the US Navy gave a 
presentation on US Navy policy, including mission, functions, and roles.  After 
the presentation, JMSDF representatives stated that they were generally familiar 
with the concepts from ‘open source professional literature’—indicating that 
this was the first time they had obtained this information officially—from the US 
Navy.136   Similarly, the JMSDF gave a presentation on its defence programme, 
task group composition and new naval construction, and US Navy 
                                                 
134 Memorandum from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations to participants in the first staff talks 
between the US Navy and the JMSDF.  This memorandum was contained in:  Memorandum for 
the Record, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, ‘United States Navy/Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Force Staff Policy Talks’, 2 February 1978, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, 
Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
135 Memorandum from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations to OPNAV distribution list, ‘Navy to 
Navy Policy Talks with Korea and Japan’, Memo 605/189, 30 June 1977, declassified from 
Confidential, p. 1, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, 
Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
136 Memorandum for the Record,Office of Chief of Naval Operations, ‘United States 
Navy/Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Staff Policy Talks’, 9 February 1978, 
declassified from Secret, pp. 3-5, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational 
Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
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representatives asked basic questions concerning command relationships 
between JMSDF district and mobile forces. It also appears to be the first time 
that the JMSDF presented—graphically—its command, control and 
communications network, including current and planned capabilities, as well as 
communication problems between the JMSDF and the US Navy.137  This issue 
became a highly sensitive issue in years to come, as is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
The naval talks also appeared to be the first time that there had been a 
candid discussion of the regional threat and the naval balance in the Pacific, 
complete with maps and other graphics detailing these developments.  The 
JMSDF representatives highlighted their fears about Soviet capability to conduct 
surface strike hit and run attacks against Japanese coastal batteries, especially 
in the Sea of Japan, and their concerns about their own capabilities against 
nuclear submarines.138  It also appeared to be the first time the two navies 
discussed their respective roles and missions and how they would work 
together to meet the emerging Soviet naval threat in Northeast Asia and the 
western Pacific.139  
During the naval talks, the participants agreed that the JMSDF role was 
to maintain sea control in the western Pacific through ASW operations, using 
surface and air platforms, and by blockading Tsugaru, Soya (La Perouse) and 
Tsushima Straits.  The US Navy role was to maintain strategic nuclear 
deterrence, maintain mobile strike capability, and protect the Sea Lines of 
                                                 
137 Ibid. 
138 ‘United States Navy/Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff Policy Talks’, 9 February 
1978, p. 5.   
139 Less than a year later, the Chief of Naval Operations briefed the Director General of the Japan 
Defense Agency (Kanemaru) on the US Navy strategy for defence of Japan—the first time this 
had been done for a JDA director.  See Memorandum for the Record, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations,‘Call by Minister Kanemaru on Admiral Holloway’, Memo 61/S49-78, 26 June 1978, 
declassified from Secret, pp. 1-2.  Box 426A, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational 
Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
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Communication (SLOC) outside the JMSDF area of responsibility.  Of particular 
note, in response to JMSDF concerns that it may have difficulty in getting air 
cover from the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, the US Navy urged the JMSDF to 
take the initiative to get this assistance because air support from US aircraft 
carriers might not be immediately available.140  This was another reminder to the 
JMSDF that while cooperation with the US Navy was improving, in the end 
Japan could be on its own for critical portions of a regional conflict and as such, 
had to improve its own capabilities. 
In assessing the frank exchange of information during the naval talks, 
Vice Admiral William Crowe, the senior US Navy representative at the meeting, 
stated that the Japanese view of its contributions to the Japan-US Mutual 
Security Treaty would likely form the basis for future planning and policy 
discussions between the two navies.  Furthermore, Admiral Crowe praised the 
willingness of Admiral Oga, the senior Japanese representative present, to 
discuss sensitive matters concerning US Navy/JMSDF/South Korea naval 
cooperation, ‘…while considering the obvious political and emotional 
problems.…’ In summary, he declared the naval talks ‘a complete success’, 
portending closer cooperation between the two navies in the future.141
The US and Japan had different goals and expectations, as well as 
different stakes in the talks.  As was evident by the rank of the naval officials 
heading each delegation, the stakes were higher for the JMSDF.  The Chief of 
the Maritime Staff headed the delegation.  The JMSDF had wanted to participate 
in this kind of a dialogue with the US Navy because it put the JMSDF on a level 
with other major navies, which had already been participating in formalised 
                                                 
140 ‘United States Navy/Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff Policy Talks’, 9 February 
1978, p. 7.   
141 Ibid., p.1. 
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naval talks.  It was also an opportunity for the JMSDF to lay out its desires and 
concerns, in front of a captive audience, about the growing regional threat, 
cooperation with the United States on certain naval missions, and future 
acquisition items.  The JMSDF also wanted the opportunity to present items for 
which it was hoping to get US Navy support, such as for a ‘small’ carrier.142
For the US Navy, a Vice Admiral—the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
(Plans, Policy and Operations)—was the senior representative.  As was typical 
at the time, there appeared to be a split between naval representatives located in 
the Pacific and those in Washington.  According to officials from the US Pacific 
Command, the US Navy supported the naval talks because it believed they 
would assist in maintaining allied confidence in US defence commitments in the 
Western Pacific and would complement other Japan-US defence links at the US 
Pacific Command, the Joint Staff (of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff), and ongoing 
efforts in the Japan-US Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation.  US Navy 
officials in the Pacific hoped that the talks would expand cooperative defence 
measures in functional areas of intelligence, operations, communications and 
logistics.143  As will be discussed later in this chapter, the desires of US Navy 
officials in the Pacific were not always the same as the US Navy as an 
institution, particularly in some of these functional areas. 
Washington naval officials had a slightly different set of priorities that 
were evident the first chance it had to comment on the JMSDF presentation on 
ASW cooperation.  A US Navy representative immediately asked, ‘How does the 
JMSDF plan to work closer with the Republic of Korea Navy?’  In addition, ‘what 
is the JMSDF view on the implementation of USN-ROKN-JMSDF exercises?’  
                                                 
142 Ibid., pp. 1-10. 
143 Cable from USCINCPAC to Chief of Naval Operations, ‘Navy to Navy Talks with Korea and 
Japan’, 170120Z, June 1977, declassified from Confidential, p. 1, Box 426, Political-Military 
Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
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These were both extremely sensitive questions for Japan—a country for whom 
participation in collective defence operations was technically not allowed and 
for whom defence relations with South Korea were particularly sensitive.  But 
the United States saw Japan’s cooperation on these issues as an important 
factor for the Japan-US naval relationship, given the instability on the Korean 
Peninsula and the naval role in the event of the crisis.  Admiral Oga explained 
that exercises with Korea were difficult because of the ‘peculiar political 
relations’, something that the US Navy representatives in the Pacific were 
certainly well aware of.144   Nevertheless, the candour of the first set of Japan-US 
naval talks set an important precedent for later dialogue. 
 
In ormation Sharing f
                                                
 
The sharing of sensitive information and technology was a particularly 
thorny issue of naval relations in the late 1970s and created a challenge for 
internal coordination in the relationship.  Advocates for Japan in the US 
government, such as Ambassador Mike Mansfield, wanted to eliminate many of 
the restrictions that were preventing Japan from obtaining key systems, 
equipment and technology, and which put Japan on a less than equal basis with 
other US allies.  These advocates, including many officials within the US Pacific 
Fleet and Pacific Command, also believed that greater access to information and 
technology would improve the JMSDF's interoperability with US forces and 
enable Japan to more effectively cope with the emerging threat from the Soviet 
Union.  Officials at the US Navy headquarters in Washington viewed the 
 
144 ‘United States Navy/Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff Policy Talks’, 9 February 
1978, pp. 6-7.  
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situation differently and as such, this highlighted internal differences within the 
US Navy and raised questions about the Navy’s relationship with the JMSDF, 
compared with other naval relationships.  A review of the JMSDF-USN 
relationship at this time also highlights less quantifiable issues such as trust and 
cultural identity, which will be discussed later. 
 In 1976, the US Navy’s policy for disclosure of classified information was 
contained in Naval Instruction S5510.155—‘National Disclosure Policy’.145  This 
document identified eight categories of military information.  For each category, 
the policy established disclosure classification levels for particular countries 
and international organisations.  For example, in 1976 Japan was cleared for 
access to six categories of information at the Secret level and two categories at 
the Confidential level, as identified in Table 2.  The policy did not automatically 
authorize disclosure of information to a particular country, but it established the 
highest level of access that the Chief of Naval Operations could authorise 









                                                 
145 This naval instruction was based on US Department of Defense Directive 5230.11, 'Disclosure 
of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations', 31 
December 1976.  
146 OPNAVINST S5510.155, ‘National Disclosure Policy’, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 8 
February 1977, pp. 1-2, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, 
Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
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Table 2:  National Disclosure Policy Towards Japan (January 1977) 
 
 Military Information Disclosure 
Levels 
Category One Organization, Training, and Employment of Military 
Forces 
Secret                  
Category Two Military Materiel and Munitions Secret 
Category Three Applied Research and Development, Information 
and Materiel 
Confidential 
Category Four Production Information Confidential 
Category Five Combined Military Operations, Planning, and 
Readiness 
Secret 
Category Six US Order of Battle Secret 
Category Seven North American Defense Secret 
Category Eight Military Intelligence Secret 
Source:  US Navy, 'National Disclosure Policy Toward Japan', 17 January 1977, declassified       
from Secret, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
 
Even if a country was not cleared for access at a certain level, the 
country (or the US supporting organisation) could apply for an exception to the 
policy.  According to archival documents, the US Navy at the time preferred the 
exception approach to information and technology disclosure rather than 
making wholesale changes to the formal disclosure policy.147   In the case of 
Japan, between 1963 and 1977, the US government requested six exceptions for 
the release of classified information.  The US Navy requested four of the six 
exceptions for the JMSDF.   In 1963, for example, the US Navy requested an 
exception for the release of Secret-level information concerning acoustic 
detection systems for ocean areas and barriers that contained information on 
both operational systems and systems still in research and development.  In 
1972, the Navy requested the release of Top Secret level information on 
                                                 
147 Report from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Exceptions in Effect as of 30 September 
1977’, 16 October 1977, declassified from Secret, pp. 72-74, Box 426, Political-Military Division: 
Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
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minefield planning, which the JMSDF needed to implement the coordinated 
joint emergency plan for the defence of Japan.148  
In the mid-1970s, the established US policy towards Japan was to treat it 
as co-equal to NATO allies.  Japan was included in summit meetings of 
industrialised democracies and consulted closely within bilateral and 
multilateral forums.  Japanese financial and political support was solicited in 
most major international undertakings.  Even on US Congressional notifications 
for arms transfers, as part of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Japan was 
placed in special status shared only by NATO nations, Australia and New 
Zealand (part of the ANZUS alliance).  However, for access to certain sensitive 
and classified information, the United States did place Japan on a different level 
than NATO and ANZUS allies.  In particular, as noted in Table 2 above, the 
United States restricted Japan’s access to information concerning applied 
research and development, as well as production information to the Confidential 
level, while NATO allies, Australia and New Zealand, had access at the Secret 
level.  NATO and ANZUS allies also received greater access to information 
concerning Combined Military Operations, Planning, and Readiness—at the Top 
Secret level—while the United States restricted Japan to the Secret level.149
In the latter part of the 1970s, the JMSDF increasingly encountered 
problems accessing information and technology for exercises with the US Navy, 
principally systems for ASW operations and secure communications between 
US Navy and JMSDF platforms.  In addition, the JMSDF had difficulties in 
arranging technical briefings at the Secret level concerning systems and 
                                                 
148 Ibid. 
149 Naval Message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 
‘National Disclosure Policy Toward Japan’, #010815Z, November 1977, declassified from Secret, 
p. 2, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical 
Center, Washington, DC. 
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equipment for potential purchase.  In many cases, the US Pacific Fleet 
supported the requests, but US Navy headquarters denied the JMSDF access to 
requested information.  Examples of some of these incidents are described 
below. 
In January 1976, the US Pacific Fleet requested permission to provide the 
JMSDF information on US towed array sonar systems (TASS) used on surface 
ships for anti-submarine operations for a JMSDF-USN anti-submarine warfare 
exercise.  With the rapid growth in capability of the Soviet submarine fleet, 
TASS technology provided an extremely valuable asset for the US Navy in 
addition to under water surveillance systems—all of which were highly 
classified systems.  While US disclosure policy permitted disclosure of general 
information concerning TASS on a need-to-know basis, the office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) in Washington did not believe this included 
information revealing capabilities, technology, performance and/or utilisation of 
the equipment.  Hence, the CNO’s office denied the US Pacific Fleet’s access 
request.  After a request for reconsideration of the original disclosure request, 
and after identifying inconsistencies in the treatment of Japan compared with 
certain other allies participating in the exercise (Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the UK), the CNO’s office granted the Pacific Fleet’s request on a one time 
basis only.150  
One year later, the Maritime Staff Office of the JMSDF requested 
assistance in arranging detailed technical presentations concerning certain 
surface ship air defence weapon systems--at the highest level of classification 
releasable to Japan.  According to the US Embassy’s Office of Defense 
                                                 
150 Cables from Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) to Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), #220241Z, January 1976; CNO to CINCPACFLT, #132205Z, February 1976; 
CINCPACFLT to CNO, #262001Z, February 1976; and CNO to CINCPACFLT, #272257Z, February 
1976 (all declassified from Secret), Box 352, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational 
Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
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Cooperation, the JMSDF was considering requesting these systems in future 
defence budgets.  Therefore, the Defense Cooperation Office considered the 
briefings useful in contributing to standardisation of equipment and 
complementarity of USN and JMSDF forces, in addition to, of course, potential 
purchase of US equipment.  For the purpose of this briefing, however, the Navy 
did not grant an exception to the disclosure policy and the information was 
conveyed at a Confidential classification level.151
Also in 1976 and 1977, many problems arose concerning JMSDF access to 
secure communications technology for use in exercises with the US Navy.  
Operational lessons learned from exercises held between the two forces at the 
time indicated the need to have secure communications capability when the 
USN and JMSDF operate together.  A particularly illuminating memorandum 
from the JMSDF identifies Japan’s desire for this technology and its rationale for 
improved interoperability when operating with US forces.  The memorandum is 
quoted below in its entirety.152   
 
From:  Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet (CINCSDFLT), JMSDF 
To:      Commander US Naval Forces, Japan 
Subj:   Secure Communications   
 
1. Lessons learned through combined exercises and operations with the United 
States Navy proved that both USN and JMSDF should have common secure 
communications. 
2. Necessity of secure communications has been discussed at the combined 
ASW Committee meetings since 1975 and the Committee reported the 
results of discussions to COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVFORJAPAN and 
other US Forces concerned. 
3. During the SOAP [Soviet Out-of-Area Patrol] Operations ’77, JDS Akigumo 
and Asagumu were deployed on scene and covered teletype and covered 
                                                 
151 Cable from CMDAO Tokyo to CNO Washington, ‘Japan Request for Technical Briefings’,  
#120744Z, April 1977, p. 1, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives 
Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
152 The JMSDF memorandum is contained in Naval Message from COMNAVFORJAPAN to 
CINCPACFLT, ‘Proposal for Communication Security Assistance to JMSDF’, #300050Z, 30 
November 1977, declassified from Secret, p. 2, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, 
Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
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voice equipments were installed on these ships.  It showed us the great 
benefits of covered communications for coordination between on-scene 
commanders. 
4. Working level negotiation has already started and discussions have been 
held between staffs of COMNAVFORJAPAN and CINCSDFLT. 
5. CINCSDFLT hereby requests COMNAVFORJAPAN to provide Self-Defense 
Fleet with means for secure communications in order to conduct more 
effective US/JMSDF combined exercises and operations. 
 
In the exercise described above, the JMSDF provided one to two ships 
on-scene for the majority of the operation.  However, initially, no instructions, 
intelligence or any classified information could be passed directly between the 
US Navy on-scene commander and the JMSDF ships due to the lack of secure, 
US compatible communications equipment aboard Japanese ships.  In this 
particular case, the US Navy eventually delivered the appropriate equipment to 
the ships to ensure secure communications.  However, other similar exercises 
occurred during the mid-1970s when this was not the case. 
In 1977, after continued problems in obtaining access to secure 
communications equipment from the United States for use in exercises with the 
US Navy, the JMSDF requested, through the Commander, US Naval Forces 
Japan, that Japan develop its own secure communications equipment for US 
Navy/JMSDF exercises.  The equipment would be used to provide secure 
covered radio teletype communications between USN and JMSDF ships.  
However, before Japan began work on developing these systems, it wanted 
assurance from the US Navy that the equipment, once developed, would be used 
during JMSDF-USN exercises.  It was likely that the JMSDF and the 
headquarters of US Naval Forces Japan were using this option as another way to 
push the US Navy (in particular, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) to 
improve Japan’s access to secure communications systems that the US Navy 
had been denying Japan up to that point.  Naval officials from the headquarters, 
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US Naval Forces Japan, maintained that the proposed secure communications 
equipment would have been a tremendous improvement over the equipment 
that was currently being used in exercises—off-line encryption/decryption 
equipment.  However, they also admitted that it was questionable whether the 
equipment, if developed, would satisfy the needs of both navies during real 
world operations.153
The terse reply from the CNO’s office stated that it was not feasible for 
US Navy ships to carry additional equipment solely to support combined 
exercise activity.  Should such an operational requirement exist, the message 
stated, the release, on loan, of limited numbers of US secure communications 
equipment to provide for secure interoperability between the USN and JMSDF 
may be appropriate.  Before this could happen, the CNO’s office wanted to 
ensure that an operational requirement for Japan-US communications security 
was documented and justified.  Furthermore, the office required that the US 
Pacific Fleet submit a detailed proposal containing information on equipment, 
funding, installation and maintenance that would be provided in support of such 
a requirement.154  
In the autumn of 1977, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
International Security Affairs, submitted a proposal to the National Disclosure 
Policy Committee to upgrade national disclosure levels for Japan in three 
categories: production, technology and military planning.  The stated reason for 
doing so was to facilitate information exchange at Security Consultative 
                                                 
153 Naval Message from COMNAVFORJAPAN to CINCPACFLT, ‘Development of COMSEC 
Equipment by Japanese for Mutual Training’, #072311Z, March 1977, pp. 1-2, Box 425, Political-
Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
154 Naval Message from CNO to CINCPACFLT, ‘Development of COMSEC Equipment by 
Japanese for Mutual Training’, #022000Z, May 1977, declassified from Secret, p. 1, Box 425, 




Committee meetings and to make US disclosure policy consistent with US 
defence policy toward Japan.  The initiative was likely the result of ‘behind the 
scenes’ activities by Japan advocates within the International Security Affairs 
office and is an example of the importance that particular people played in 
establishing and maintaining Japan-US naval relations. 
The proposal was raised before the National Disclosure Committee on 
the 26th and 28th October 1977, but the proposal was defeated each time.  The US 
Navy voted against the proposal on the grounds that the existing policy—which 
allowed exceptions to the disclosure policy—was adequate for Navy 
programmes and that no case had been established to support the upgrading.  
The vote on the 28th October 1977 was a split 4-4 vote, with the NDPC Chairman 
casting the deciding vote.   Those in favour of the disclosure policy change for 
Japan included the Department of State, Joint Staff, US Army, and the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.  Those against upgrading 
Japan’s disclosure included the Navy, Air Force, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, and OSD/Comptroller.155
In the midst of this discussion, the US Embassy in Tokyo, and in 
particular Ambassador Mike Mansfield, became increasingly frustrated with the 
access problems the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were having with the US 
Department of Defense and, in particular, the US Navy.  After learning of the 
Disclosure Committee’s decision, Ambassador Mansfield sent a caustically 
worded cable back to the Department of State noting his frustration in response 
to the policy decision.  He stated that, 
 
 
                                                 
155 Memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the Secretary of the Navy, 
‘Access of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force to Classified Material’, November 1977, 
declassified from Secret, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives 
Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
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It makes no sense to me to attempt to engage the Japanese in a 
closer security relationship, as signified by our work in the new 
Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation and our plans to renew 
consultation in the SSC, if we continue to indicate in our day-to-day 
relations that some close allies are more equal than others.  Surely 
we are better off having the Japanese intimately tied to us through 
dependence on technology than encouraging them to move out on 
their own.  And I am convinced that they will reluctantly take the 
latter course rather than engage in repeated, often frustrating, and 
sometimes humiliating efforts to obtain access to information that 
we should find in our mutual security interest to share in the first 
place.156   
 
Ambassador Mansfield was particularly incensed with the Navy’s 
response to the proposal raised at the National Disclosure Committee meeting.  
During visits to the American Embassy in Tokyo by the Secretary of the Navy 
(Mr. Claytor) and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and 
Operations (VADM Crowe) in the Fall of 1977, Ambassador Mansfield was very 
critical of the US Navy for denying the JMSDF access to classified material.   In 
meetings with the Secretary of the Navy and with the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations, Ambassador Mansfield stated that the Navy should know Japan’s 
importance as an ally, and as such he was displeased that the Navy had not 
supported the proposal to upgrade disclosure levels in the stated instance.157
After intense promotion on the part of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and the Department of State, a March 1978 vote by the National 
Disclosure Committee members resulted in concurrence by all members, 
including the Navy, for raising the eligibility levels for Japan to ‘Secret’ in 
Categories 3 (applied research and development) and 4 (production 
                                                 
156 Cable from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘National Disclosure Policy 
Toward Japan’, #10816Z, November 1977, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational 
Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
157 Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, ‘Access of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force to 
Classified Material’, November 1977.    
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 information) of the National Disclosure criteria.158  The arguments made by 
members from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs (ASD/ISA) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering (USD/R&E) were particularly convincing and apparently were key 
reasons why the Navy in the end changed its vote.  In a draft white paper, the 
ISA office noted that raising the disclosure level would encourage Japanese 
views on security policy to coincide with US views and would be regarded by 
them as one indication that the US government regarded Japan as a full partner, 
a most important consideration.  From ISA’s perspective, any diminution of trust 
between the United States and Japan, particularly given the growth of Soviet 
military power, would support elements in Japan who urged a more 
independent security posture.  A loosening of Japan’s ties to the United States 
would alter the world power balance and would be a serious US disadvantage, 
ISA believed.159
Why did the Navy end up being the ‘odd man out’ through most of the 
disclosure debate?  First it is important to point out that the ‘Navy’ in this 
context refers to the representatives in Washington—principally in the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations.  The US Navy representatives out in the field, in 
the Asia-Pacific region, such as the US Pacific Command and the US Pacific 
Fleet, tended to side with the US Embassy in Tokyo, the US State Department 
                                                 
158 The CIA concurrence actually came on 10 March because the representative at the March 
meeting had not yet received the agency opinion.  The Department of Energy abstained because 
it had no direct agency interest.  See Department of Defense Memorandum, ‘Minutes of Special 
NDPC Meeting’, 13 March 1977, declassified from Secret, Box 425, Political-Military Division: 
Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
159Draft OSD/ISA draft white paper, ‘National Disclosure Policy for Japan’, 5 December 1977 and 
Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, to the 
Chairman of the National Disclosure Policy Committee,, Proposal to Change NDP 1/7 Category 
Three and Four Guidelines for Japan’, 14 March 1978, declassified from Secret, Box 426, 
Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, 
Washington, DC. 
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and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.160  
Having to deal with Japan on a daily basis, the Navy representatives in the Asia-
Pacific region viewed its relations as more than purely military and rather a 
combination of political, military and diplomatic influences.  As such, the US 
Navy representatives in the field tended to be more sympathetic to Japan and its 
interests.  For example, in the midst of the debate on disclosure policy, the 
Defence Attaché (a US Navy Captain) at the American Embassy in Tokyo sent a 
telegram to Washington stating that Japanese officials were aware of significant 
differences between briefings and technologies provided them and NATO allies.  
He further noted that when technology is released, it is done with such 
reluctance and delay that it raises questions about the current and future Japan-
US relationship.  The Attaché also pointed out that the United States reversed 
the decision to make the P-3C patrol aircraft available to the JMSDF only after 
Japan expressed interest in the Nimrod—a similar aircraft produced by the 
United Kingdom.161  The P-3C Orion is a land-based maritime patrol and anti-
submarine warfare aircraft. It eventually became the primary anti-submarine 
platform for the JMSDF.   
The Chief of Naval Operation’s office in Washington viewed the situation 
through a more singular analytical lens.  Officials believed that the existing 
policy was adequate for Navy programmes and that no case had been 
established to support the upgrading.  The CNO’s office pointed out that the 
Navy had requested only five exceptions to national disclosure policy in the 
previous five years under the existing disclosure criteria and that this was 
evidence of the adequacy of the current policy.  A memorandum from the Office 
                                                 
160 DOD’s Office of Research and Engineering had initially voted against changing the policy but 
changed its mind after hearing the views of the Department of State and DOD’s Office of 
International Security Affairs.  
161 Naval message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘National Disclosure 
Policy Toward Japan’, November 1977.  
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of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs points 
out that this logic is flawed because the Japanese, given their ‘psychology’, will 
not ask for an exception to the disclosure policy when they know their request 
will be rejected.162  In a discussion paper prepared for the March 1978 National 
Disclosure Policy Committee meeting, officials from the CNO’s office stressed 
that release of information under Category 4 (production information) posed the 
greatest risk of technology loss.  For this reason, only countries with acceptable 
industrial security systems have had access to Secret information in Category 4 
(e.g., the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Federal Republic of 
Germany).  According to archival documents, in the early 1970s, US Department 
of Defense officials found deficiencies while reviewing Japan’s facilities and 
procedures for storing classified material.  These shortfalls were later corrected, 
according to the Defense Attaché at the American Embassy, Tokyo.  Scepticism 
existed, nevertheless, amongst certain US Department of Defense Officials 
concerning the release of sensitive information to Japan.163   
During the latter part of the 1970s, the US Navy was very concerned 
about the advancing threat from Soviet submarines and as such was particularly 
protective of US technology developed to detect these submarines.  The US 
Navy submarine and intelligence communities, in particular, closely guarded 
these acoustic detection systems as they participated in the increasingly 
competitive cat and mouse game with the Soviets in the Western Pacific.  Any 
leak of information from Japan to the Soviet Union would have been devastating 
for the US Navy, according to a retired senior US Navy officer and submariner, 
who had extensive contact with the JMSDF as well as with US Navy 
                                                 
162 ‘Access of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force to Classified Material’, November 1977.  
163 Navy Talking Paper, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/OP-09, ‘Proposed Revisions to the 
National Disclosure Policy—Japan and Korea’, 20 March 1978, declassified from Secret, Box 426, 
Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, 
Washington, DC.   
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headquarters during this period.  As such, he was very aware of USN concern 
about guarding US submarine detection systems.164   
Even once the Disclosure Policy had changed, however, the JMSDF and 
the US Navy still had disagreements over what technology Japan could obtain.  
For example, prior to signing a memorandum of understanding for a long-term 
purchase from the United States of P-3C aircraft, Japan wanted to ensure that 
the aircraft would be equipped with advanced systems that would enable the 
aircraft to operate effectively against the growing Soviet submarine threat, in 
conjunction with US forces.  The Maritime Staff Office of the JMSDF submitted 
to the US Navy a detailed questionnaire concerning releasability issues.  Many of 
these issues concerned promises or agreements made by the Navy in the past 
concerning the licensed production of certain supporting equipment on-board 
the P-3C aircraft, as well as release of certain technology and information.  In 
March 1978, after reviewing the draft P-3C memorandum of understanding, the 
Maritime Staff Office of the JMSDF informed the US Embassy in Tokyo that 
many of the questions concerning the releasability of information and 
technology still had not been resolved.165  The two navies did eventually sign the 
P-3C memorandum of understanding in April 1978, with the US pledge that 
remaining releasability issues would be settled in the future.   
Given this progression of events, it is not surprising that even after the 
United States and Japan signed the P-3C memorandum of understanding, 
technology access problems still existed.  As the JMSDF was planning its P-3C 
programme, the KG-40 cryptographic system became a key focus of its 
                                                 
164 Interview 21A (9 May 2005 and follow-up on 5 June 2007). 
165 Naval Message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to Chief of Naval Operations, ‘Japan 
Questionnaire Concerning P-3C MOU Annex A’, #270358Z, March 1978, declassified from 
Confidential, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, DC.  The message details the many issues of concern raised by 
the Japanese prior to signing the P-3C MOU. 
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attention.  The KG-40 is used to provide cryptographic security protection for 
Navy Link 11 and any data communications meeting Tactical Data Information 
Link data standards. 166  Link 11 and the KG-40 were critical to ensuring effective 
and secure communication and data transfer between USN and JMSDF 
platforms.  Japan was aware that NATO allies were receiving more information 
and technology than Japan, including the KG-40 system, and JDA officials 
pressured the US government to release more of this information to Japan.  The 
American Embassy in Tokyo, again concerned about the double standard 
existing between NATO and Japan on access to cryptographic systems, sent a 
message to Washington laying out these concerns.  The message emphasized 
that Japanese officials, aware that the KG-40 is a standard NATO system, were 
concerned at what they perceived was a lack of US confidence in them, despite 
repeated high-level assurances of Japan’s importance as a US ally.  The JMSDF 
eventually received this system but not for nearly two years.  In the interim, the 




Several themes emerged concerning the institutional coordination of the 
relationship during this period.  Firstly, a mutually recognised security threat, 
combined with a new priority on defence cooperation within the Japan-US 
security relationship, provided the necessary incentives for increased 
                                                 
166 The KG-40 links the computer and the data terminal set. Link 11 provides high speed 
computer-to-computer digital radio communications in the high frequency and ultra-high 
frequency bands among Tactical Data System equipped ships, aircraft and shore sites.  
http://www.lm-isgs.co.uk/defence/datalinks/link_11.htm, accessed 10 May 2007. 
167 Naval Message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘Japanese Request 
for Release of Cryptographic Equipment/Interoperability Issues’, #110754Z, December 1978, 
declassified from Secret, Box 426B, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives 
Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.   
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institutionalisation in the relationship, reversing what had existed previously, 
when there was little formal coordination and sharing of basic information.  
Secondly, the interactions between the USN and JMSDF during this time 
indicate a lack of trust between the navies, which likely emanated from the lack 
of operational familiarity between the navies.  This was manifested most clearly 
in the discussions concerning whether or not to raise Japan's level of access to 
classified military information.  As the two navies had not previously 
participated together in military operations against a mutually recognised 
security threat, sharing risks and defence burdens, there was no basis for the 
development of this trust.  Differences in culture and language also contributed 
to the challenges experienced by the navies at the start of this period.  Thirdly, 
the disagreements within the US Navy concerning the disclosure of classified 
military information and technology to Japan demonstrated that navies are not 
necessarily unified entities.  The objection of Navy headquarters likely emanated 
from the influence of the US submarine community, which was closely guarding 
acoustic technology for detecting the increasingly quiet Soviet submarines.  
Further, while the JMSDF had many supporters within the US Pacific Fleet and 
the US Pacific Command, a large part of the US Navy at this time still tended to 




The period 1976-1981 constituted 'foundation years' for the operational 
aspects of the Japan-US naval relationship and its institutionalisation.  The more 
prominent changes in training, exercises and interoperability occurred some 
years later and implemented the plans laid out during this earlier time period.  
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Nevertheless, the JMSDF and US Navy made determined steps in improving the 
nature and extent of its operational interaction during this period.   While unit 
training and small exercises had occurred in earlier years, the political 
commitments that resulted in the 1978 Japan-US Guidelines for Defense 
Cooperation enabled the two navies to operate more openly together and to 
pursue more sophisticated and threat-relevant training scenarios.  The 
Guidelines were the impetus for JMSDF participation in the multilateral Rim of 
the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, which occurred for the first time in 1980.  
Participation in this multilateral exercise raised the self-confidence of the 
JMSDF and as such, improved the partnership relationship between the two 
navies.  But operational aspects of the relationship suffered from the lack of 
sharing of sensitive information and technology, demonstrating that political 
will and mutual trust were not yet present in this naval relationship. 
The US Navy and the JMSDF participated in a number of training 
activities with US naval forces from the mid-1950s onward.  However, the 
training generally had a singular focus, such as minesweeping or ASW, and was 
directed toward improving the JMSDF technical skills in a defined area.  The 
frequency and technical sophistication of this training grew during the 1976-1981 
period, with a growing pattern of formal and informal interaction among USN 
and JMSDF operational units.  In addition to the joint training indicated in Table 
3, unit training was also ongoing, particularly between ASW units.   
 




Location Description Participating Units 
    Japan                     US 
1976 
(4-7 Sept.) 















ASW Sea around Izu 
Islands 








ASW Eastern area of 
Izu Islands 






ASW Sea of Japan & 
eastern area of 
the Main Island 
Same as above 1 vessels 4 vessels 
1977  
(28 Oct. –1  
Nov.) 
ASW Eastern area of 
Izu Islands 








East of Izu 
Islands 








South of the Main 
Island & west of 
Kyushu 
Same as above 1 vessel 2 vessels 
1979  
(10-17 Feb.)  
ASW 
training 
East of Nansei 
Islands 





(15-30 June)  
Small-scale 
exercise 
Japan Sea, sea 
west of Kyushu 




1 vessel 1 vessel 
1979  






ASW search, attack 







(2-6 Feb.)  
ASW 
exercise 
Sea east of 
Okinawa 








Sea south of 
Okinawa 




































ASW patrol, attack 









East of Nansei 
Islands 




Source:  Japan Defense Agency, Defense o  Japan  1976, 1978 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982 f ,
 
In addition to joint training that occurred in the vicinity of Japan, the 
JMSDF also conducted ASW training off the coast of Hawaii, as shown in Table 
4.  According to a US Navy officer who commanded the submarine training 
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facility, this was excellent operational training for the JMSDF and was often 
combined with land-based training at the submarine facility at Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii.168
 
Table 4:  JMSDF-USN Exercises in Hawaii (1976-1981) 
 
Dates Description of activity Japan’s Contribution*
1977 (May-June) Escort ship training  2 escort ships 
1977 (May-June) ASW patrol plane training  8 P-2Js 
1977 (Sept.-Dec.) Submarine training  1 submarine 
1978 (July-Aug.) Destroyer training  2 destroyers 
1978 (July-Aug.) ASW patrol plane training  8 P-2Js 
1978 (July-Oct.) Submarine training  1 submarine 
1979 (August-Nov.) Submarine training  1 submarine 
1980 (Jan.-Apr.) Destroyer training 2 destroyers 
1980 (Feb.-Mar.) ASW patrol aircraft training 8 P-2J 
Source:  Japan Defense Agency, Defense o  Japan 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982 f
                                                
* US participating units not documented.  
 
 
The training highpoint for Japan-US naval relations occurred in 1980, 
when the JMSDF first participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 
exercise.169   RIMPAC is a comprehensive, multinational naval engagement 
planned by the Third Fleet of the US Navy and conducted nearly annually since 
1971 with the participation of warships and other platforms from foreign 
 
168 Interview 21B (May 2007) 
169 See Ohmori Oral History, p. 8 and Maruyama Oral History, p. 18, and Yoshihide Soeya, ‘Japan's 
Dual Identity and the Japan-US Alliance’, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, May 
1998, p. 17.  Interviews with US and Japanese naval officers, conducted by the author, also 
identified similar concurrences. 
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countries in the Asia-Pacific region.  The JMSDF had wanted to participate in 
RIMPAC years earlier, but a combination of factors, including the Lockheed 
scandal (discussed later in this chapter) prevented JMSDF participation until 
1980.   
Japan participated in RIMPAC 1980, conducted for about three weeks 
from February 26 through March 18, 1980, in the central Pacific near Hawaii.  
Forty-three ships, 200 aircraft, and 20,000 personnel from the US, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and Japan participated in this exercise.  The JMSDF sent a 
helicopter-carrying destroyer, a missile-mounted destroyer, and 8 ASW patrol 
aircraft (P-2J) to participate.170  While this was a multilateral exercise, Japan was 
able to operate ‘officially’ only with the US Navy, given Japan’s collective 
defence restrictions.  Through its participation in RIMPAC 1980, the JMSDF 
became more fully aware of the extent of expertise and capabilities of the US 
Navy (and other navies as well) and as such was introduced to the latest combat 
technology.  Just as significantly, JMSDF pride in its own capabilities was also 
boosted by this experience.  According to Japan’s 1980 Defense White Paper, 
‘the JMSDF became convinced that it was not at all inferior to the US Navy or 
any other forces in terms of navigation, technique, morale, and discipline'.171
Not all current and former JMSDF officers agree on the benefit of 
participating in this large exercise.  While the JMSDF wanted very badly to 
participate in RIMPAC 1980 (and earlier RIMPAC exercises), one retired officer 
maintained that there was not much difference between this exercise and other 
bilateral training interactions the JMSDF had had with the US Navy since the 
1950s.172  But participation in large-scale manoeuvres with the United States—
                                                 
170 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1980, pp. 176-78. 
171 Ibid., pp. 178-179. 
172 See, for example, Admiral Naotoshi Sakonjo (JMSDF-ret.), interviewed by Koji Murata, 4 
April1996, National Security Archives Japan Program, George Washington University, p. 16.      
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something that had not been done previously—did have significant merit for the 
JMSDF, even though the operational contact with other countries was minimal, 
because it was a sign that the JMSDF was recognised as a ‘player’ in the Pacific 
region.  Furthermore, even though no operational interaction occurred with 
other navies, there were many opportunities for informal contact between naval 
personnel of different countries at the social events and gatherings throughout 
the exercise.  This was considered nearly just as important for increasing 
understanding and relations among navies, according to JMSDF officers.173   
Operational interaction between navies is enhanced by the extent of their 
interoperability because it is an indication of organisational coherence.  
Interoperability between navies is comprised of many different elements—some 
tangible and others less tangible.  At a broad level, the US Department of 
Defense defines interoperability as ‘the ability to operate in synergy in the 
execution of assigned tasks’.  The definition further notes that it is the condition 
achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of equipment 
when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily 
between them and/or their users.174  However, interoperability is more than 
equipment, technology and standardisation.  It also involves cultural, political, 
and other less tangible dimensions.  These less tangible dimensions are often 
more important than having compatible systems and equipment because they go 
to the heart of relations between navies.  At the highest level, nations must be 
willing and able to organize themselves into a common force and accommodate 
each other's operational methods.  At the operational and tactical levels, navies 
must be able to exchange information well enough to maintain a common 
                                                 
173 Interviews 19E (2 March 2002) and 22F (4 August 2005), with JMSDF officers.   
174 US Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02:  ‘Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms’, 12 April 2001, as amended 17 October 2007, p. 277. 
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picture of events and be able to support and sustain each other.  In summary, 
the key elements of naval interoperability include compatible doctrine and 
operating procedures, compatible systems and equipment, and compatible 
political and cultural approaches.175 
Unlike NATO, US Navy interoperability in the Asian theatre is not based 
on a long-standing alliance with a tradition of common operating patterns and 
standardisation of systems.  In the 1970s, Japan and the United States were only 
just beginning to establish the foundations for compatible forces.  However, 
decisions made during the years 1976-1981 helped enhance interoperability 
between the two navies and strengthen their organisational foundation.  Firstly, 
US and Japanese defence forces officially acknowledged in defence cooperation 
guidelines that they needed to be able to work together effectively in order to 
resist regional threats.  Secondly, they began talking in navy-to-navy meetings 
about their respective capabilities.  Also, the navies made key decisions on 
procurement of compatible systems and equipment and access to information 
and technology that enhanced the navies' ability to operate together.  Thirdly, 
the two navies enhanced their exercise programme and began to operate 
together more frequently and realistically.  As such, through more frequent 
contact, the navies moved toward common approaches and procedures, systems 
and equipment. 
Until 1976, interoperability existed at the very basic level, unless the US 
Navy lent more sophisticated equipment to the JMSDF for particular exercises.  
During the 1976-1981 period, as Japan was making a transition to a force that 
was more capable of dealing with the developing regional threat, defence 
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175 See a more detailed discussion of naval interoperability in Michael Johnson, Peter Swartz, 
Patrick Roth, Doctr ne for Partnersh p  A Framework for US Mu t nationa  Naval Doctr ne, 
Center for Naval Analyes, CRM 95-202, March 1996, 77-78, and Ken Gause, ‘US Navy 
Interoperability with Asian Allies’, SP's Military Yearbook, 2002. 
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acquisition plans included qualitative improvements in JMSDF platforms, 
systems and equipment.  New acquisition plans included, for example, new anti-
aircraft missile destroyers containing remodelled Tartar anti-aircraft missile 
systems, as well s anti-ship striking capability, helicopters designed to deploy on 
specially-designed destroyers for additional ASW capability, and land-based P-
3C ASW aircraft.176  However, the operational benefits of these acquisitions and 
their contribution to JMSDF-USN interoperability did not appear until some 
years later, and will be discussed in Chapter 3.   
In terms of tactical communication systems, the US Navy and JMSDF had 
only a very basic capability to communicate and pass mission-essential data in a 
high threat environment.  In 1977, for example, the 'secure' communication 
capability in use between USN and JMSDF ships involved manually 
encrypted/decrypted messages passed over uncovered voice circuits.  The 
system was neither rapid nor accurate enough and resulted in degraded tactical 
effectiveness and late reporting to higher authorities.  Sometimes, as discussed 
earlier, the US Navy would temporarily install equipment on JMSDF ships for a 
particular exercise.  However, this practice was not consistent and typically 
involved bureaucratic delays.177
Communicating tactical data and sharing interactive pictures of the 
operating environment became increasingly important to the United States and 
its allies in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the Soviet threat increased.  In the 
late 1970s, as discussed earlier, the JMSDF did not have access to advanced 
                                                 
176 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1980, pp. 114-123. 
177 Memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), ‘COMSEC Assistance for the Japanese 
Maritime Self-Defense Force’, 30 January 1978, Ser 941/S603903, declassified from Secret, and 
Naval Message from COMNAVFORJAPAN to CINCPACFLT, ‘Proposal for Communication 
Security Assistance to JMSDF’, #300050Z, November 1977, declassified from Secret, Box 426, 
Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, 
Washington, DC.   
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tactical data links, such as Link 11, although the US Navy, as well as NATO 
allies, had been using the system to link their ships and aircraft for a number of 
years.  The availability of this system became a sensitive JMSDF-USN issue, 
particularly in the context of the new P-3C aircraft that Japan planned to buy for 
its naval forces, as discussed in an earlier section.  Even with the 1978 change in 
US National Disclosure Policy, conflict between the two navies over access to 
technology still occurred.  
The Japan-US naval relationship did not develop its own doctrinal 
publications but rather used those from NATO as the foundation for its 
operations.  Over the years, the US Navy and JMSDF made changes to the 
publications to accommodate the unique conditions under which the naval 
relationship operates.  The common publications are in English, although the 
JMSDF has made some translated materials available.   
Political will and commitment are the final major components of 
interoperability between navies.  In the case of the Japan-US relationship, the 
two countries' willingness to begin cooperating on defence-related matters, as 
demonstrated by the 1978 Defense Cooperation Guidelines, as well as Prime 
Minister Suzuki's statement in 1981 that Japan would take responsibility for 
sealane defence were important contributions to future naval interoperability.  
The two navies also demonstrated their commitment to a more integrated and 
interoperable relationship, as demonstrated by the navy-to-navy formal talks 
held during this period.  However, each navy had its own interests.  The US 
Navy had to balance its concerns about the risk of unauthorized disclosure of 
information and technology concerning US submarine operations and 
capabilities against having the JMSDF as an active player in ASW operations in 
the Northwest Pacific. 
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The JMSDF recognised the importance of interoperability and the need to 
create compatible doctrine, tactics and procedures with the US Navy at this 
critical point in their relationship.  The JMSDF recognised that it was in its own 
best interest to do so.  According to research conducted by Alessio Patalano, 
Admiral Yada, Chief of the Maritime Staff in 1980, wanted to increase the level 
of cooperation with the US Navy, in accordance with the recommendations of 
the 1978 Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines.  Yada introduced the 
concept of ‘Renkei’, translated as ‘teamwork’ / ‘coordination’ as part of his 
efforts to strengthen JMSDF-USN cooperation.  In particular, Admiral Yada 
wanted to strengthen the ASW capabilities of the JMSDF and to improve 
interoperability and communications between the two navies.  Patalano’s 
research also indicated that the JMSDF viewed closer ties with the US Navy as 
an opportunity to learn as much as possible at the tactical level and to be able to 
maximise the use of modern equipment as well as develop original tactics.178   
 
Institutional Depth  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the depth of a naval relationship is determined 
by a number of tangible and intangible factors, such as shared fundamental 
values, perceptions of the international environment and shared concepts of 
security, along with an equitable sharing of burden and risk.  Similar language 
and culture help to further promote and strengthen a naval relationship.  Due to 
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with the US Navy came from original work by Alessio Patalano, as part of his forthcoming 
doctoral thesis in the Department of War Studies, King’s College, University of London, entitled, 
Unveiling the Imper al Legacy: Strategy, Naval Policy and Propaganda in the Post-Cold War
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a variety of factors during this period, the US and Japanese navies did not 
experience the deeper ties that existed between the US Navy and certain other 
navies in Europe.  Firstly, as noted earlier in this chapter, the US Navy still 
looked across the Atlantic for its strongest relationships.  Secondly, the lack of 
extensive operational interaction during this period prevented the development 
of deeper personal and professional relationships.  Thirdly, culture and language 
differences between the two navies were exacerbated because there were fewer 
opportunities for interaction and familiarisation.  A fraternal bond exists 
between navies; however, navies are still products of their national governments 
and cultures, with all the prejudices and preconceived notions that go along 
with those associations.  Interviews with US and Japanese naval officers—active 
and retired—provided valuable perspectives concerning the depth of the naval 
relationship at this time and the factors that influenced it. 
While sharing much in common as navies, the institutional depth of the 
Japan-US relationship in the mid-1970s was challenged by memories of World 
War II, language and cultural differences, and the lack of familiarity between the 
two navies because they had not worked together in an actual operation.  The 
‘institution’ of the US Navy still looked toward Europe, rather than the Pacific, 
for its close allies.  As the Soviet naval presence expanded into the western 
Pacific during the late 1970s and early 1980s, USN attention began to shift as 
well.  The changing nature of the threat and its perception by both navies were 
the key drivers in moving the navies closer together.  However, the incident 
involving the sinking of the N ssho Maru, discussed later in this chapter, 
demonstrated how quickly a growing relationship can regress when crises 
emerge.   
i
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The nature of Japan-US naval relations for the first 30 years after World 
War II, particularly on an interpersonal level, is well documented by Admiral 
Arleigh Burke and by James Auer.179  JMSDF senior officers continued to have 
good working relations with senior US Navy officers stationed in Japan after 
that time.  However, despite these prominent early relationships between the 
two navies, one should not underestimate the effect that World War II had on 
members of the US Navy, and hence the naval relationship, well into the 1970s 
and 1980s.  A prominent example of the mark that World War II left on certain 
US Navy officers involved a 1978 incident concerning the Commander-in-Chief 
of the US Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. and the memory of his father, 
Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Sr., who died on the bridge of his flagship, the USS 
Arizona, during the December 7, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.   
In May 1978, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, DC—Ambassador 
Fumihiko Togo—had wanted to visit the headquarters of the US Atlantic Fleet in 
Norfolk, Virginia, and meet with Admiral Kidd.  The Japanese Ambassador was 
considered to be ‘pro-military’ and particularly ‘pro-Navy’, and had already 
visited US Pacific Fleet headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Third Fleet 
headquarters in San Diego, California, and the US Naval Academy.180  The only 
missing link was the Atlantic Fleet.  The request for a visit went out twice and 
was turned down each time, with diplomatic excuses made about the Admiral's 
unavailability.  This visit request quickly escalated into a sensitive issue at the 
highest level.  Finally, the reason for Admiral Kidd's resistance emerged in a 
                                                 
179 Admiral Arleigh Burke’s Oral History Interview, (volume I), May 1979, from the US Naval 
Institute, Annapolis, MD, and James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime 
Forces. 
180 Naval Message from CINCLANTFLT to Chief of Naval Operations, ‘Visit of Japanese 
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Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.  The memorandum stated 
the following: ‘CINCLANTFLT Protocol Office has advised that Admiral Kidd 
does not plan to have the Japanese call on him, period’.181  An attached hand-
written note explained that despite the various reasons that had been given in 
the past for Admiral Kidd’s inability to meet with Ambassador Togo, the ‘real 
reason’ was that Admiral Kidd’s father had been killed at Pearl Harbor and was 
entombed on the Arizona.  As such, Admiral Kidd had no desire to meet with the 
Japanese Ambassador.182  
Admiral Kidd’s attitude was by no means unusual for US naval personnel 
during this period.  Even Admiral Arleigh Burke, one of the best friends of 
Japan's maritime community, had less than positive sentiments about the 
Japanese in the years immediately following World War II.  One of the questions 
posed to him during his oral history interview was whether his attitude was 
typical of naval personnel at the time.183  Admiral Burke provides a useful 
discussion of the effect of wars—and World War II in particular—on naval 
relationships:   
 
Oh, yes, I think it was because when you go to war you see a lot of 
things, you're fighting them all the time, and they're your enemy, 
so this attitude was generally held by all our navy people at that 
time and, as a matter of fact, even now, that opinion is held by 
quite a few old-timers who have not been in Japan since the war.  
They still do not like Japanese.184
 
Gradually, in the late 1970s, a network of relationships between the two 
navies began to increase as a growing number of Japanese officers graduated 
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183 Arleigh Burke Oral History, pp. 88-89. 
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from the Naval War College and other training programmes in the United States.  
Beyond these contacts, JMSDF-USN relationships generally were between 
JMSDF officers and US Navy officers who were or had been stationed in or 
operated out of Japan.  JMSDF relations with senior US Navy officials in 
Washington during the 1970s were not as collegial due to a lack of regular 
contact and, according to several key US naval officers, a lack of interest by 
senior US Navy officers in Washington to establish a closer working 
relationship.185  This was particularly the case for officers who had not had 
experience operating in the Pacific region in the post-World War II years.  US 
Navy officers also point to the fact that during this time Europe was still the 
priority mission for the US Navy and for the other US military services, since 
concern about the Soviet threat was focussed principally in the European region 
during the early years of the Cold War.  Further, many US military officers had 
spent formidable periods of their careers in Europe and as such, they were most 
comfortable operating with navies within the NATO alliance.186   
Several other factors prevented the Japan-US naval relationship from 
achieving the closeness that existed with other naval relationships, such as 
within NATO.  According to several senior US Navy officers (active and retired) 
who had served in Japan and Washington from the 1970s through the 1990s, one 
of the problems in working with the JMSDF was that the US Navy never 
completely knew if it could depend on the JMSDF in case of a crisis in the 
region because any request for assistance involved arduous negotiations 
between Japan and the United States before a decision was made, due 
                                                 
185 Interviews 5E (8 April 2005), 5F (10 January 2006) and 15A (22 August 2000). 
186 Interviews 3C (14 December 1999), 2B (29 July 1999), 13A (21 June 2000) and 20A (24 May 
2000), with USN officers who had experience operating with the JMSDF as well as with the 
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principally to constitutional and other restrictions in Japan.  One experienced 
US Navy officer stated that, 'if you can’t plan it (a navy) in, it’s irrelevant'.187   
US naval officers interviewed also noted that culture and language 
differences affected the naval relationship at this particular time.188  While most 
senior level Japanese officers (captain and above) spoke English, the quality 
was not consistent.  The JMSDF required all officers and senior enlisted to pass 
an English language test, but this simply guaranteed that the officer had basic 
language skills.  Few US Navy officers spoke Japanese.  The US Navy did not 
encourage or reward this capability. Therefore, when senior US Navy officials 
met with their JMSDF counterparts, interpreters often had to be used.  This did 
not encourage spontaneity or depth in a relationship, according to US officers.189  
In addition, without more extensive operational contact between the navies, 
there was no incentive to work through the cultural and language differences.   
A combination of cultural and other issues emerged in the forefront of an 
unfortunate accident involving the collision of the US nuclear-powered and 
nuclear-armed submarine, the USS George Washington, with a Japanese cargo 
vessel, the Nissho Maru.  The collision occurred on the morning of 9 April 1981, 
when the submarine surfaced in stormy seas and hit the cargo vessel.  The 
Japanese captain and another crew member drowned.  The other 13 crew 
members floated in two life rafts at sea for hours before being rescued by a 
Japanese destroyer.  According to reports of the accident, the submarine 
                                                 
187 Interview 5E (8 April 2005). 
188 Numerous officers interviewed for this study emphasised the cultural implications of 
operating with the JMSDF versus with English-speaking navies (i.e., navies for whom English 
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189 See, for example, interviews 5E (8April 2005), 7A (20 July 2000), 2B (29 July 1999), 3C (14 
December 1999) and 13 A (21 June 2000). 
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submerged, left the scene and did not immediately report the accident.190  In an 
interview with the retired naval officer who was the US Defense Attaché (US 
Embassy Tokyo) at the time of the collision, the official noted that cultural 
differences affected how Japan and the United States reacted to the accident 
and exacerbated an already difficult situation.  Japan was particularly angry 
because the US Navy did not immediately admit its mistake.191
The damage that the incident caused to the Japan-US security 
relationship and the naval relationship was serious and it unleashed a storm of 
protest and anger in Japan.  The most serious consequences for the security and 
naval relationships came because the incident gave critics of the Japan-US 
security relationship a new platform for their anti-American protests, and 
boosted Japan's anti-nuclear movement.192  In the end, the US Navy took full 
responsibility for the accident in the final, very critical investigative report, 
issued nearly 5 months after the accident.  One aspect of the incident that would 
not be forgotten was Ambassador Mansfield's apology to the Japanese 
government.  When Ambassador Mansfield delivered the Navy report to Foreign 
Minister Sunao Sonoda, he bowed deeply from the waist to nearly a 45-degree 
angle—a powerful symbol of contrition in Japan.  The action was covered in the 
Japanese press and helped in mitigating the effects of the accident and the 
public anger that had been generated there from.193  Despite the wording of the 
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Ambassador to Japan at the time of the accident.  See Don Oberdorfer, Sena or Mansfie d: The
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Navy report and US apologies, the incident set back the security and naval 
relationships nearly a year, according to the retired naval officer who served as 
the Defence Attaché at the time.  The US Navy had to work hard behind the 
scenes to reinforce and renew the naval relationship, including restoring a 




Linkages to outside organizations expand the nature and extent of mutual 
contacts between navies.  These opportunities were critical in helping 
familiarize Japanese naval personnel with respective operating procedures and 
decision making and encouraged the growth of friendships and personal 
contacts between the navies.  During this period, the JMSDF was seeking out 
opportunities for contact with the US Navy and for a better understanding of its 
operations.  This was facilitated through personnel exchanges, staff liaisons and 
increased training and educational opportunities in the United States.  Typically, 
the JMSDF was seeking out opportunities for increased contact with the US 
Navy and for a better understanding of its operations.   For the US Navy, it was a 
way to share its knowledge and influence the development of the JMSDF.  As 
such, however, the Japan-US naval relationship during this period was 
somewhat one-sided in terms of the flow of information and influence 
rendering.  USN officials encouraged this growth in influence rendering, 
recognising that it supported US interests. 
As the Japan-US naval relationship matured, the navies began 
participating together in an increasing number of naval conferences, forums and 
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symposia.  Such participation helped to strengthen the relationship and its 
institutionalisation by providing ideas for new approaches and procedures, as 
well as a way to engage other navies about their operational experiences.  As 
was the case with training and exercises, the two navies were in the early stages 
of expanding their relationship to include connections with outside naval-
related organisations and conferences.  The US Naval War College provided the 
focus for many of these new opportunities, including the bi-annual International 
Seapower Symposium. 
Educational exchanges and training and technical assistance provided an 
important avenue for broader institutional linkages.  The two navies approached 
these opportunities differently, given their different expectations about the 
naval relationship.  Soon after the formation of the JMSDF in 1954, Japan’s naval 
officers were very interested in re-establishing a professional relationship with 
the US Navy, which included officer exchanges, liaisons, and increased training 
and educational opportunities in the United States.  These opportunities were 
critical in establishing closer relationships between the two navies and 
increased institutionalisation because they helped familiarise naval officers with 
respective operating procedures and decision making, as well as encouraged the 
growth of friendships and personal contacts between the navies.  In addition, 
English language skills—critical for working with the US Navy—also improved 
as an increased number of Japanese officers (and later enlisted personnel) came 
to the United States for study and technical training.   
JMSDF participation in educational activities grew steadily through the 
years, as indicated in Table 5.  In 1956, Admiral Richard Colbert invited the 
JMSDF to send a senior officer to the Naval Command College, an institution at 
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the Naval War College established for foreign naval officers.195  The JMSDF 
continued to send one to two officers a year to the Naval Command College 
during this period.  As Japan began to acquire more technologically 
sophisticated systems from the United States, particularly in the area of air 
defence, the JMSDF sent a large number of its officers and enlisted personnel to 
technical training classes in the United States.  This training began in the late 
1970s but grew more rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, after the purchase of the 
Aegis air defence system and its predecessor, the TARTAR system.  In addition 
to US defence institutions, the JMSDF also sent many of its officers to 
programmes (degree and non-degree) at US universities.  Some but not all of 
these numbers are captured in Table 5. 
 
Table 5:  JMSDF Education and Training in the United States, through 2004*  
 




Naval War College  
(Naval Command College)1
49 officers in total (always 1) Since 1957 
Naval War College (Naval Staff 
College) 
31 officers in total (always 1) Since 1974 
Naval Post-Graduate School 29 officers Data not available * 
National Defense University   4 officers Since 1993 
Civilian Colleges 18 officers Data not available * 
AEGIS-related courses 283 officers and enlisted Data not available * 
Equipment/technical courses  306 officers and enlisted Data not available * 
Intelligence courses 44 officers and enlisted Data not available * 
Other misc. training/courses 61 Data not available * 
Source:  JMSDF (Maritime Staff Office), Education Office, 19 August 2004 
* JMSDF officials were not able to provide a year by year break-out of the number of JMSDF 
personnel attending US educational institutions nor was it able to identify when attendance 
began, in most cases. 
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and Allied Naval Cooperation (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991).  This publication 
provides an excellent overview of the evolution of US Navy cooperation with foreign navies. 
 127
The US Navy and others in the US defence establishment recognised the 
importance and value of having Japanese officers study in the United States.  
This is demonstrated in a November 1977 cable from the Defense Attaché at the 
US Embassy in Tokyo—a Navy captain—to the Commander, US Pacific Forces.   
The cable identifies three areas of concern that warranted further US attention 
in order to foster better defence relations between the United States and the 
Japan Defense Agency.  One of the three items included expanding 'military 
schooling' for more members of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and funding the 
expansion with International Military Education and Training funds.  The 
Defense Attaché believed that there was an obvious correlation between the 
high degree of interface between US and Japanese students attending such 
training, and the strong rapport, understanding and influence resulting from that 
interaction and exposure to US military personnel, equipment and doctrine.196
The US Navy did not have the same sense of desire or urgency to send US 
Navy officers to defence or other educational institutes in Japan.  In 1977, the 
US Navy sent an officer to the JMSDF’s Maritime Staff College, and this 
continued on a fairly regular basis thereafter, as indicated in Table 6.  In 1982 US 
officers began attending the National Defense College/National Institute for 
Defense Studies, in Tokyo—the equivalent of the National Defense University in 
Washington, D.C .  As a matter of priority, the US Navy—which found itself 
increasingly stretched as it deployed forces throughout the world in response to 
the expanding Soviet naval threat—wanted its officers to focus on operational 
matters.  Therefore, the Navy did not actively encourage language training or 
other educational training that would have provided a considerable number of 
                                                 
196 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, to DOD 
distribution list, ‘Fostering Closer Interaction with the Japan Defense Agency’, 25 October 1977, 
declassified from Confidential, Box 426A, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational 
Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.     
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US Navy personnel a better understanding of Japan and likely a closer 
relationship with JMSDF officers.197
 
Table 6:  USN Education and Training in Japan, through 2004 
 
Institution Numbers of USN 
Officers 
Date Attendance Began 
Maritime Staff College 19 Since January 1977 
National Institute for Defense 
Studies 
11 Since August 1982 
Source:  JMSDF (Maritime Staff Office), Education Division, 19 August 2004 
* JMSDF officials were not able to provide a year by year break-out of the number of USN 
personnel attending JMSDF educational institutions 
 
 Another way in which the JMSDF attempted to enhance its relationship 
with the US Navy was through liaison officers placed on the staff of certain 
Navy commands.  As indicated in Table 7, the JMSDF provided two officers to 
the headquarters of US Naval Forces Japan, beginning in 1956, to serve as links 
between the two navies.  An additional liaison was added to the US Pacific Fleet 
in 1974.  No additional JMSDF liaison officers assumed positions on US Navy 
staffs during the 1976-81 period.  As the liaisons were mid-level naval officers—
generally a Commander or Captain—they served as administrative liaisons—not 
as decision makers.  According to JMSDF and USN officers interviewed, the 
JMSDF liaisons benefited the JMSDF more than the USN because the liaisons 
received access to certain types of information and US perspectives that would 




                                                 
197 See, for example, interviews 3C (14 December 1999) and 2A (22 March 1999). 
198 See, for example, interviews 18A (8 July 2004) and 19E (3 February 2002).  
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Table 7:  JMSDF Liaison Officers on US Military Staffs, through 1981  
 





Headquarters, US Pacific Fleet  1 officer Since 1974 
Headquarters, US Naval Forces 
Japan 
2 officers Since 1956 
Source:  JMSDF (Maritime Staff Office), Education Office, 19 August 2004. 
 
As was the case with education and training, the US Navy did not 
reciprocate and place USN officers on JMSDF staffs. The only liaison officer the 
US Navy provided to Japan during this time was a junior Navy lieutenant who 
taught naval history classes at the Maritime Academy in Eta Jima, Japan.  This 
position was established in October 1972.  According to US Navy officers 
interviewed, other operational requirements prevented the US Navy from 
placing one of its officers on the JMSDF staff.  They noted that since the two 
navies were located so close to each other, communication was not a problem.  
That said, however, several USN and JMSDF officers of the period interviewed 
have indicated that one or more US liaisons at the JMSDF headquarters would 
have provided tangible benefits, particularly in the early days of the naval 




The foregoing analysis indicates that while interacting in various 
capacities for many years prior to 1976, the two navies were just in the early 
stages of formalising their relationship.  They had a considerable way to go to 
come close to the relationship that the US Navy had established with certain 
                                                 
199 See Interviews 7A (20 July 2000), 22F (4 August 2005) and 19E 2 March 2002. 
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allies in NATO and in the ANZUS alliance.  The relationship displayed just the 
basic elements of institutionalisation during this period.  The key 
accomplishment for the naval relationship was establishing a foundation for 
cooperation, which was critical for building the later relationship.  In addition, 
the developments during this period also represented an acknowledgement on 
the part of both navies that naval cooperation was in their best interest, and as 
such, both navies made adjustments to their policies and procedures. 
Some of the greatest achievements during this period occurred in internal 
coordination—a key institutional building block.  This was best exemplified in 
the first formalised naval talks, held in 1977, that helped foster improved navy-
to-navy understanding and began to lay the groundwork for closer operational 
cooperation.  Operational cooperation, in the form of exercises and training, 
also grew during this period but was challenged by a lack of interoperability due 
in part to the US Navy's objection to sharing certain information and technology 
with the JMSDF.  The US Navy’s unwillingness to share sensitive information 
and technology, even though the United States had provided some of the same 
information to certain other allies, demonstrated a lack of trust between the two 
navies.  The US Navy adjusted some of their policies towards the end of this 
period, which represented the start of more substantive cooperation between 
the two navies.  Similarly, the JMSDF recognised the importance of teamwork 
between the navies and, through its policies and practices, took various actions 
that strengthened certain operational capabilities and interoperability.  Of 
particular significance in 1980, the JMSDF participated in its first RIMPAC 
multinational exercise. 
One of the most interesting revelations during this period was that the US 
Navy was far from a unitary block when it came to fostering cooperative 
 131
relations with the JMSDF and providing the JMSDF access to classified military 
information and technology.  The institution of the US Navy was split between 
those who had had experience operating in the Pacific and working with the 
JMSDF and those whose experience had been with the US Atlantic Fleet and 
principally with NATO allies.  The two navies were just beginning to operate 
together—on a regular basis—to meet mutually acknowledged security threats.  
Institutionalisation was beginning to grow out of this cooperation as both navies 
acknowledged that certain structures, processes and procedures were needed to 




OTHER FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE JAPAN-US NAVAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
The changing nature of the Japan-US security relationship was an 
important influence on the naval relationship, particularly in the early stages of 
institutionalisation.  This was exemplified by the political commitment by Japan 
and the United States to support defence cooperation, as articulated in the 1978 
US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation.  They provided the foundation 
for increased cooperation of a more complex nature and served to ‘legitimise’ 
the cooperative relationship that had been developing between the two navies.  
The decision by Japan and the United States to improve the nature and extent of 
their security cooperation rose from a large degree of self-interest motivated by 
political, economic and security factors in each country.  Changes within Japan 
were particularly important in facilitating new levels of cooperation.  With the 
support of Japan’s political leadership, US officials could more easily engage 
their counterparts and constructively work toward building a more cooperative 
security relationship.  At the same time, the JMSDF had greater freedom to 
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engage the US Navy, with overt support from their senior political leadership.  
This had not been the case in the past.   
A combination of factors in both countries helped create conditions for 
cooperation.  The growing threat from the Soviet Union became an increasing 
concern to both navies and defence establishments and eventually the political 
establishments.   In the United States, the aftermath of Vietnam, rising debt, 
inflation and balance of payment problems meant that the United States in the 
1970s was principally concerned with getting allies to help share the defence 
burden through increased defence spending and a more equitable sharing of 
military roles and missions.  Japan was a focus of congressional attention 
because of on-going trade battles and competition over a variety of other 
economy-related issues.  Key US civilian officials were responsible for asserting 
the importance of the Japan-US security relationship and helped launch 
cooperative initiatives with Japan that ultimately benefited the navies, fending 
off US congressional pressure. 
In Japan, the key factors that led to a more cooperative security 
relationship with the United States and increased exercises and other 
interaction between the navies included a growing Soviet threat in the Northeast 
Asia region and recognition of the vulnerability of Japan, changing attitudes of 
the Japanese public toward defence and security issues and a growing 
consensus on defence issues within the Japanese political establishment.   In 
addition, continued vitriolic trade and economic relations with the United States 
created competing pressures on the government and on efforts to cooperate on 
defence-related issues with the US government.  As with the United States, key 





Until approximately 1976, US concerns about the Soviet Union were 
principally focussed on activities in the Atlantic and in Europe.200  However, a 
series of events and new activities in the strategic environment changed these 
perspectives.  Of particular concern was growing Soviet naval strength in the 
Pacific.  In 1977, Admiral Maurice Weisner, Commander-in-Chief, US Forces 
Pacific (CINCPAC), warned that the Soviet Union had improved and increased 
its naval capabilities to such an extent that they could pose a threat to US 
maritime interests in the Pacific Ocean.201  One year later, in 1978, CINCPAC 
noted a fundamental change in the balance of naval forces in the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans.  He noted that the Soviet Pacific Fleet was now the largest of all 
Soviet fleets and that it was likely that new Soviet vertical/short take-off-and-
land/anti-submarine warfare carrier and Backfire Bomber would join the Pacific 
Fleet beginning in 1980, significantly improving Soviet war-fighting capabilities 
in the Pacific.202 In a statement to the Far Eastern Economic Review (May 5, 
1978), Admiral Weisner stated that if war broke out, US forces in the Pacific 
would have an 'even chance' of defeating Soviet forces but that ‘the balance of 
power is tipping towards the Soviets’.203
Along with the acknowledgement of the increasing Soviet threat in the 
Pacific came unsettling revelations by senior military personnel about US 




200 For example, in 1975, the Ford Administration reduced the number of forward-deployed 
aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific from three to two.  See US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, US Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installa ons, Committee Print, 
prepared by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 1979, p. 190. 
201 US CINCPAC, 1976 Command History, declassified from Top Secret, p. 498, Operational 
Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.   
202 US CINCPAC, 1978 Command History, declassified from Secret, p. 127, Operational Archives 
Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.   
203 US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military
Instal ations, pp. 185-186.   
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vulnerabilities—particularly with regard to the US ability to defend vital 
sealanes in the Pacific.  The revelation emerged initially with the announcement 
in February 1976 by Admiral James Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, that 
the United States had lost its once undisputed control of the Sea of Japan.204  
Then, in 1977, Admiral Stansfield Turner stated that because of the shortages of 
sea control forces and mobile logistics support forces, the United States would 
have difficulty protecting lines of communication into the western Pacific.205   
Referring to the ‘swing strategy’, Admiral Holloway testified that if US Pacific 
Fleet assets were shifted to Europe in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, remaining 
US forces could protect only military lines of communication to US allies in the 
Western Pacific.  Holloway omitted any reference to the US ability to keep sea 
lines of communication open for economic supply of Japan from the Persian 
Gulf, Southeast Asia, and the United States.206
During the period 1976-1981, Japan’s concerns about the growing threat 
from the Soviet Union were publicly acknowledged and discussed in increasing 
detail each year in its annual defence white papers.207  These security concerns 
were one of the central reasons Japan re-evaluated its defence requirements and 
its force structure, beginning with the 1976 Defense Outline, and for the 
increased focus on improving naval capabilities in the late 1970s.  Japan’s new 
assessments were a striking change from the past, when publicly articulated and 
published statements in Japan concerning defence and the international 
situation indicated a relaxation of tensions between the East and the West.  The 
                                                 
t t ti
204US CINCPAC, 1976 Command History, p. 396. 
205 Ibid., p. 396.  Also see Admiral Stansfield Turner (USN-ret.), ‘The Naval Balance: Not Just a 
Numbers Game’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 2, January 1977. 
206 US Foreign Policy Objec ives and Overseas Military Ins alla ons, pp. 185-186.  
207 While some may question when Japan began to be concerned about the military capabilities of 
the Soviet Union and the potential effect on the region, scholars appear to agree that the public 
acknowledgement of this threat occurred in the mid-to-later 1970s.  See James Auer Oral History 
Interview and the Defense of Japan white papers for years 1976-1981. 
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formidable incident for Japan came in September 1976, when a Soviet MIG-25 
aircraft intruded its territorial airspace.  The 6 September intrusion and forced 
landing at Hakodate Airport in Hokkaido by the Soviet Union’s most advanced 
fighter aircraft was one of a number of wake-up calls that occurred in the next 
few years that prodded Japan into making needed changes to its defence forces, 
including its naval forces.208 The incidents demonstrated not only the 
increasingly daring Soviet forces but also the vulnerabilities of Japan’s defence 
forces to defend its borders from regional threats.   
The JDA’s annual White Papers became increasingly specific during the 
years 1976-1981 concerning the nature of this potential threat.  The 1976 report 
contained less than 5 pages about Soviet military capabilities.  This coverage 
grew incrementally larger during each of the years that followed.209  According to 
the JDA, Soviet aircraft approached Japan about 200 times that year, and 
scrambles by Japanese Air Self-Defense Force aircraft were flown on more than 
300 occasions.210 From an operational standpoint, questions arose as to how the 
Self-Defense Forces could have allowed a MIG-25 to penetrate Japan’s territorial 
airspace, despite round the clock coverage by 28 radar stations across the 
nation and Air Self-Defense Force aircraft on ground alert.  The JDA and the 
Self-Defense Forces discovered that the Soviet aircraft was able to land 
undetected due to the lack of early warning capability against low-altitude 
intrusions and insufficient airborne ‘look-down’ radar capability of interceptor 
                                                 
f
208 Soviet aircraft intruded Japan’s territorial airspace also in September 1977 and March 1978, 
near the island of Tsushima.  See Defense of Japan 1978, pp. 33-34.  According to US CINCPAC, 
Japanese officials reported in August 1976 that the Soviet Union had intensified its aerial and 
naval intelligence activities around Japan, including frequent violation of Japanese air space and 
territorial waters.  See US CINCPAC, 1976 Command History, declassified from Top Secret, 
Volume One, p. 415. 
209 See Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1976, pp. 16-20; 1977, pp. 28-34; and 1978, pp. 31-
39. 
210 De ense of Japan 1978, pp. 33-34. 
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aircraft in Japan.211  This discovery—and other recognised vulnerabilities—
affected future procurement decisions for Japan’s Air and Maritime Self-Defense 
Forces for years to come.  For the JMSDF, platforms with enhanced surveillance 
capabilities received priority.   
The notable increases in Soviet armed strength included particularly its 
increased naval power and advancing ‘blue water’ capability, which Japan 
feared had begun to affect the regional military balances in both Europe and the 
Far East.  The 1978 defence white paper stated that Soviet naval power was 
becoming ‘an unignorable factor in the security of the island regions off the 
coast of continental Asia’.212   
 
Changing Public Opinion and Politics in Japan 
 
Over the course of the post-war period, Japan’s security planning process 
revolved around the contentious domestic issue of defining the purpose of the 
Self-Defense Forces, as well as containment of the military’s institutional 
influence in national policy formulation.  The relatively late incorporation of 
Japan’s military into US regional strategy was due not only to decisions in the 
United States but also in Japan, where a slow and complex process existed for 
defining an acceptable place for the post-war military in national policy.  It was 
not until the national policymaking process had gained greater domestic support 
that the Japanese government was able to move in the direction of creating a 
policy dialogue with the US government to establish procedures and goals for 
                                                 
211 This incident, and the continued assertiveness of Soviet forces in the years that followed, 
helped justify procurement decisions during this time period and resulted in such purchases as 
the E-2C Hawkeye, an airborne, all-weather early warning aircraft that warns the naval task 
force of approaching air threats.  See Defense of Japan, 1977, pp. 126 and 137. 
212 See Defense of Japan 1978, p. 50. 
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cooperation between the two militaries.213  This, then, enabled the navies to 
conduct their cooperative activities more openly. 
In the mid-1970s, Japanese public opinion began to change concerning 
security issues in general, and more specifically concerning Japan’s defence 
forces and the Japan-US security relationship.   Security issues began to be 
discussed more openly and less passionately, and both the security treaty 
(between the US and Japan) and the Self-Defense Forces received greater public 
acceptance.214  Table 8 indicates changes in public opinion between 1965 and 
1977 on questions concerning the role of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and 
demonstrates that a greater recognition of the SDF role in national security 
preservation existed in 1977 than in earlier years.  Of particular significance, on 
5 August 1976, the Japanese High Court ruled that it was legal for the country to 
maintain military forces—reversing a district court ruling made 35 months 
earlier.215   
 
















1965 15 40 28 3 14 1 
1969 13 50 22 2 13 0 
1972 10 56 20 2 12 1 
1975 13 57 21 1   8 1 
1977 13 60 16 1 10  1 
Source:  Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1978, p. 177.  (The Prime Minister's Office 
conducted this survey until 1975, when an external research organisation conducted the survey.) 
 
                                                 
213 Sheila Smith, ‘The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the Japan-US Alliance’, p. 80. 
214 Cable from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘US Goals and Objectives: 
Overview Statement’, cable #220835Z, February 1978, declassified from Secret, p. 4, Box 426, 
Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, 
Washington, DC.     
215 US CINCPAC, 1976 Command History, p. 413. 
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Japanese defence officials expressed optimism about the emerging 
changes in Japanese public opinion.  Michita Sakata, Director General of the 
Japan Defense Agency, stated in the 1976 Defense White Paper that ‘…a 
tendency to confront defence issues within current realities has begun to 
emerge among the people.  They seem to have accepted that defence power is 
not a tool to wage war, but rather to deter it, in other words, a tool for people’.216
The significance of the public opinion shift in Japan at this time and the 
effect it had on the JMSDF should not be minimized.  Between 1952 (when 
Japan and the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty) and the mid-
1970s, a vocal minority had successfully stymied the public discussion of 
defence issues and targeted the US government and the Mutual Defense 
Agreement as objects of hostile reproach.  Throughout the Japanese government 
and the public in general there existed a moderate opposition to what was 
viewed as the 'promotion' of defence and security issues, and this affected the 
implementation of defence programmes.  Anti-defence public opinion 
significantly affected defence programmes during the Fourth Defense Plan 
(1972-76), according to Japanese officials, including the type and amount of 
equipment procured, changes in the defence budget, and the extent of 
cooperation with US military forces.  This attitude even affected the publication 
of Japan’s second Defense White Paper in 1976 (the first was published in 1970), 
according to former JDA Director General Michita Sakata.  He stated that the 
drafting took longer than expected due in part to ‘…the predominance with the 
Defense Agency of a long-standing passive atmosphere, shunning public 
controversy, over positive attitudes of presenting defence issues frankly to the 
people and cultivating understanding of Japan’s defence requirements’.217   
                                                 
i
216 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1976, p. 44. 
217  Ib d., pp. 1-2. 
 139
As preparations were being made for JMSDF participation in the 1980 
RIMPAC multilateral exercise, Japanese defence officials cautioned US officials 
to keep discussion of the preparation out of the public eye.  These defence 
officials realised that while Japanese public opinion was changing, JMSDF 
participation in a multilateral exercise at a location way beyond Japanese 
territorial waters—even though Japan would be operating solely with US 
forces—was still a sensitive subject to the Japanese population.218  According to 
two former senior Defense Agency officials, although Japan was technically 
capable of participating in RIMPAC prior to 1980, they were not able to do so 
because advance political groundwork had not been laid in time.  According to 
these officials, the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation was a key 
element in the ‘political persuasion’ that was necessary before the JMSDF could 
participate in RIMPAC, demonstrating once again the important role of Japanese 
domestic politics in the JMSDF’s ability to interact operationally with the US 
Navy.219
The increased public interest in Japan's national defence and the 
attitudinal shift can be attributed to a number of factors.  According to JDA 
Director General Sakata, various factors contributed to this shift, such as the 
end of the Vietnam War, the debate over ratification of the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty, tension on the Korean Peninsula, Sino-Soviet conflict on 
the 'hegemony' issue, the Japan-US summit conference, and the activities of 
Soviet naval and air forces around Japan.220  The American Embassy viewed the 
situation similarly and discussed it frequently in cable traffic back to 
                                                 
218  Naval Message from CINCPACFLT  to USDAO (Canberra, Australia), ‘JMSDF Participation in 
RIMPAC’, #150210Z, December 1978, declassified from Secret, p. 2, Box 426, Political-Military 
Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.     
219 Ohmori Oral History interview, p. 8 and Maruyama Oral History interview, pp. 18-19. 
220 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1976, pp. 52-53.  See also cable from American 
Embassy, Tokyo,‘US Goals and Objectives: Overview Statement’, p. 4. 
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Washington.  The Embassy saw that old inhibitions—political, psychological and 
constitutional—were less apt to paralyze the government of Japan and to affect 
its security relationship with the United States.  These changes, in addition to 
the JDA’s establishment of a semi-official think tank for defence issues, were 
unimaginable in prior years, according to the Department.221  
One indication of the changes in outlook on security-related issues is to 
compare Japan’s first Defense White Paper, published in 1970, and the second 
one, published in 1976.  Table 9 provides an assessment of the key elements in 
each one.  The assessment, conducted by the US Department of State’s Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research, identifies a move away from autonomous defence 
and towards a view that was more closely aligned with the United States at that 
time and with the Mutual Security Treaty.  As indicated in Table 8, an attitude 










                                                 
221 See, for example, American Embassy, Tokyo, ‘US Goals and Objectives: Overview Statement’, 
p. 4; Naval Message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘Japanese 
Defense—the Future’, #200836Z, 20 April 1978, declassified from Secret, p. 13, and Department 
of State, ‘Current Foreign Relations’, issue No. 10, 8 March1978, declassified from Confidential, 
p.7— both from Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, DC.     
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Table 9:  Comparison of Japan’s 1970 and 1976 Defense White Papers 
Conducted by the US Department of State 
 
 Autonomous vs. 
Collective Security 







to European neutrals 
Small nuclear arms were 
considered legally and 
theoretically permissible, 
though contrary to 
government policy 
The Japan-US Mutual 
Security Treaty was 
considered necessary as 
long as Japan was not a 
nuclear power and no 
major changes in the 





emphasis on principle 
of collective security 
Japan affirms reliance on 
US nuclear deterrence 
and emphasises its three 
non-nuclear principles 
Places greater emphasis on 
the Treaty and conveys a 
sense of less qualified and 
more permanent support 
Source:  US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, ‘Japan Issues Second 
Defense White Paper’, Report No. 496, 25 June 1976, pp. 1-3, Box 352, Political-Military Division: 
Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.     
. 
In addition to the changing attitudes toward security and defence among 
the Japanese public, the mid-to-late 1970s also saw greater consensus 
concerning defence issues within the political establishment in Japan.  This 
includes the political parties and the government bureaucracy—principally the 
JDA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance.  These changes 
contributed significantly to improved security cooperation and enhanced 
defence links between the two countries because previously existing barriers to 
intra-government cooperation were reduced or eliminated.  The result of these 
changes was a more pragmatic approach to foreign and security policy 
planning—better suited to the domestic and international conditions of the late 
1970s. 222   
Three political changes were critical to the renewed support for the 
Mutual Defense Treaty and security cooperation with the United States.  The 
                                                 
222 US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, ‘Japan Issues Second Defense 
White Paper’, Report No. 496, 25 June 1976, pp. 1-3, Box 352, Political-Military Division: Japan, 
Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.     
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first change was the alignment of the factions within the ruling LDP to support 
this objective.  The unification of the LDP and its movement to a new middle 
ground began with the collapse of  Defense Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s 
autonomous defence plan (the Fourth Defense Buildup Program from 1972-
1976).  For senior members of the Japanese government in the mid-1970s, the 
Nakasone experience (and the failure to achieve his goal) proved that the 
constituency for defence spending had to be expanded to include moderates in 
government and industry—including the Ministry of Finance.  Depth of support, 
such as from industry, had to be sacrificed for breadth of support from the 
public, according to new Japanese leadership.  Secondly, in addition to the 
growth of consensus among LDP factions, the Democratic Socialist Party 
provided centrist political party support for Japan-US relations and the Komeito 
(Clean Government) Party provided their tacit support.  Finally, the Japan 
Socialist Party dropped its opposition to the Mutual Security Treaty and Japan's 
security relationship with the United States.223  Obtaining political party 
consensus (or in the case of the Japan Socialist Party—the lack of opposition) 
was essential in order to pass necessary legislation and defence programmes 
that would serve as the foundation for the new security relationship with the 
United States.  
In conclusion, the political environment in Japan in the 1970s had a 
critical effect on the conduct of JMSDF-USN exercises and other related 
interaction.  The shifts in Japanese public opinion concerning security and 
defence issues and the JMSDF, combined with other political changes, helped 
                                                 
223 For a more detailed account of the political changes and how they affected support for 
defence in Japan, see Naval Message, ‘Japanese Defense—the Future’, pp. 2-4   See also, Naval 
Message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘Moderate Parties Pledge 
Support of Japan-US Relations’, #160006Z, December 1977, declassified from Confidential, pp 1-
2, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical 
Center, Washington, DC.     
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increase the number of naval exercises and enabled the two navies to operate 
more openly together.  The discussions between Japan and the United States on 
defence cooperation, which culminated in the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense 
Cooperation, finally provided an element of legitimacy for naval cooperation 
between the two countries. 
 
Defence Burdensharing   
 
In the mid-to-late1970s, a combination of political and economic tensions 
in the Japan-US relationship served, ironically, to influence changes in the 
security relationship, including a greater focus on defence cooperation, which 
ultimately benefited the naval relationship.  During this time period, the United 
States began to pressure Japan for increased defence burdensharing, given the 
struggling US economy, the growing trade imbalance between the United States 
and Japan, and the growing threat from the Soviet Union that was requiring 
increased US military attention and resources.   
In the United States, the US Congress had assumed the role of the chief 
antagonist on burdensharing issues, maintaining that Japan’s defence forces 
should significantly expand their role and mission in the region given its 
economic status and the potential security challenges it faced in the region.  In 
1976, Japan had the third largest economy in the world and a gross national 
product of about $500 billion.  A report to the Congress by the US General 
Accounting Office in January 1977 is one example of the discussions and debate 
at the time within the US government concerning whether or not Japan was 
bearing an appropriate share of the defence burden.  The summary page at the 
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front of the report expresses a perspective that was shared by many in 
Washington and more generally in the United States at the time:  
 
Defense requirements in Northeast Asia continue to be borne 
primarily by the United States.  Japan’s most immediate security 
concerns—open sealanes and a stable Korea—are met by US 
military forces.  Japan has prospered under the security provided 
by the US defence umbrella and developed into an economic 
superpower capable of assuming a greater share of the common 
defence burden.  This report identifies conditions impacting on 
Japan’s role and discusses possible areas for increased Japanese 
support.224  
 
The burdensharing requests included not only increased financial support 
for US forces stationed in Japan but also suggestions that Japan should upgrade 
its own defence capacity, with particular emphasis on qualitative improvements 
in ASW and air defence.  While Japan’s Self-Defence Forces had gradually 
improved their capabilities, they still were not capable of defending Japan 
against a large sustained attack.  Furthermore, while Japan’s defence spending 
approached $5 billion in fiscal year 1976, Japan’s financial support for the US 
military presence in Asia was limited to paying land rental for areas occupied by 
US forces in Japan.  The burdensharing debate was not just a phenomenon 
affecting Japan.  The United States was at the same time pressuring its allies in 
Europe to both increase defence spending and improve their defence 
capabilities, as indicated by additional US General Accounting Office reports to 
the Congress at this time.225
In Japan, burdensharing was part of a larger set of issues concerning 
trade and balance of payments disputes.  As tensions grew, diplomatic officials 
                                                 
224 US General Accounting Office, Opportunity for More Equitable Sharing of the US/Japan 
Defense Burden, January 1977, ID-77-8, pp. 1-3.  See also, Naval Message from American 
Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘Japan Self-Defense Capabilities’, #100153Z , 10 May 
1977, p. 2, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, DC.     
225 US General Accounting Office, Opportunity for More Equitable Sharing of the US/Japan 
Defense Burden, pp. i and ii.  The Government of Japan also considered payments to Japanese 
communities near US bases as a support cost.  
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in both Japan and the United States were concerned about rising nationalist, 'go 
it alone' sentiment in Japan.  These debates coincided with the US decision in 
1976 to withdraw a large portion of its forces from South Korea.226  This decision 
created significant concern in Japan about the future presence of the United 
States in the region and ultimately the future security of Japan.  According to 
archival documents, Japan faced a conundrum over the force withdrawal issue.  
If it made a major diplomatic issue out of the withdrawal proposal, the United 
States would then ask Japan why it was not increasing its defence capabilities in 
order to better meet the perceived threat.227
The increasingly contentious atmosphere between the two countries on 
issues of burdensharing and trade-related issues was creating serious diplomatic 
problems.  In November 1977, US Ambassador Mike Mansfield sent a detailed 
cable to the US Secretary of State detailing his concerns over the state of the 
Japan-US relationship.  As with his other communiqués back to Washington, 
Ambassador Mansfield alleged that US officials did not trust Japan—be it with 
regard to trade relations or on Japan’s ability to safeguard sensitive defence 
information and technology.  Regarding defence burdensharing, Mansfield 
stated that while Japanese performance in some areas left much to be desired, it 
was important to recognise the limitations on the ability of the Government of 
Japan to influence the events.  He noted that within these limits, Japan was 
                                                 
226 In his successful Presidential campaign in 1976, Jimmy Carter promised to withdraw, 
eventually, US ground forces from Korea.  The plan evolved into a withdrawal of nearly 32,000 
troops over a 4 to 5 year period.  See USCINCPAC, 1977 Command History, declassified from 
Top Secret, p. 41, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 
227 US Navy position paper, ‘Japan: Politico-Military Summary’, written by Captain J.E. Baker, OP-
612, 16 June 1978, declassified from Secret, p. 1, box 426A, Political-Military Division: Japan, 
Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.  This position paper 
highlights the various issues that made Japan and other Asian countries sceptical of US 
intentions in the region.  See also personal note from Defense Attaché, American Embassy 
Tokyo, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, 17 March 1977, concerning Japanese 
statements concerning potential US force withdrawal from the Republic of Korea.  Both 
documents were obtained from the Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives 
Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC, boxes 426A and 425, respectively.   
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attempting to strengthen the capability of its forces by commitments to 
purchase such aircraft as the F-15, P-3C and the E-2C—all of which were 
qualitative improvements over existing platforms.  In Japan, moderate 
proponents of continued US military presence exerted their influence in 
supporting qualitative improvements for Japan's Self-Defense Forces, further 
financial support of US forces in Japan and greater security cooperation with 
the United States, including with the US Navy. 228 As discussed in Chapter 3, 
Japan’s efforts eventually paid off, particularly for the JMSDF, and resulted in 
US congressional favour for the transfer of certain technologies, such as Aegis 
capability for JMSDF destroyers. 
  
Defence Cooperation Initiatives 
 
The naval relationship in the 1970s was not isolated from other elements 
in the Japan-US security relationship.  As the broader security relationship was 
undergoing an institutionalisation process, two elements were particularly 
significant for the naval relationship: the work of the Subcommittee on Defense 
Cooperation and the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation.  They 
provided a certain ‘legitimacy’ for defence cooperation between the two navies, 
laid out a path for future cooperation and served to engage senior leadership in 
both countries on defence cooperation.  Without these efforts and the sanction 
of the US and Japanese governments, the cooperation and institutionalisation 
between the two navies would have remained at a fairly low level. 
                                                 
228 Cable from Ambassador, American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘State of the 
Relationship’, #090818Z, November 1977, declassified from Confidential, pp. 1-4, Box 426, 
Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, 
Washington, DC and Naval Message, ‘Japanese Defense—The Future’, pp. 5-10. 
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The Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation, established in 1976, and the 
1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, which emerged from the 
Subcommittee, established the first formalised mechanism between Japan and 
the United States to discuss when and how the two defence forces should 
cooperate for defence purposes.229  Although the US Navy and the JMSDF had 
had ongoing cooperative activities at a low level for many years, the activities 
were not publicised, particularly in Japan.  As such, the Defense Cooperation 
Subcommittee and the Defense Guidelines provided a certain legitimacy for 
defence cooperation between the US and Japanese navies.  They also served as 
vehicles to engage the United States on issues of growing concern to Japan.230  
Of particular significance was the role played by senior Japanese officials in 
initiating and promoting discussion of defence cooperation.  For the naval 
relationship, the engagement by Japanese political officials and their influence 
in promoting changes in Japanese public opinion toward greater acceptance of 
the defence forces provided an additional boost to the JMSDF and its desire to 
pursue active cooperation with the US Navy. 
Japanese and US officials assumed important roles in initiating improved 
defence cooperation between both countries.  Japanese officials, in particular, 
encouraged the establishment of improved defence cooperation and discussions 
between the United States and Japan.  The Subcommittee on Defense 
                                                 
229 The Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation was part of the Security Consultative Committee, 
an alliance mechanism discussed in Chapter 1. 
230 The SDC focussed on potential contingencies in Japan and the Far East and on Japan-US joint 
exercises and other activities during non-conflict periods.  The defence establishments in the 
United States and Japan believed that under the aegis of the SDC panels, Japan-US military 
requirements could surface more openly.  This is likely true because previously there was no 
other way to establish these parameters without the existence of a formal structure.  While the 
navies had been working together for over 20 years, this was the first opportunity they had had 
to sit down with their counterparts, as well as their respective civilian leaderships, and discuss 
operational planning.  See Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Staff Paper, ‘Subcommittee on 
Defense Cooperation: Terms of Reference’, 21 June 1976, declassified from Confidential, Box 
352, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, 
Washington, DC. 
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Cooperation emerged after a series of meetings between senior US and 
Japanese officials: US President Gerald Ford and Prime Minister Miki Takeo in 
August 1975, and subsequent talks that month between US Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger and Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Michita 
Sakata.231   
In discussions with Schlesinger, Sakata suggested that in order to move 
forward with the Japan-US Security treaty, Japan and the United States needed 
to come to terms with the specifics of the arrangement between the two 
countries concerning control of the sea areas.  The role that JDA Director 
General Sakata played in initiating discussions on defence cooperation was 
remarkable for two reasons.  Firstly, it was highly unusual that a Japanese 
official, who was not the Prime Minister, had the authority—or wherewithal—to 
make such a suggestion to a senior official in the US government.  Secondly, the 
Defense Agency was not an independent agency, and typically, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency’s parent organization, served as the key 
point of contact in high-level dialogues with the US government.  While initially 
suggested by Japan, US officials realised that participation in such a process 
was in the best interest of the United States, given other emerging issues such as 
the drawdown of its forces from the region after the Vietnam War.232  
In August 1977, the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation made the first 
of a series of important decisions affecting the Japan-US defence relationship.  
The Committee agreed that while the Self-Defense Forces would be in charge of 
responding to limited and small-scale aggression, in the case of larger scale 
                                                 
231 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1977, pp. 7-8. 
232 Apparently Sakata wanted to discuss the matter of emergency cooperation with US Secretary 
of Defense Schlesinger after Sakata was questioned in the National Diet on the protection of 
maritime traffic.  He recognised that there was no established organ to discuss defence 
cooperation—in an emergency or any situation.  See Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 
1976, pp. 5-6, and Takashi Maruyama Oral History, p. 10. 
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aggression, the Self-Defense Forces would be in charge of defensive operations 
and US forces would head the offensive.  In essence, Japan was the shield and 
the United States the spear.  This decision was critical in the preparation of 
guidelines for defence cooperation.  For the navies, it was critical in how they 
would share responsibilities in defending the sealanes that surrounded Japan 
and was a precursor to later discussions on roles and missions.233
In 1978, after two years of discussion and deliberations between US and 
Japanese representatives in the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation, Japan 
and the United States approved the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense 
Cooperation.  The Defense Guidelines were considered a milestone in Japan-US 
defence relations.  They formed the basis of defence planning and other 
activities—albeit limited—between US forces and Japan’s Self-Defence Forces 
until the late 1990s.  The Guidelines set precedents for civilian control, 
interagency cooperation and operational legitimacy for the JSDF, as well as 
helped to bind the US and Japanese strategies together.234 The Guidelines spelled 
out a general division of labour between the two defence forces and called for 
joint studies on operational issues in three areas: prevention of aggression 
against Japan, responses to military attacks on Japan, and Japan-US cooperation 
in case of a conflict in the Far East.  The Guidelines also called for joint 
exercises and training, cooperation in intelligence activities, and the study of 
                                                 
233 A number of events occurred nearly concurrently during the mid-1970s and helped influence 
the division of defence responsibilities between the United States and Japan and the 
institutionalising of Japan-US defence cooperation between the defence forces.  For Japan, the 
1976 National Defense Programme Outline, discussed later in this chapter, was particularly 
important.  Japanese scholar Yoshihide Soeya provides a useful discussion of how National 
Defense Program Outline and other factors affected Japan-US defence cooperation.  See 
Yoshihide Soeya ‘Japan’s Dual Identify and the Japan-US Alliance’, pp. 15-16. 
234 Green and Murata maintain that the Guidelines laid the groundwork for the ‘roles and 
missions’ strategic approach that the Japan-US alliance pursued in the 1980s, which significantly 
affected the naval relationship.  Michael J. Green and Koji Murata, ‘The 1978 Guidelines for the 
US-Japan Defense Cooperation:  Process and the Historical Impact’, Working Paper No. 17, 
George Washington University National Security Archives, 27 April 2004, pp. 4-5.  See also Soeya, 
‘Japan’s Dual Identify and the Japan-US Alliance’, pp. 15-16.    
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how facilitative assistance should be extended to US forces.235  In defence 
planning, studies focussed on responding to a military attack on Japan.  
Cooperation in the case of an emergency in the Far East proved too 
controversial due to constitutional and political constraints on Japan’s security 
policy and was pursued in the later 1990s, when Japan and the United States 
revised the Guidelines.  Despite its shortcomings, the 1978 Defense Cooperation 
Guidelines laid the groundwork for the ‘roles and missions’ strategic approach 
that the Japan-US alliance pursued in the 1980s.  This approach was critical for 
the two navies, particularly after 1981, when Japan publicly committed itself to 
protect the sealanes out to a radius of 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo. 
Mixed views emerged in Japan and the United States concerning whether 
and how the JMSDF and US Navy benefited from the Guidelines.  Some officials, 
such as James Auer, former Japan Director in the Office of the Secretary, US 
Department of Defense, maintained that the Defense Cooperation Guidelines 
made little difference to the JMSDF and US Navy because a habit of cooperation 
already existed between them. Auer believed that the Guidelines ‘worked fine’ 
but were limited in scope and 20 years too late, especially for the naval forces.  
He stated that the two navies had been conducting joint exercises and 
intelligence sharing since the 1950s, although Japan’s ability was very low 
initially.236   
Others, such as Keiji Ohmori, a former senior Japanese defence official, 
maintained that the Guidelines helped raise the technical sophistication of joint 
training between the two navies and with Japan’s Air Self Defense Force 
(JASDF), he said.  The JMSDF and the JASDF traditionally had the closest 
                                                 
235 For a summary of the Guidelines, see Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1979, pp. 187-
193.  
236 James Auer Oral History Interview, p. 9. 
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relationship with the US forces.  For example, Ohmori pointed out that the 
Defense Guidelines helped influence the emergence of scenario training.  Prior 
to the Guidelines, joint training for both the JMSDF and the JASDF generally 
involved learning particular technical skills from the US forces.  In addition to 
changes in the nature of joint training, the number of exercises also increased, 
which Ohmori attributed to the Guidelines.237
 
Importance of People 
 
In taking stock of the political changes that occurred between 1976 and 
1981 in Japan, Michita Sakata, Director General of the Japan Defense Agency 
from 1975-1977, stands out as having had a particularly significant influence on 
the Japan-US security relationship and on the JMSDF-USN relationship.  Sakata 
was one of the key Japanese officials who stepped forward and pushed for 
closer cooperative security relations with the United States following the end of 
the Vietnam War, when the possibility of US withdrawal from Japan threatened 
to reignite internal LDP warfare over ideologically sensitive defence issues.238 
Sakata was responsible for creating the long-term National Defense Program 
Outline (NDPO), which emphasized the primacy of the Japan-US alliance 
relationship.  The NDPO, adopted by Japan’s National Defense Council on 29 
October 1976, set out the principles for Japan's defence alongside the necessary 
force structure to achieve these principles.  The new plan included a standard 
defence force concept that restricted the potentially endless quantitative build-
up of Japan's defence forces and expenditures for which there was limited 
                                                 
237 Ohmori Oral history interview, p. 8. 
238 Green and Murata, 'The 1978 Guidelines for the US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Process and 
the Historical Impact’, p. 2.   
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domestic support.  The NDPO created an internal political truce within the LDP 
and also a more stable foundation for the emergence of a new security policy in 
Japan. 239
In addition to the NDPO, Sakata played a key role in initiating policy 
discussions with US Defense Secretary Schlesinger and other US officials on 
defence cooperation, an unprecedented move by a senior Japanese bureaucrat.  
These discussions resulted in the creation of the Subcommittee on Defense 
Cooperation, and two years later, the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense 
Cooperation.  In general, he set a new direction for the defence establishment—
away from an industry constituency to one that had a broader base—in order to 
achieve increased public support for defence policies, defence forces, and the 
Japan-US Mutual Defense Treaty.240   
As a long-time Diet member, Sakata understood the importance of public 
support for national defence and as such helped establish programmes and 
initiatives to provoke public discussion and consideration of defence issues.  In 
order to reach the public, Sakata re-commissioned the publication of an annual 
Defense White Paper.  He also recommended that the National Defense Council 
assume a more active role on issues considered to be within the framework of 
overall national security.241  His most significant action to improve public 
relations within Japan for defence issues was the creation of a ‘Forum on 
Defense’, consisting of 11 representatives of industry, academia and the media 
who met six times over a period of three months and issued a public report with 
its findings in September 1975.  According to defence specialists, the group had 
                                                 
ili239 See, for example, Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' M tary Power, 
Adelphi Paper 368-9, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, pp. 67-69. 
240 Ibid., and Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1976, pp. 4-5 and 53. 
241 Former Director General Nakasone had initiated the first White Paper six years earlier, in 
1970.  No additional White Papers were issued after that time.  See Defense of Japan 1976, pp. 4-
5 and 53. 
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the most open and healthy debate on defence issues that Japan had experienced 
in the post-war period.  This ultimately had an important influence on the Japan-
US defence and naval relationships, as defence issues were now more publicly 
recognised and accepted.242  
Once Sakata laid the groundwork for increased defence cooperation, 
Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, in 1981, provided the political commitment for 
more significant and long-term security cooperation with the United States.  
Prime Minister Suzuki, in a summit meeting with US President Reagan, 
announced that Japan would provide sealane defence in the northwest Pacific 
out to 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo.  As such, the Prime Minister was also 
endorsing extended JMSDF cooperation with US forces, which would be 
operating in the region.  This was also another example of civilian leadership 
laying the foundation for the JMSDF to assume a much more robust role in 
Japanese and regional security matters.  Prime Minister Suzuki declared that 
some new 'division of roles' between Japan and the United States in the 
northwest Pacific was desirable and that Japan would 'seek to make even 
greater efforts for improving its defence capabilities in Japanese territories and 
surrounding seas and air space'.243
Why would Prime Minister Suzuki have made such a commitment, and 
what influenced his announcement?  To some, this announcement came out of 
the blue and was a surprise.  To others, especially within the Japanese 
government, the announcement was a surprise only in so far as it had not been 
previously planned and coordinated in Japan prior to the Prime Minister’s 
departure for Washington.  For example, according to a former senior Japan 
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242 See Defense of Japan 1976, pp. 4-6 for Sakata's own explanation of why public forums and 
discussions were important in order to achieve a successful defence programme.  See also 
Green, Arm ng Japan, pp. 75-76. 
243 See US Department of State, ‘Visit of Prime Minister Suzuki’, Department of Sta e Bulletin 81, 
2051 (June 1981), p. 3.   
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Defense Agency official, Noboru Hoshuyama, the 1,000 mile sea lane defence 
concept was ‘well known and almost common sense’ inside the Defense Agency 
as well as inside the Japanese government.  According to Hoshuyama, the 1,000 
mile sealane defence, as well as the territorial waters around Japan, was the 
area the government had targeted for defence.  He contemplated that perhaps 
someone informed Prime Minister Suzuki that this was a commonly accepted 
view within the Japanese government and that as such there should be no 
problem in mentioning it in his Washington speech.244   
According to the Japanese senior official who served as Director General 
of the North American Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the 
Ministry was very surprised at Suzuki’s announcement.  Director General 
Shinichiro Asao regretted that MOFA officials had not explained more about 
sealane defence when they briefed the Prime Minister.  Asao stated that MOFA 
officials did not know in advance whether the sealane defence issue would be 
raised at the press conference that followed the Suzuki-Reagan communiqué.245    
Euan Graham, in his book on Japan’s sealane security, bases his 
discussion of the Suzuki announcement principally on interviews with Hisahiko 
Okazaki, who at the time was Japan Defense Agency Councillor for Foreign 
Relations and had accompanied Prime Minister Suzuki to the United States.  
According to Okazaki, the brief for Suzuki’s May 1981 visit to Washington was 
prepared with the objective of presenting Japan in the most positive light 
possible, by re-packaging existing policy statements that were a matter of Diet 
record.  For example, Prime Minister Suzuki appeared before the House of 
                                                 
l
, fi i l, f  
244 Statements by Noboru Hoshuyama in Report on Japanese Ora  History Program and Remarks 
by Noboru Hoshuyama  Former Japanese Defense Agency Of c a  on US-Japan De ense
Cooperation, conference organised by the National Security Archive US-Japan Project and the 
Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, March 12, 
1996, p. 14. 
245 Shinichiro Asao, interviewed by Koji Murata, 3 October 1996, National Security Archives 
Japan Program, George Washington University, pp. 8-9. 
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Councillors Special Committee on Security on 10 November 1980 and stated that 
the SDF had the legal right ‘to defend Japanese shipping on the high seas if it is 
exposed to attack and other dangers’.  According to Graham, this was the first 
time that a post-war prime minister had asserted the constitutionality of 
protecting Japan’s sealanes beyond the extent of its territorial waters.246  
Graham writes that Suzuki was unaware of the controversy generated by 
the Joint Communiqué or by his subsequent press conference until he read the 
Japanese press coverage of the summit during a refuelling stop on his return 
flight to Tokyo.  It was only at this point that Suzuki realised his comments on 
sealane defence had been taken by Washington as an official policy commitment 
on the part of his administration.247
The situation surrounding Prime Minister Suzuki’s announcement was 
likely an example of the influence rendering that occurred between the defence 
establishments in Japan and the United States.  In 1980 and 1981, a number of 
influential US officials visited Japan and met with government officials, 
including Okazaki, to discuss the concept of a Japan-US division of labour based 
on sharing roles and missions.  The defence policymaking environment in Japan 
was particularly sensitive at this time to US pressure on burdensharing, and was 
anxious to placate Washington through concessions on security issues.248  It is 
likely, therefore, that defence officials in Japan, such as Okazaki—who had 
strong links to the US defence establishment---did what they could to influence 
the Prime Minister’s announcement.  Japan’s assuming responsibility for sealane 
defence out to 1,000 miles was consistent with expectations from Washington 
for a division of labour. 
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Soon after Prime Minister Suzuki's visit, the Japanese and American 
press as well as government representatives began disputing the context and 
meaning of Suzuki's statements.  In Japan, opposition parties were opposed to 
such an extension of defence lines and expanded cooperation with the United 
States.  In the United States, many saw the 'commitment' as hollow, given the 
capability of the JMSDF at the time and that it was meant to placate the US 
government in the midst of sensitive discussions over defence burdensharing.  
Secretary of Defense Weinberger, however, stressed that in previous discussions 
with Japan he had only asked that in the near-term Japan start to acquire the 
capability to defend the sealanes out to 1,000 miles.   
Suzuki’s announcement was eventually taken to mean that Japan had 
committed to a goal—to be attained in about a decade.  This was consistent with 
expectations by the US defence establishment that Japan assume greater 
defence burdensharing responsibility.  However, the Japanese government made 
it clear that its sealane responsibilities applied only in the event that Japan was 
under attack.  This interpretation soon changed to accommodate sealane 
defence without an attack on Japanese territory—a more realistic assumption 
during the Cold War.249   
    
Summary 
 
External factors played a key role during the 1976-1981 time period in 
influencing the development and expansion of the naval relationship.  The 
developing threat environment, national leadership influence and compatible 
                                                 
249 See Peter J. Wooley, Japan's Navy:  Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000 (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
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Security Issues’, in Japan:  A New Kind of Superpower?  edited by  Craig C. Garby and Mary 
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national goals and objectives—as reflected in defence cooperation initiatives in 
the broader security relationship—contributed to the movement toward 
increased cooperation between the navies.  While external factors were not as 
critical to the naval relationship in later periods, once the navies had established 
a closer operational relationship, they now were instrumental in helping 
establish the foundation for cooperation and eventually naval 
institutionalisation during the years covered in this chapter.     
The political commitment by Japan and the United States to support 
defence cooperation, and the resulting Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in 
1978, provided the foundation for increased cooperation of a more complex 
nature and served to ‘legitimise’ the cooperation that had already started to 
develop between the two navies.  The navies realized they could do only so 
much without the support and commitment of their respective governments.  As 
such, Prime Minister Suzuki’s commitment in 1981 to develop the capability for 
sealane defence out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan opened the door to new 
opportunities for the JMSDF and new contributions to the naval relationship. 
Domestic politics in both Japan and the United States contributed to the 
transformation of the Japan-US security relationship and was a positive 
influence on naval cooperation during this period.  In Japan, the alignment of 
factions within the ruling LDP to support the Mutual Defense Treaty and 
security cooperation with the United States, the support and tacit support of the 
Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito Party, respectively, and the lack of 
opposition of the Japan Socialist Party helped improve the nature of Japan-US 
security relations by removing previous resistance that prevented initiatives for 
cooperation.  Similarly, the shift in public opinion in Japan toward greater 
public acceptance of the Self-Defense Forces, as well as for the security treaty 
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between the United States and Japan, was also an important step in the 
development of the naval relationship.  Combined with the US-Japan Guidelines 
for Defense Cooperation, the shift in public opinion in Japan enabled the two 
navies to operate more openly together and to increase the nature and 
sophistication of their exercises.   
In the United States, domestic politics contributed to the advancement of 
the security relationship and defence cooperation.  While US congressional 
pressure for increased defence burdensharing on the part of Japan contributed 
to periods of tense foreign relations between the two countries, this pressure 





This early period in the institutionalisation of the naval relationship 
provided a variety of new opportunities for the JMSDF and US Navy as they 
moved toward more cooperative relations with each other.  Although the two 
navies had been exercising together for the previous two decades, the 
institutionalisation in the relationship was relatively limited.  During this earlier 
time period, there was no need to create institutional structures because the 
naval relationship entailed no operational engagement, per se, but rather 
training and limited exercises.   
During the 1976-1981 time period, institutionalisation growth was closely 
linked to the Japan-US security relationship and to other external influences, 
such as the increased threat and domestic politics.  It is doubtful that without 
the progress in the security relationship, including the emergence of the 
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Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, that the navies could have on 
their own advanced institutionalisation in the operational relationship.  With the 
domestic political restrictions that Japan faced, agreement had to be reached at 
the national level before naval cooperation—which had been ongoing—could be 
made public and enhanced.  Advancements in the security relationship provided 
a degree of legitimacy to the naval relationship and its associated activities.   
Significantly, however, external influences were not enough on their own 
for institutionalisation to grow in the naval relationship.  As the nature and 
extent of JMSDF-USN interaction and cooperation increased, the navies 
recognised that a more effectively coordinated relationship was necessary, 
including new communication mechanisms, improved interoperability of 
systems and equipment and improved structures for decisionmaking.  This is not 
a unique phenomenon for navies.  Indeed, the British and Japanese navies 
responded similarly as their operational relationship developed within the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the early part of the twentieth century.   
The new cooperative relationship—now publicly recognised—served the 
interests of both navies and they derived benefits from it.  As such, the navies 
had their own reasons for promoting the relationship.  In the case of the JMSDF, 
the cooperative relationship with the USN provided a way for it to have 
deployment opportunities that it likely would not have experienced given 
domestic constraints in Japan.  The Rim of the Pacific naval exercise, for 
example, gave the JMSDF the opportunity to operate in an environment with 
other navies—something unheard of just two years earlier—and a way to 
increase its own prestige.  For the US Navy, the developing operational 
relationship that was receiving greater recognition in both countries meant that 
it could turn its attention to the growing naval threat in the broader Pacific 
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region and rely more heavily on the JMSDF to secure the area around Japan.  
This sentiment grew in the mid-1980s as the JMSDF’s technical capability 
increased. 
Nevertheless, despite evidence of institutional growth during this period, 
the two navies had far to go when compared with other alliance naval 
relationships due to a range of constraints in the external environment and 
within the naval relationship itself.  Chapters 3 and 4 show how some of these 





CHAPTER 3:  Maturing of the Naval Relationship:  1986-1991 
 
For the two navies, the five years between 1986 and 1991 were marked by 
a diverse set of challenges and circumstances.  The growing threat from the 
Soviet Union over the previous decade and a convergence of US and Japanese 
strategic interests resulted in more physical integration and interoperability than 
ever before.  In the previous period (1976-1981), the two navies made strides 
towards establishing a foundation for cooperation.  During this period, the 
JMSDF and the USN operated extensively together and created a division of 
labour of sorts for its military cooperation under the Japan-US Mutual Security 
treaty.  The growth of this relationship, and the increased trust that developed, 
proved key to improvements in the sharing of sensitive information and 
technology.  This culminated in 1988 in the transfer to Japan of the Aegis 
advanced radar system—the top of the line air defence system—despite on-
going battles in the security relationship over technology transfers.   
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new threats, 
the end of the 1980s was a time of change for the security relationship.  The two 
defence bureaucracies worked more closely together than in the previous 
decade and established close personal and professional contacts.  However, as 
the Japanese economic bubble continued to grow, conflicts between the two 
nations increased over trade-related matters and defence burdensharing.  In 
1991, Japan’s unwillingness to send defence forces to the Persian Gulf, a 
decision driven by political forces in Japan, was a turning point for the alliance 
and naval cooperation.  Operational interaction in the form of exercises, as well 
as other cooperation between the two navies, began to slow as Japanese and US 
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interests diverted and this affected continued institutional progress in the 
relationship. 
 
MAPPING THE NAVAL RELATIONSHIP:  1986-1991 
 
During this key period in the evolution of the Japan-US naval 
relationship, the capability of the two navies operating together increased 
significantly, relative to the previous period.  The period was marked by themes 
that reflected an increasingly close naval relationship.  All the elements of 
institutionalisation—internal coordination, operational interaction, external 
linkages and institutional depth—grew during this period.  The greatest growth 
occurred in the area of operational interaction.  This growth was particularly 
significant because of its effect on the other elements of institutionalisation.  As 
a result of the increased contact between the US Navy and the JMSDF, their 
standards of behaviour in an operational environment became more similar and 
culture and language differences were more easily overcome than in the past.   
New structures, procedures and routines—such as regular high-level naval 
meetings—emerged in order to facilitate the operational cooperation.   
The specific roles and missions of each navy were also now more 
explicitly defined.  This helped facilitate exercises and joint operations against 
regional threats.  While Japan took responsibility for defending the air space and 
sealanes up to 1,000 miles from its shoreline, the United States provided the 
nuclear umbrella, offensive projection forces in the Northwest Pacific, and 
sealane protection forces in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans.  
Interoperability between the two navies improved during this period as a result 
of the JMSDF’s acquisition of technologically sophisticated platforms for anti-
 163
submarine and anti-air warfare missions—most of which were the same 
platforms as those operated by the US Navy.  In addition, a closer alignment of 
doctrine and operational philosophies improved operations and interoperability.  
 
Internal Coordination   
 
The two navies emerged in 1986 with much more sophisticated processes 
for working together, including regular high-level navy-to-navy meetings and 
more defined organisational procedures and routines.  In large part, this was 
due to an agreement to share roles and missions in the region and the new 
requirement for closer cooperation.  This was also the case for sharing 
information and intelligence.  The US Navy needed the JMSDF assistance in 
defeating a formidable regional naval threat and as such loosened many of the 
former restrictions on sharing information, systems and technology with the 
JMSDF.  However, at the end of the Cold War, with both navies heading in 
somewhat different directions, signs emerged that the internal coordination was 
breaking down. 
The discussions between the United States and Japan concerning their 
respective roles and missions occurred primarily in the early 1980s, but the 
effect was felt in the latter part of the decade.250  Internal naval coordination was 
critical to ensuring that the JMSDF and USN worked effectively together in 
performing their respective missions.  One of the ways this was accomplished 
was through Navy-to-Navy Talks, which had begun in the previous period.  Now 
these talks these talks were being held on an annual basis.  While the minutes 
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sealane protection forces in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans.  
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and discussion points from these meetings remain classified, naval officials 
participating in them stated that the nature of the discussions had changed 
considerably since 1977, when the first formal set of meetings occurred.   
By the mid-1980s, the talks were considerably more open and relaxed, 
and information and intelligence were shared more freely by the US Navy.  This 
was due, in part, to the increased time the navies were now spending operating 
together against the Soviet threat and recognition on the part of both navies that 
operational cooperation was in their best interests.  According to one retired US 
Navy officer, ‘the Soviet submarine force bound the two navies in a “lovers 
embrace” ’ and as such, cooperation was considerably improved from the 
previous period.251  US Navy officers who participated in the Navy-to-Navy Talks 
during this period noted that they were no longer conducted in a teacher-
student format, with the US Navy providing the majority of the information, as 
had been the case in the past.  Now, the JMSDF had information to share with 
the US Navy concerning trends in the movement of Soviet naval forces, which 
they were also tracking.252  In general, 10 years after the first Navy-to-Navy Talks, 
the discussions were now conducted on a more equal basis and the navies 
responded to each other more honestly and openly.  In addition to the Navy-to-
Navy Talks, the US Pacific Fleet and the JMSDF were now holding annual staff 
talks, the first of which was held in 1988.  Moreover, JMSDF-USN Intelligence 
Exchanges were being held bi-annually.253
The mid-to-late 1980s was a period of improved information and 
intelligence sharing between the JMSDF and the US Navy, and the United States 
began to loosen many of its previous restrictions on technology transfers.  A 
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more equitable sharing of sensitive military information, intelligence and 
technology was a significant accomplishment for the naval relationship.  
According to US Navy officers (active and retired) interviewed, the JMSDF 
dedication to sealane defence and the need to communicate with US forces and 
transfer mission-related data was the impetus for many of these changes.254  
Gradually, the US Navy and the US Department of Defense expanded the range 
of technology shared with Japan, including equipment and technology for 
improved anti-submarine warfare, tactical communication, secure data transfer, 
and finally, in 1988, Aegis technology for improved air defence, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  In October 1987, for example, the US Secretary 
of Defense and the Director General of the Japan Defence Agency agreed to 
promote ASW technology and equipment exchanges, as well as to conduct 
closer exchanges of information related to ‘maritime observations’.255   
Another important reason for the relatively close relationship between 
the navies during this period was their mutual dedication to the ‘maritime 
strategy’.256  Yet, this ‘strategy’ was not a US strategy but a US Navy strategy.  
The JMSDF responded energetically to it, according to US Navy officials and 
Japan specialists, and the strategy was the driving force for JMSDF operations 
in the 1980s.257  US Navy influence was exerted through the maritime strategy, 
given JMSDF dedication to it.  The JMSDF was ‘empowered’ by its role in the 
implementation of this strategy in the Northwest Pacific—empowered to 
                                                           
254 Interviews 16B and 21A, with retired US Navy officers who held key positions in managing the 
naval relationship during this time. 
255 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1988, p. 165. 
256 Conceived by the US Navy in the 1980s, the ‘Maritime Strategy’ focused heavily on offensive 
operations against the Soviet Union.  The strategy was used to broaden the US Navy’s role in Cold War 
military strategy and justify new procurement, including a  ‘600-ship’ Navy.  For further information on 
this concept and its development, see John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the US Navy’s Maritime 
Strategy, 1977-1986, Newport Paper #19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004). 
257 Interviews with US Navy officers and Japan specialist:  Interviews 9K (Sept. 2004), 5A (Mar. 2000), 
15A (Aug. 2000) 23A (August 2000). 
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improve its operations with the US Navy but also to go beyond the 
complementary roles and missions established in the 1980s. 
In addition to encouraging Japan to take certain actions during this 
period, the United States was also influential in stopping Japan from taking 
certain actions.  For example, in the early 1990s, the United States found out 
about the JMSDF interest in building an aircraft carrier—and squashed it.  This 
was one of a number of incidents that occurred in the early 1990s that indicated 
that divergent goals and objectives were beginning to take the navies in different 
directions, at the end of the Cold War period.258  While the capabilities Japan 
wanted to develop were useful for sealane surveillance and defence missions, 
they also signalled possibly larger ambitions as well.  Senior US government 
officials opposed a power projection capability for Japan, viewing it as 
redundant rather than complementary to US capabilities in the region.  
According to Michael Armacost, US Ambassador to Japan at the time, there was 
very little support in senior US circles for Japan’s plans, particularly in the wake 
of the 1991 Gulf War, in which Japan did not participate.259  Interviews with 
retired US Navy officers who were familiar with the developments indicated that 
senior JMSDF officials were angry that they did not receive support for their 
proposals when they met with senior US Navy officials in Washington.  A more 
significant revelation, according to these officers, is that the US admiral who 
received the Japanese officials had not been briefed on the controversial nature 
of their visit beforehand and quickly dismissed the issue with little discussion—
an indication, according to these officers, that the formerly close relationship 
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258 Interview 5A (21 March 2000), 5D (8 April 2005) and 3B (14 December 1999), with retired US 
Navy officers with extensive Japan experience. 
259 Michael H. Armacost, Friends or Riva s?  The Insider’s Account of Japan-US Rela ons (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 88-90. 
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was breaking down.  This was also an indication that naval roles, missions and 
goals were not being as closely coordinated as they had been in the past.260
 
Operational Interaction   
 
The JMSDF and USN moved from conducting relatively simple exercises 
and training in the late 1970s to more realistic exercises and operations during 
this period, in response to regional threats and the new roles and missions they 
were now performing.  This cooperation, in which the navies shared operational 
risks and the regional defence burden, was a critical element in binding the 
navies together. While these joint interactions were technically ‘exercises’ and 
‘training’, in reality they were critical operations that provided anti-submarine 
and related support in the region. The end of the decade brought new threats in 
the Middle East.  The US Navy helped prepare the JMSDF to make its first out-
of-area deployment since the Korean War and provided assistance during this 
1991 minesweeping deployment, at the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm.  
However, this cooperation was short-lived.  The JMSDF returned from the 
deployment but did not return to the region until a decade later.   
Japan-US naval exercises at this time were divided into two general 
classes—‘fleet exercises’ and more unit specific training.  Fleet exercises 
included the participation of a variety of platforms in exercises such as 
‘ANNUALEX’ and RIMPAC.  These exercises generally occurred on a regular 
basis—such as once a year, lasted a number of days and included formal 
exercise preparation and debriefing periods.  Unit-specific exercises focused on 
a specific specialty, such as anti-submarine warfare.  It may have included just 
                                                           
260 Interview 5A (21 March 2000), 15A (22 August 2000) and 3D (4 December 1999), with retired 
US Navy officers with extensive Japan experience. 
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one type of platform (such as the P-3C) or several types (submarines and anti-
submarine helicopters).    
The JMSDF-USN formal exercise programme increased in both scope and 
sophistication during the1986-1991 period, providing a further indication of a 
more integrative concept of operations between the two navies, as well as of 
growing institutionalisation.  Key indicators for exercise complexity include the 
number of units participating in the exercise, the diversity of the units and the 
scale of the exercise.261  In the 1970s, JMSDF-USN interactions tended to focus 
on just one warfare specialty and were limited generally to just anti-submarine 
warfare and minesweeping exercises.  This changed in the mid-to-late 1980s, as 
the US Navy and the JMSDF participated in a greater number of combined 
operations emphasizing ASW, air defence and surface strike operations, as a 
result of new threats and security challenges.   
By 1987, most ASW exercises were part of a larger contingent of forces 
that also engaged in air defence and surface strike training.  This was in large 
part because of on-going threats in the Persian Gulf and the acknowledgement 
by navies worldwide that this was the threat against which they needed to 
exercise.  The 1987 missile strike in the Persian Gulf against the USS Stark, a 
guided missile frigate, and the subsequent threats in this region, dramatically 
increased the global focus on missile defence.262  Nevertheless, ASW was still the 
backbone of JMSDF-USN operations.  Only minesweeping exercises remained a 
singular focus.  Japan’s minesweeping capability was a unique asset for the 
nation and since the end of World War II Japan had taken great pride in these 
                                                           
261 Interview 3B (14 December 1999), with US Navy officer who participated in JMSDF-USN 
exercise development and implementation.  
262 See, for example, George C. Wilson, ‘Preemptive US Strike on Iran Missiles Debated: July 1 
Deployment of Weapons Possible’, Washington Post, 5 June 1987, p. A-1.  This article, and a 
series of other similar news articles, note concern by the US government and other governments 
about Iran’s possible deployment of Silkworm anti-ship missiles against international oil tankers 
transiting the Gulf and potential  international responses. 
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forces.  The US Navy acknowledged the importance of this mission capability, 
since the US capability was minimal.  Without minesweeping vessels deployed 
in the region, the US Navy’s contribution to the exercises was limited to aircraft 
that helped lay the mines.263   
Another change during this time period was the participation in 1987 of 
the USS M dway carrier battlegroup in the JMSDF's annual combined exercise.  
The Midway’s participation was a result of an ‘invitation’ from the JMSDF.  
According to James Auer, who was stationed in Japan at the time, the two 
navies had been talking for some time about the possibility of having the 
Midway and its battlegroup exercise with the JMSDF.  The discussions were 
deliberately conducted behind the scenes because although the Japanese public 
was less resistant to Japan-US security cooperation, sensitivity still existed in 
Japan, especially when a US aircraft carrier was involved.  This was a clear 
example of the shift in JMSDF-USN combined exercises from a decade earlier, 
when the focus was on relatively simple engagements and generally just one 
warfare specialty.  JMSDF records indicate that a US aircraft carrier 
participated in a JMSDF combined exercise again in 1989 and in November 1991.  
Preparation for the Gulf War in 1990 and anti-shipping concerns in the Persian 
Gulf in 1988, and the dedication of forces to that region, likely prevented aircraft 
carrier participation during these years, according to a USN officer.
i
                                                          
264
In addition, for the first time in a JMSDF annual exercise, the 
headquarters of US Naval Forces Japan manned a 24-hour exercise cell within 
 
i f l
263 Japan had been perfecting its minesweeping capability since 1945, when its minesweepers 
began to search Japanese waters for mines sown during World War II.  They were later used in 
1950 to clear mines in Korean harbours.  In 1990, Japan had more than 40 highly capable 
minesweeping vessels.  By comparison, in 1987 the US Navy had only three minesweeping 
vessels in the active Navy and 18 in the reserve force, all of which had been built in the 1950s.  
See Norman Polmar, The Ships and A rcra t of the US F eet (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 
1987), pp. 233-234. 
264 Interview 3G (March 2000). 
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the operations command centre to provide a liaison between the US Navy and 
the JMSDF operating forces at sea and ashore commanders.265  Table 10 provides 
a list of major JMSDF-USN combined exercises held between 1986 and 1991.  
The list is evidence of the increased diversity and sophistication of the 
exercises, compared with the exercises and training presented in Chapter 2.  
The reduced activity in 1990 and most of 1991 is due to the Gulf War and the 
preparation for the Gulf War—the focus of US Seventh Fleet forces during this 
time period. 
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Source:  Defense of Japan 1987, (p. 326), 1988 (p. 321), 1989 (p. 326), 1990 (p. 180), 1992 (p. 232) 
 
At the unit level, the most active ASW units in both navies were the P-3C 
patrol aircraft.  The JMSDF had acquired 40 P-3C aircraft by 1987, and by 1990 
this number had increased to 60—far surpassing the number of US Navy P-3C 
aircraft deployed to Japan during this time period.266  During the height of the 
Soviet submarine threat, in the mid-1980s, JMSDF and USN P-3C squadrons 
worked very closely together in prosecuting the Soviet submarine threat.  Based 
on the numerous interviews conducted for this study, the JMSDF-USN P-3C 
community appears to be the model success story of JMSDF-USN cooperation 
during the Cold War period.  P-3C ASW squadrons were nearly interchangeable, 
according to US and Japanese naval officers.  According to one Japanese naval 
officer, a typical engagement might have included a USN P-3C dropping a 
                                                           
266 In 1988, the US Seventh Fleet had 25 P-3C aircraft deployed in Japan.  See Rear Admiral 
Edward B. Baker, Jr. statement to the Seapower Subcommittee, House Armed Services 
Committee, US House of Representatives, 4 February 1988, p. 4. 
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number of sonobuoys into the ocean and then a JMSDF P-3C arriving on the 
scene later to monitor the submarine contacts.267   The JMSDF aircraft would be 
replaced later with another USN P-3C, which would continue the monitoring.  
Finally, a JMSDF P-3C would arrive and retrieve the sonobuoys.268   
As compared with other JMSDF and USN platforms, the P-3C units 
conducted frequent training, often without the formal announcements and 
preparation that occurred with other units.  One advantage over other naval 
units is that many of the P-3C bases were either co-located or located relatively 
close to each other, which facilitated joint unit training, joint briefings, and 
other joint interaction.   As discussed in Chapter 2, the joint training occurred 
even before the two navies were using the same aircraft.  In the mid-1980s, the 
JMSDF transitioned to the P-3C patrol aircraft from the P-2J.  The P-3Cs used 
digital technology that facilitated data transfers between the aircraft, increased 
the speed of processing submarine contacts and improved secure 
communication between the aircraft.  Interoperability between the navies thus 
improved considerably as a result of using similar aircraft to prosecute ASW 
targets.269
Another contribution to improved alliance interoperability in the area of 
ASW came in 1988, when the JMSDF began deploying SH-60J ASW helicopters 
aboard its destroyers.  These helicopters provided additional ASW capabilities 
as well as anti-surface protection.270  In addition, during the same year, the 
                                                           
267 A sonobuoy is a small sound receiver-transmitter normally dropped from an aircraft to detect 
submarine noises and transmit them back to the aircraft. (See John V. Noel, Jr. and Edward L. 
Beach, Naval Terms Dictionary (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1978) p. 277. 
268 These comments were reiterated in with JMSDF and USN officers who had operated the P-3C 
aircraft.  See, for example, interviews 2A&B, 4A, 5A, and 9A and many others in both navies.  
Even non-P-3C naval personnel noted that the level of cooperation between the JMSDF and USN 
P-3C community was nearly unprecedented. 
269 Interviews 5A and 9A.  Both naval officers (one active and one retired) were P-C3 pilots. 
270 As the successor of the JMSDF HSS-2B anti-submarine helicopter, the SH-60J is a licensed 
modification of the US Navy's SH-60 airframe. 
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JMSDF began taking steps to equip its destroyers with a ‘passive’ sonar system 
known as TASS, capable of searching for submarines over a wide range of area.  
Since the US Navy also had TASS, this enabled more effective operations when 
ships from the two navies were operating together against Soviet submarines. 
Despite the interaction and extensive training that went on between P-3C 
units during this period, USN officers interviewed cautioned that this did not 
necessarily mean that all JMSDF-USN units were operationally engaged in the 
same way.  Indeed, according to these officers who had had several 
deployments in Japan, JMSDF and USN ships homeported in Yokosuka rarely if 
ever engaged each other at sea during this period, outside of one of the formal 
exercises.  The USN officers maintained that these were missed opportunities to 
practice and improve certain tactical skills, such as communications.  They 
attributed the lack of interaction to the Japanese preference for advanced 
planning versus extemporary engagement.  Further, there was no internal 
JMSDF-USN influence to change this situation.271
In addition to exercises and training conducted at sea, the 1980s also saw 
greater use of command post exercises.  These exercises are conducted on land, 
usually at a defence headquarters location or at one of the war colleges.  
Command Post exercises typically include computer simulations and other ways 
to simulate naval operations without actually having to conduct an operation at 
sea.  It also gives the respective naval staff greater opportunity to exchange 
information and hold discussions that might not be possible at sea.   For the first 
time, in June 1987, the two navies participated in a command post exercise at 
the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.  This was known as the 
                                                           
271 Interviews 3B (14 December 1999), 20A (24 May 2000), and 7A (20 July  2000), with USN 
officers whose ships were homeported in Japan during the 1986-1991 period.  According to one 
officer, even JMSDF and USN ‘sister ships’ based at Yokosuka did not interact at sea, outside of 
the formal scheduled training.  He noted that when his ship was heading out to the operating 
area, the JMSDF ship often would be returning. 
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Northwest Pacific War Game for the Defense of Japan. Participants included US 
Naval Forces Japan, US Seventh Fleet, the US Pacific Fleet and the JMSDF.272  
Also during this time period, the JMSDF also began participating in specialized 
combined training at elite training facilities in the United States.  JMSDF 
participation in ‘Blue Flag’ began in 1990. The first exercise included the JMSDF, 
the US Navy, US Fifth Air Force, US Air Force Tactical Air Command, and the 
US Army IX Corps.273 While the Blue Flag exercise used a ‘defence of Japan’ 
scenario, the advanced tactical communication mechanisms practiced during 
the exercise helped the two navies prepare for joint operations in the Persian 
Gulf region, at the end of the war.274    
Throughout the 1980s, the JMSDF participated in the Rim of the Pacific 
(RIMPAC) exercise with an increased number of naval assets and more robust 
exercise scenarios.  The ‘collective defence’ restrictions still existed, prohibiting 
JMSDF operational contact with any navy but the US Navy.  But once ‘over the 
horizon’, JMSDF ships had more operational freedom.  Officially, however, it 
still cooperated just with the US Navy.275  While RIMPAC was just one of a 
number of exercises for the US Navy and other navies, it was a major training 
event for the JMSDF because of the unique opportunities it provided.  In the 
latter part of the 1980s, as the JMSDF became a more confident participant, it 
had more operational contact with other ships, including tactical 
communication exchanges and informal cooperation on search and rescue 
                                                           
272 Commander, US Naval Forces, Japan, Command History for 1987, (no page numbers).  
273 Blue Flag is a US Air Force-run exercise conducted from Hurlburt Field, Florida, and is one of 
the largest computer-assisted modeling and simulation exercises in the world.  It trains combat 
leaders in command, control and intelligence procedures.  The operation center for these 
exercises is set up just as it would be in an actual operation and provides excellent combined 
training, generally with multiple service and international military forces participating.  See Air 
Force News, ‘SECAF Cites Importance of Blue Flag’, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1996/n19960624_960600.html, accessed 22 August 2006. 
274 US Naval Forces Japan, Command History- 1990, ‘Command Chronology’ (no page number). -
275 According to one US Navy officer, ‘over the horizon’ generally meant beyond the 1,000 mile 
marker, which had become almost a ‘psychological barrier’ for the JMSDF.  Interview 20A (24 
May 2000), with a senior US Navy officer with numerous deployments in Japan. 
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engagements.276   Table 11 provides a summary of how the numbers and types of 
JMSDF platforms used in RIMPAC exercises gradually increased each year 
between 1980 and 1990. 
 
Table 11:  JMSDF Participation in RIMPAC (1980-1990) 
 
RIMPAC 1980 2 destroyers and 8 ASW aircraft (P-2J) Training in surface strike, ASW 
patrol and attack, air-defence. 
RIMPAC 1982 3 destroyers and 8 ASW aircraft (P-2J) same as above 
RIMPAC 1984 5 destroyers, 8 ASW aircraft (4 P-3C and 4 
P-2J) and one flag officer  
same as above 
RIMPAC 1986 8 destroyers, 1 submarine, 8 ASW aircraft 
(P-3C) 
same as above 
RIMPAC 1988 8 destroyers, 1 submarine, 8 ASW aircraft 
(P-3C) and 1 supply ship 
same as above 
RIMPAC 1990 No exercise held  
Source:  De ense of Japan, 1980, p. 176; 1982, p. 254; 1984, p. 179; 1987, p. 174; and 1988, p. 177. f
                                                          
 
One senior retired USN admiral recounted his experience with the 
JMSDF in RIMPAC in the mid-1980s as evidence that the JMSDF was now 
defying stereotypes concerning its cautious approach to operational issues.  The 
US admiral, who was a destroyer squadron commander, noted that the Japanese 
admiral—the ASW commander for the exercise—asked many questions and was 
very assertive in his approach, even more so than the USN officers.  He wanted 
the operation to be realistic and for all the players to position themselves as if 
they were in a wartime situation.  As such, he questioned the US Navy for 
temporarily taking its aircraft carrier out of the operational scenario so that it 
could go and recover aircraft.  The Japanese admiral noted that this would not 
have been done in a real war.277   
 
276 Interview 15A (22 August 2000) and (24 May 2000), with one retired and one active senior US 
Navy officers.  
277 Interview 15A (22 August 2000), with senior USN officer, with several deployments to Japan. 
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The 1980s marked a period of capability improvements in JMSDF-USN 
operations. In large part this was because of increased interoperability between 
the two navies.  As discussed in Chapter 2, research done by Alessio Patalano 
indicates that JMSDF leadership recognised the importance of improving 
cooperation with the US Navy, as an alliance partner and as one of the two 
leading naval powers at the time, and in 1980, Admiral Yada, the Chief of the 
Maritime Staff of the JMSDF, introduced the concept of ‘Renkei’ (translated as 
‘teamwork’ / ‘coordination’).  His focus at the time was on strengthening ASW 
capabilities, as well as improving interoperability and communications with the 
US Navy.  In 1985, the Renkei concept was more fully developed and articulated 
by the then Chief of the Maritime Staff—Admiral Osada.  He focused on further 
strengthening the partnership with the US Navy, particularly in the areas of 
equipment, tactics, language and personnel exchanges.278  As with the actions 
taken in 1980, this new focus was a continued desire to operate effectively with 
the USN and recognition on the part of the JMSDF that improved cooperation, 
interoperability—and ultimately institutionalisation in navy-to-navy relations, 
was in the best interest of the JMSDF. 
The JMSDF had replaced older platforms with state-of-the-art new ones, 
and many of the new platforms were the same or nearly the same as US Navy 
platforms—albeit defensive in orientation.  For example, certain offensive 
weapon systems, such as Tomahawk, were not installed on JMSDF ships.  While 
in pure numbers, the changes were not particularly significant over those made 
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i f
278 This information was the result of an examination of JMSDF Chief of the Maritime Staff 
‘official instructions’ by Alessio Patalano.  His forthcoming Ph.D. thesis (in 2008) is entitled, 
Unveiling the Imper al Legacy: Strategy, Naval Policy and Propaganda in the Post-Cold War
Japan Marit me Self De ence Force, King’s College, University of London.  Mr. Patalano provided 
an English translation of the original Japanese text.  In addition to improving cooperation and 
interoperability with the USN, Patalano’s research revealed that in 1985, Admiral Osada also 
advocated improving the nature and extent of cooperation with the ground and air forces in 
Japan—the JGSDF and the JASDF. 
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in the previous decade.  However, in qualitative terms, the JMSDF had become 
one of the world's most technologically advanced navies.  In addition, the 
JMSDF had exceeded the US Seventh Fleet in numbers of capable platforms, 
such as destroyers and P-3C ASW aircraft.279  These capability improvements 
meant that combined naval operations had become smoother and more effective 
because the USN did not have to reduce its own capabilities when operating 
with JMSDF platforms.  This was a source of pride to the JMSDF, according to 
both JMSDF and USN officers interviewed.  Operational procedures could be 
more easily synchronized, resulting in greater organisational coherence and 
increased institutionalisation.280   
The most significant defence acquisition during this period, in terms of its 
contribution to joint operational effectiveness was the foreign military sale from 
the US Navy to the JMSDF of the very highly capable Aegis fleet air defence 
system.  Given the improvements in aircraft and missile range in the 1980s, and 
the use of long-range stand-off missiles to attack surface ships, Aegis provided 
the JMSDF with needed capabilities for sealane defence in the Northwest 
Pacific.281  With the changing threat environment, Japan realized that its forces 
had become increasingly vulnerable to missile threats, particularly in the 
context of air defense at sea.  Funding for the Aegis system was included in the 
                                                           
279 Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., ‘Proposed Sale of Aegis Weapons Systems to Japan’, Statement before the 
Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on Arms Control, International Security, and 
Science, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 16 June 1988, p. 2.  Sigur states that in 1988, the 
JMSDF had over 50 destroyers, more than twice as many as the US Seventh Fleet at the time.  
Further, while the Seventh Fleet had 25 P-C3 patrol aircraft, the JMSDF had nearly 100 such 
aircraft. 
280 See, for example, interviews 15A (22 August 2000),  20A (24 May 2000) and 3C (14 December 
1999) with senior- and mid-level USN officers  and 19E (2 March 2002) and 60A (11 September 
2002), with senior JMSDF officers.    
281 In congressional testimony, Rear Admiral Edward Baker, Jr. made the point that without 
Aegis, Japan’s naval surface ships prosecuting Soviet submarines would be vulnerable to attack 
by multiple numbers of Soviet aircraft, as the JMSDF carried out their mission to protect the 
sealanes 1,000 miles from Japan.  See Rear Admiral Edward B. Baker, Jr., ‘Statement to the 
Seapower Subcommittee’, House Armed Services Committee, US House of Representatives, 4 
February 1988, pp. 5-6. 
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Defense Agency’s 1988 budget, and the JMSDF commissioned the first of four 
new Kongo class destroyers, with the Aegis system installed, in March 1993.  
Japan was the first US ally to acquire Aegis capability.  South Korea, Norway, 
Spain and Australia also acquired the system, but did so many years later.   
The Aegis system—known as the ‘crown jewel’ of the US Navy—was 
exponentially better than the previous air defence system, known as Tartar, 
which the JMSDF had acquired from the United States in the 1960s.  The Tartar 
system was not able to keep up with advances in aircraft and missile 
technology.  The Aegis acquisition was particularly remarkable given the battles 
over release of defence technology to the JMSDF in the 1970s and early 1980s 
and indicated a major change in the level of trust between the two navies.  Not 
all portions of the US Aegis system were installed on the Japanese ships.  For 
example, the Navy did not export the Tomahawk system and several other 
systems were also deleted from the Japanese ship, which was oriented toward 
more defensive missions.282  Table 12 provides a comparison of Tartar and Aegis 
capabilities.   
 
Table 12:  Capability Differences between the Tartar and Aegis Missile Defence 
Systems 
 
 Tartar System Aegis System 
Expansion of range covered 
by radar 
100 km or more Several hundred km or more 
Curtailment of reaction time (no information available) About 1/2 or below 
Increases in the capability 
to destroy targets 
simultaneously 
Several targets 10 targets or more 
Extension of maximum 
range 
18 km or more 100 km or more 
Improvement of electronic 
warfare capability 
Capable of countering 
medium-degree jamming 
Capable of countering high-
degree jamming 
 
Source:  Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1988, p. 154 
                                                           
282 Interview 3J (4 April 2005) and 16A (8 March 2005), retired US Navy officers with extensive 
experience in the Pacific, including Japan. 
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Persian Gulf Operations 
                                                          
 
The previous discussion concerned the development of JMSDF-USN 
capabilities to facilitate naval operations against Soviet forces in the area 
surrounding Japan.  However, Japan-US naval cooperation and interaction was 
also effective in helping the JMSDF in 1991 to make its first out-of-area 
deployment since the Korean War.  The lead up to this operation occurred in the 
mid-1980s, as oil tankers operating under many flags had become casualties of 
the prolonged war between Iraq and Iran.  The eventual response of the United 
States to these attacks was to police the international waters of the Persian 
Gulf.  Kuwaiti oil tankers were reflagged as US vessels and escorted through the 
Straits of Hormuz by the US Navy.  In addition to the United States, several 
navies from Western Europe and the Soviet Union also assisted in the effort.283
JMSDF preparation for the 1991 deployment actually began in 1987, when 
the US government asked Japan to contribute to the international naval effort to 
escort reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers.  The Japanese Cabinet decided against 
deploying Japan’s naval forces to the Gulf in 1987 and instead decided to 
contribute funding and technical assistance, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  However, in the interim, JMSDF officials began calculating what would 
be required if it deployed minesweepers such a long distance, and with 
assistance from the US Navy, developed a deployment plan.  This was all 




283 See, for example, Don Oberdorfer and Molly Moore, ‘New Accord to Let Kuwaiti Tankers Fly 
US Flag’, Washington Post, 20 May 1987, A-22; and John H. Cushman, Jr., ‘Danger in the Gulf: 
How US Navy Girds for Escort Duties With Tankers’, New York Times, 19 July 1987, p. 12. 
284 Peter Woolley provides a useful summary of the course of events that occurred in the latter 
1980s in his research on the Japanese navy.  Peter J. Woolley, Japan's Navy: Po cs and 
Paradox, 1971-2000, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 65-87 and Peter J. Woolley and 
Commander Mark S. Woolley, ‘The Kata of Japan's Naval Forces’, Naval War Co ege Review, 
Volume XLIX, Number 2, Spring 1996, pp. 63-66.  This information is supplemented by interviews 
with US naval officers who worked with the JMSDF during this period.  See interview 2A (22 
March 1999) and 22B (29 July 1999), and 16B (8 March  2005). 
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JMSDF initiative and JMSDF-USN cooperation was demonstrated again 
in 1988.  According to accounts by Peter Woolley, two retired JMSDF admirals 
went aboard US escort vessels to observe the operation in the Gulf and report 
back as to whether Japanese participation might be feasible in the future.  This 
initiative was worked closely with the US Navy and would not have been 
possible without US Navy encouragement.  The admirals produced an unofficial 
study for the Strategy and Research Center in Tokyo, and the report was 
circulated in the Japanese Diet, Foreign Ministry, and the JMSDF’s Maritime 
Staff Office.  The report stated that the JMSDF was capable of undertaking an 
escort mission in the Persian Gulf and explained how it could be successfully 
accomplished.285
In August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait marking the beginning of 
another Gulf crisis, once again the Japanese government was confronted with 
the decision of whether to allow its defence forces to participate in the resulting 
military operation in the Gulf.  Once again the Japanese government decided not 
to contribute defence forces, after months of debate within the Japanese 
government.  It was not until April 1991, when Operation Desert Storm had 
concluded, that the Japanese government agreed to a minesweeping 
deployment.  With many of the plans already made and having worked closely 
with the US Navy, the JMSDF was able to deploy fairly quickly to the Persian 
Gulf.  Japan deployed six JMSDF ships—a destroyer escort, four minesweepers, 
and a fleet support ship—to the Gulf. The deployment was noteworthy because 
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285 See Peter J. Woolley, Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000, (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2000), pp. 65-87 and Peter J. Woolley and Commander Mark S. Woolley, ‘The Ka a of 
Japan's Naval Forces’, Nava  War Co ege Review, Volume XLIX, Number 2, Spring 1996, pp. 63-
66.  
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it demonstrated the extensive behind the scenes preparation and planning by 
the JMSDF and its politically savvy strategy.286   
The latter part of this chapter provides a broader analysis of the 
Government of Japan’s response to the US request for assistance in the Persian 
Gulf, from a foreign policy perspective.  Few academics or defence practitioners 
have analysed the operation from a naval perspective.  As discussed in Chapter 
1, Peter Woolley focuses primarily on the JMSDF response.  He maintains that 
JMSDF behaviour leading up to the deployment is clear evidence that it took 
action after careful planning and rehearsal, as the previous four decades 
indicated, and that kata was a prevailing influence.287  Based on the evidence 
during this period, however, this appears to be more the case for the Japanese 
government rather than for the JMSDF.  The JMSDF’s persistence was in sharp 
contrast to the cautionary approach of the Japanese government.  A certain 
element of kata was present in JMSDF behaviour, such as when the Japanese 
government refused to allow naval deployments to the Gulf and the JSMDF 
retreated behind the scenes to develop alternate plans.  However, the JMSDF 
reaction appears to be more closely emulating US Navy behaviour.  This could 
be expected, given the relatively close operational relations that had developed 
between certain elements of both navies.  Certain JMSDF and USN officers 
interviewed for this thesis agree that the close operational relationship between 
the two navies during the 1980s had resulted in the JMSDF adopting many of the 
operational characteristics of its larger and more capable partner, using the US 
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286 In April 1991, a senior Japan Defense Agency official announced that the Japanese 
government had formally asked the JMSDF to ‘consider formation of a minesweeper squadron, 
equipment needs, and compile specific information on floating mines in the Gulf.’  See Woolley, 
Japan's Navy, p. 103, and reflection by US Navy officers, such as interview 5F (12 January 2007) 
and 12A (14 December 2006). 
287 As discussed in Chapter 1, Woolley notes that ka a, or ‘form’, is emphasized in every 
endeavour, in stark contrast to the American predilection for improvisation and innovation.  See 
Peter J. Woolley, Japan's Navy, pp. 65-87 and Peter J. Woolley and Commander Mark S. Woolley, 
‘The Ka a of Japan's Naval Forces’, pp. 59-69. 
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Navy in part as a conduit to favourable decisionmaking by the government of 
Japan.288  
By late 1990, it became increasingly difficult to schedule JMSDF-USN 
exercises because of the chance that US naval forces would not be available.  
With increasing US Navy activity in the Middle East, some of the training events 
that had occurred in the past were postponed.  During the lead up to the 1991 
Gulf War, US naval exercises and training in the region focused primarily on 
preparation training for the deployment to the Middle East.  According to a 
former US Pacific Fleet official, combined training between the US Navy and 
JMSDF forces was reduced during the preparation for the Gulf War and during 
the conflict itself.   Some ASW and minesweeping training were still conducted 
but many of the major combined training exercises were cancelled.289
The US Seventh Fleet played a key role in the naval portion of the 1991 
Gulf War.  The US Seventh Fleet Commander, Admiral Stanley Arthur, assumed 
responsibility on 1 December 1990 as US Naval Forces Central Command.  He 
deployed to the Middle East and led US naval operations during Operation 
Desert Storm, which began in January 1991.  The Seventh Fleet flagship, the USS 
Blue Ridge, along with the USS M dway, the US aircraft carrier permanently 
forward deployed in Japan, and Midway’s battlegroup, participated in the  
i




288 Interviews with US and Japanese naval officers confirm a trend that was developing, starting 
in the latter part of the 1980s, after several years of close cooperation with the US Navy against 
the Soviet Navy in the Northwest Pacific.  See, for example, interviews with 19A (7 June 2004), 
19E (2 March 2002), 3H (2 March 2000) and 15A (22 August 2000).     
289 US Naval Forces Japan, Command Histories, 1990 and 1991 (no page numbers).  Also, see 
interview 16A (4 March 2005).  In addition to reassigning forces to the Indian Ocean and the 
Persian Gulf, the United States began to downsize its armed forces in the 1990s, because of 
budget concerns, and consequently reduced some of its naval presence in the western Pacific.  
See interviews 16A (4 March 2005) and B (8 March  2005) and 17 B (19 November 2002) and D (8 
March 2005).  Also see Woolley, Japan's Navy, pp. 143-144.  
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operation.290  These forces and the US Seventh Fleet Commander, returned to  
the western Pacific in the Spring of 1991.  However, interaction with JMSDF 
forces remained limited because the US forces were working to re-establish 
their readiness status after their Middle East deployment and participation in 
the Gulf War.  Table 13 identifies the US Navy's Seventh Fleet assets that 
deployed to the Middle East during the 1990/1991 period.   
 
Table 13:  US Seventh Fleet Ships and Aircraft that Deployed to Operation 
Desert Shield and/or to Operation Desert Storm (1990-1991) 
 
 (Departed Japan in August, September, and October 1990)  
*USS Midway (aircraft carrier) 
*USS Blue Ridge (flag ship for the US Seventh Fleet) 
*USS Bunker Hill 




*USS San Bernardino 
 
*Ships based in Japan (as part of Overseas Family Residency Programme) 
Source:  Command H stories, US Naval Forces Japan, 1990 and 1991, and Department of the 
Navy, The Un ed S a es Navy in ‘Desert Shield’ /‘Deser  Storm’, Washington, DC, 15 May 1991, 
various pages. 
i
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Institutional Depth     
 
During the mid-to-late 1980s, with the increased activity between the two 
navies and their respective civilian counterparts in the US Department of 
Defense and the Japan Defense Agency came a closer relationship on many 
 
i i / t
290 The USS Midway Carrier Battle Group deployed from Yokosuka, Japan, on 2 October 1990.  
For a description of the naval portion of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and in particular 
the role of US Navy platforms that deployed from Japan, see Department of the Navy, The 
Un ted States Navy in ‘Desert Sh eld’ ’Deser  Storm’, Washington, DC, 15 May 1991, pp. 19-26, 35-
49, A6 – A61.   
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levels.  The naval relationship benefited from these closer relationships.  The 
United States was satisfied with the progress Japan had made in improving its 
defence capabilities and in taking responsibility for sealane defence 1,000 
nautical miles from its shoreline.  This influenced the nature and tone of the 
relationship between the navies and the defence organisations.  The closeness 
of the relationship is exemplified by the relationship between the top national 
officials and those in the respective defence organisations, as will be discussed 
later in this chapter.  Within the naval relationship, changes occurred at the 
professional and at the personal level.  This is not to downplay the cultural 
differences and how this affected the approach to naval operations, or the 
challenges in the relationship in the early 1990s, as discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter with regard to the JMSDF desire for a helicopter carrier.  But for 
most of the period under review in this chapter—1986-1991—the two navies 
maintained a generally close relationship. 
The relations between the two navies improved during the latter part of 
the 1980s in large part due to the nature and extent of the navies' operational 
interactions against a mutually acknowledged security threat.  Generally, the 
improvements were most visible between senior naval officials and certain 
operational units.  One retired US Admiral who was stationed in Japan during 
the 1960s and 1970s identified significant differences in the relationship decades 
later.  He stated that while he had a relatively close relationship with the JMSDF 
for official purposes during the earlier years, this was not the case for personal 
relationships.  He maintained that senior US Navy officers stationed in Japan in 
the 1980s and later had closer personal and professional relationships with the 
JMSDF likely due to the increased day-to-day contact between the navies and a 
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greater acceptance on the part of the Japanese public for the Japan-US defence 
relationship.291   
The JMSDF used the improved naval relationship to its advantage.  The 
relationship became a conduit for encouraging favourable decisionmaking by 
the Japanese government concerning JMSDF systems and equipment and on the 
nature of JMSDF operations.   One official at a private research organisation in 
the United States who had been a senior defence official at the US Embassy in 
Tokyo during this period noted that the influence ‘messengers’ to the Japanese 
government generally were US Navy and US Department of Defense officials, 
and representatives of the Japanese and US defence industry, rather than the 
JMSDF itself.  In fact, this official noted that generally, the JMSDF did not have 
a close working relationship with other elements of the Japanese government.292  
As was clear in interviews with both JMSDF and USN personnel, certain 
USN units had more contact with the JMSDF than others, and this affected the 
nature of their relationship.  At the unit level, the extensive operations between 
P-3C ASW units, for example, improved the nature of their professional 
relationships as they became more at ease in operating with each other.  These 
joint operations also encouraged social interaction after the work was finished 
and the establishment of long-lasting bonds.  
This was not the case with all JMSDF and USN units, given the more 
limited contact they had with each other, as indicated earlier in this chapter.  
These relationships remained relatively formal, and engagements occurred just 
during the course of scheduled exercises.  This was likely due to cultural and 
language differences between the two navies, according to USN officers 
                                                           
291 Interview 15A (22 Aug. 2000). 
292 Interview 14A (5 December 2000) and 14B (12 April 2005).  Discussions with USN officers in 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Office at the US Embassy in Tokyo also provided useful 
perspectives in this regard because of their role in facilitating the purchase of US defence 
systems.  
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interviewed who were deployed in Japan during this period.  While increased 
operational contact overall had broken down some of the cultural barriers, the 
same informality that existed between the English-speaking navies of Australia, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, still did not 
exist with the JMSDF-USN relationship.  With the English-speaking navies, it 
was more likely that the commanding officers of respective ships would initiate 
contact with neighbouring ships for the purpose of tactical engagement—as well 
as social engagement.293   
In the 1980s, the increased number of JMSDF officers who were able to 
speak English helped build closer personal relationships between the navies and 
consequently, increased institutional depth.  A significantly increased number of 
JMSDF officers attended university training as well as specialized naval training 
in the United States during this period, where English language skills were a pre-
requisite.  Even certain enlisted and non-commissioned officers attended 
technical training courses in the United States, taught in English, during this 
period.  Nevertheless, several US Navy officers interviewed noted that language 
still was a problem in an operational environment—up through the 1990s—and 
specifically noted that during RIMPAC exercises, coordination cells were staffed 
with some JMSDF personnel with just basic English skills.294  Although the 
general trend for the JMSDF was toward increased English language 
proficiency, in the late 1980s still only a relatively limited number of US Navy 
personnel had a working knowledge of Japanese.  US Navy officers interviewed 
                                                           
293 Interviews 2A (22 March 1999), 2B (29 July 1999), 3A (18 October 1999), 3B (14 December 
1999), 13A (21 June 2000) and 20A (24 May 2000), with USN officers who had operated with both 
Japanese and one or more of the English-speaking navies indicated in the text. 
294 Interviews 7A (20 July 2000), 10A (20 December 2006), 20A (24 May 2000), with USN officers 
who had operated with the JMSDF during this period in various contexts. 
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indicated that language and Japan-related expertise was not rewarded in the US 
Navy.  The priority was on operational expertise and time at sea.295   
As such, the onus was still on the JMSDF personnel to learn English and 
adapt to the methods of the US Navy if they wanted a closer relationship with 
USN personnel and if joint JMSDF-USN operations were to be effective.  
‘Learning’ from the USN was a priority for the JMSDF.  Indeed, one USN officer 
stated that during a visit to a JMSDF destroyer, the words ‘learn from the USN’ 
was written in calligraphy on the wardroom wall.  He was told that the then 
Chief of the Maritime Staff had ordered that these words be placed on a wall in 
all JMSDF ship wardrooms.296  Despite the years of cooperation between the two 
navies, the US Navy officer who made these comments was unsure whether the 
Chief of Staff’s action was an indication that the naval relationship was one of 
‘convenience’ during a period when the JMSDF needed US assistance or 
whether there was a deeper partnership developing between the two navies, of 
which this was an example.297
 
External Linkages   
 
With increased operational contact between the JMSDF and USN and the 
maturing of the naval relationship, the two navies expanded their contacts with 
other navies and institutions.  The JMSDF and USN now participated together in 
numerous international meetings and conferences each year.  New to the region 
in 1988 was the multilateral Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).  
Established in 1988 to promote mutual understanding and naval cooperation in 
                                                           
295 This opinion was expressed frequently in interviews with USN officers.  Examples include 
interviews 3C (14 December 1999), 2A (22 March 1999) and 2B (29 July 1999). 
296 Interview 3C (14 December 1999). 
297 Ibid. 
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the Western Pacific region, WPNS is the only high level Western Pacific naval 
forum at which regional navies meet and discuss common challenges. WPNS 
grew out of the biennial US Chief of Naval Operations-hosted International 
Seapower Symposium at the US Naval War College. Australia hosted the first 
symposium in Canberra in 1988.  The second symposium was held in 1990 in 
Thailand.  Initially, topics for discussion at the Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium included relatively uncontroversial topics such as safe navigation 
and pollution control.  Nevertheless, this gave the JMSDF its first real taste of 
discussing mutual challenges with its neighbours in the region and with its US 
alliance partner.  These meetings served to strengthen the organisational 
coherence of the Japan-US naval relationship and its institutionalisation by 
reinforcing the importance of structures, procedures and institutional linkages 
with other navies.298   
JMSDF attendance at the US Naval War College and at other defence-
related institutions in the United States continued during this period.  Table 5 in 
Chapter 2 identifies total JMSDF attendance at defence-related and civilian 
institutions during the three periods under review.  Neither JMSDF nor USN 
officials were not able to specifically break out the extent to which attendance 
increased during this particular period.  They did state that attendance at 
technical training courses in the United States for new defence systems and 
equipment, such as Aegis, likely increased during this period because of the 
introduction of so many new platforms, systems and equipment for the JMSDF.  
A majority of these systems and equipment came from the United States.  
                                                           
298 From 1988, onwards, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the International Seapower 
symposium were held in alternate years.  For more information, see Keynote address by Minister 
for Defence, Rear-Admiral Teo Chee Hean, at the opening the Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
in Singapore, 18 November 2004  https://www.mindef.gov.sg, accessed 22 March 2005 and 
Prepared Remarks of Adm. Vern Clark at the International Sea Power Symposium, Naval War 
College, Newport, Rhode Island, 27 October 2003 
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/pao/CNO%20remarks.htm, accessed 22 March 2005.   
 190
Training occurred at various USN operational commands for the surface, 
subsurface and air forces.  Similarly, records do not indicate whether the 
comparatively small USN attendance at defence colleges in Japan increased 
during this time.  Likely the numbers were fairly consistent through time, 
according to US and Japanese naval officials.299   Table 6 in Chapter 2 provides 
total participation of USN personnel through 2004. 
In addition to technical training and conferences that occurred at the US 
Naval War College and at other USN commands, the JMSDF officers who 
attended the year-long course of study at the US Naval War College and the USN 
officers attending the Maritime Staff College in Tokyo established important 
personal contacts that began to have a larger effect on the relationship during 
this period.  In interviews, several JMSDF admirals, including the Chief of the 
Maritime Staff, and other senior naval officers noted with fond memory their 
experiences at the Naval War College and the contacts they had established with 
counterparts in the US Navy.300  Significantly, officers interviewed also noted 
how these contacts had been useful in facilitating operational engagement and 
dealing with crises in the relationship—such as ship accidents involving the loss 
of life.  This was a conscious effort on the part of the Naval War College to 
foster international bonds and to establish a common naval ‘framework’ within 
which they could all relate.  The establishment of these institutional linkages is a 
powerful mechanism for creating organisational coherence between navies and 
for influence rendering by the leading naval power, in this case the US Navy.  
This is consistent with the original intent of Admiral Colbert, the founder of the 
                                                           
299 Interviews 19A (7 June 2004), 3J (4 March 2005) and 3K (4 September 2004). 
300 Interviews with several JMSDF admirals in Tokyo, Japan, including Admiral Toru Ishikawa, 
Chief of Staff, JMSDF (11 September 2002). 
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Naval Command Course at the US Naval War College—established in 1956 for 




The naval relationship grew in all aspects of institutionalisation during 
this period—internal coordination, operational interaction, institutional depth 
and external linkages.  Increased operational cooperation, however, was the key 
driving element for institutionalisation during this period.  The common goal of 
opposing the Soviet naval threat in the region, through the US Navy’s ‘maritime 
strategy’, helped unite the two navies.  Cooperation—and ultimately 
institutionalisation—was recognised as being in the best interest of both navies.  
Together, they shared operational risks and the defence burden, which brought 
the navies closer together.  As the navies cooperated more closely, they 
developed new organisational procedures and mechanisms to facilitate more 
effective cooperation and increased their sharing of information and 
intelligence—thus strengthening other elements of institutionalisation.  
Increased operational cooperation created greater familiarisation between the 
navies, which led to the establishment of closer operational bonds.  This, in turn, 
helped minimize some of the cultural and language differences between the two 
navies.   While the tendency toward greater cooperation occurred generally 
throughout both navies, the closest cooperation and greatest improvement 
occurred amongst ASW units who were operationally engaged on a daily basis, 
particularly the P-3C units. 
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301 The work of Admiral Richard Colbert in establishing the Naval Command Course at the US 
Naval War College is documented by Joel Sokolsky in Joel J. Sokolsky, The Fratern ty o  the 
B ue Uniform: Admiral R chard G. Co bert, US Navy and Allied Naval Cooperation (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 1991), pp. 9-15. 
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The JMSDF began adapting some of its practices—and to some extent its 
behaviour—to that of the US Navy.  Admiral Osada’s efforts to strengthen the 
partnership with the US Navy by improving interoperability in the areas of 
equipment, tactics and language, is an example of JMSDF adaptation.  In 
particular, the JMSDF became more assertive in pursuing its own objectives and 
used the US Navy as a conduit of sorts to assist in this effort.  As discussed in 
Chapter 1, adaptation to the hegemonic naval power is a common phenomenon 
throughout history.  In particular, the acquisition of equipment and 
technology—generally from the United States—helped turn the naval 
relationship into one of equals, or nearly so.   
However, just as the Soviet naval threat contributed to the establishment 
of a stronger naval relationship, the demise of the threat and additional changes 
in the strategic environment were leading factors that resulted in reduced 
operational interaction and cooperation.  The full effect of these changes on the 
institutionalisation of the relationship was manifested some years later and will 
be addressed in the next chapter.  However, signs of the loosening of the 
relationship began to appear in the closing days of the Cold War, as respective 
naval goals began to divert—particularly on issues of future roles and missions 
and associated systems and equipment.   
 
OTHER FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE JAPAN-US NAVAL 
RELATIONSHIP (1986-1991) 
 
During the mid-to-late 1980s, the collision of US global-military interests 
and Japan's national-economic interests became more evident and affected all 
aspects of the Japan-US relationship, including the naval relationship.  Security 
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and economic factors, driven by the demise of the Soviet threat, the rise of other 
security concerns in other parts of the world, Japan's exceptional economic 
performance and domestic political pressures in both countries, helped fuel this 
conflict.  In addition, gaiatsu—outside pressure—in this case from the United 
States, became a regular part of the landscape as the United States pressured 
Japan for improved trade concessions and greater contributions to defence 
burdensharing.  Ultimately, navies are instruments of state policy and as such 
are subject to many of the same influences as the nation itself. 
As in the earlier period, particular people had important roles to play in 
the Japan-US security and naval relationships.  A dichotomy of sorts existed 
between senior level officials and those managing the relationship on a daily 
basis.  In the United States, the transition from Ambassador Mike Mansfield to 
Michael Armacost in 1989 was a sign of less sympathetic and supportive 
relations between Washington and Tokyo, particularly on economic matters.  In 
Japan, the transition from Prime Minister Nakasone to Prime Minister Toshiki 
Kaifu had similar results.  At the same time, however, the Japan-US security 
relationship had matured to the point that certain middle- and senior-level 
officials in the defence bureaucracies were helping to facilitate and influence 
the security and naval relationships behind the scenes, in spite of the external 
influences.  Many of these officials were or had been US Navy officers and as 
such had established particularly effective relations with the JMSDF, working 
with them to facilitate naval cooperation during this period.   
As external security challenges shifted from the Soviet threat to a variety 
of challenges in the Middle East, the 1991 conflict in the Persian Gulf became a 
litmus test of Japan’s commitment to alliance burden sharing.  Japan’s decision 
not to contribute military personnel to this operation or to any of the naval 
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operations in the Gulf prior to 1991—for domestic political reasons—affected 
the Japan-US security relationship, including operational interaction within the 
naval relationship, probably more than any other factor during this period.  For 
the navies, the challenges lay in the fact that they were no longer operating as 
closely together, with coordinated roles and missions. 
 
US and Japan Respond to Changing Threats and New Challenges 
 
A number of external challenges existed for both the United States and 
Japan during the 1986-1991 period, including continued challenges from the 
Soviet Union and emerging new threats in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.  
The threats, and the military missions to combat these threats, were distinctly 
different from those in the earlier part of the decade. 
By the latter part of the 1980s, the ‘second Cold War’ had started to wind 
down. However, despite the ‘Vladivostok speech delivered by Soviet President 
Gorbachev in 1986 and the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
treaty in 1987, the Soviet Union still maintained considerable forces in the 
region.  In 1988, for example, about one-third of Soviet forces were stationed in 
the Far East, including Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missiles.  Furthermore, Soviet aircraft continued to violate 
Japanese airspace, including off Rebun Island, Hokkaido, and over the Okinawa 
Main Island in 1987.302   
A key element in defending against the Soviet naval threat in the 1980s 
and in tightening the link with the US Navy was Japan’s commitment to develop 
sealane defence capabilities out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan’s shoreline, 
                                                           
302 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1988, pp. 33-42. 
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as discussed in Chapter 2.   The Reagan administration embraced the sealane 
defence mission for Japan as part of an overall strategy to encourage US allies 
to take more responsibility for defending themselves and thereby contribute to 
the defence of the region.  It was also part of a new burdensharing strategy on 
the part of the Reagan administration that emphasized shared ‘roles and 
missions’ rather than percentage of GNP.303  Japan took responsibility for 
defending the air space and sealanes up to 1,000 nautical miles from its 
shoreline, and the United States provided the nuclear umbrella, offensive 
projection forces in the Northwest Pacific, and sealane protection forces in the 
Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans.304
While Japan and the United States cooperated against the Soviet threat 
during the 1980s, the threats emanating from the Middle East in the latter part of 
the 1980s posed a different kind of challenge.  By the mid-1980s, conflict 
between Iran and Iraq was ongoing and attacks on ships in the Persian Gulf 
threatened international shipping, in particular oil tankers.  In 1986, Iran had 
attacked 25 Kuwaiti oil tankers but had avoided American ships.  However, in 
May 1987, an Iraqi missile attack disabled a US Navy guided missile frigate, the 
USS Stark, in the Persian Gulf, killing 37 naval personnel and injuring many 
others.305  As a result, the United States increased its pressure on US allies to 
                                                           




303 James Auer does an effective job at explaining this change in his Oral History Interview, 
March 1996, p. 7.  See also FY 1985 Report o  the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. We nberger to
he Congress, February 1, 1984, p. 40, and Robert F. Reed, The Japan-US Alliance: Sharing the
Burden of De ense, National Defense University, National Security Affairs Monograph Series 83-
7, 1983, pp. 49-50. 
304 Reed, p. 50. 
305 Iraq claimed that the attack was an accident saying that the pilot of the F-1 Mirage jet believed 
he was firing on an Iranian vessel.  At the time, the United States was most worried about the 
missile threat from Iran and its Silkworm missiles imported from China.  The Silkworm missile 
was credited with a range of 50 miles and a warhead with the explosive power of 1,100 pounds 
of TNT--three times the power of the Exocet missile that disabled the USS Stark.  See 
Washington Post, ‘Captain Denies Ship Sensed Targeting Radar’, Patrick E. Tyler, 21 May 1987 
and ‘Preemptive US Strike on Iran Missiles Debated’, George C. Wilson, 5 June 1987.  See also 
De ense of Japan 1988, pp. 53-54, and Don Oberdorfer and Molly Moore, ‘New Accord to Let 
Kuwaiti Tankers Fly US Flag’, Washington Post, 20 May 1987, p. A22.  
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help protect international shipping in the region.  Japan, which was more 
dependent on Middle East oil than any other major western nation, became a 
particular target of attention by the US Congress.306  In addition to its oil 
consumption, the vulnerability of Japan's oil tankers provided Japan with 
another stake in the growing conflict in the Persian Gulf.  By June 1988, 19 ships 
affiliated with Japan, including four ships owned by Japanese companies, had 
been attacked and damaged in the Gulf region, yet no JMSDF ships participated 
in the escorting of tankers through the Gulf.307   
The Japanese government was split on how to respond to US pleas for 
assistance in the Gulf region.  While the JMSDF was very eager to participate in 
an out of area security operation, and the JDA supported this effort, other parts 
of the Japanese government had varying opinions.  After a high level conference 
between the Japanese government and the ruling party, Japan issued a policy 
statement in October 1987 concerning Japan's contribution to protecting safe 
navigation in the Persian Gulf.  The Japanese government decided that it could 
contribute only through strictly non-military means.  In the official statement--
’Japan's Policy of Contributing to the Securing of Free and Safe Navigation in 
the Persian Gulf’—Japan identified three other ways in which it could contribute 
to safer navigation in the Gulf:  1) establishing and funding facilities to assist 
shipping by use of high-precision radio waves,  2) expanding the scope of its 
economic and technological cooperation with countries in the Gulf area once 
hostilities had ceased and 3) shouldering a fiscal burden, commensurate with its 
international responsibility, to carry out UN Security Council Resolution 598.  308   
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306 For example, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and 
the International Energy Agency, in 1986, approximately 56 percent of Japan’s oil transited the 
Strait of Hormuz, compared with 14 percent for Germany, 18 percent by the United States, and 
30 percent by France.  See OECD/IEA report, 1986. 
307 De ense of Japan 1988, pp. 53-54. 
308 See Defense of Japan 1988, pp. 54-55 and pp. 257-258. 
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In August 1990, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the United States 
again suggested that Japan send minesweepers and tankers to the Gulf.  The 
Japanese government eventually refused on the grounds that minesweepers 
might get drawn into hostilities.  The process of arriving at a response was 
steeped in intense inter-agency rivalry and it contributed to the government's 
inability to produce an effective decision.309  According to Michael Armacost, US 
Ambassador at the time, Japan’s post-war history had left its government ill 
equipped to respond decisively to international security crises.  It had no 
tradition of expending political capital or assuming major political risks on 
behalf of general principles.310
Japan eventually deployed JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf 
after the conflict was over, but it was an operation conducted essentially on its 
own.  Political decisions made in Japan prevented a more intense level of 
operational cooperation between the JMSDF and USN in the Gulf during the 
years leading up to the 1991 conflict.  The JMSDF’s minesweeping efforts in the 
region after the war received little worldwide attention or outward appreciation, 
despite the fact that it was the first time Japan had deployed forces outside of its 
territorial waters in support of an operation since World War II.  Instead, the 
world focused on Japan’s $13 billion  contribution to the international operation 
as an example of its ‘checkbook diplomacy’. 311   
 




309 Ryuichi Teshima who at the time was a reporter for the NHK network in Japan (and in 2005, 
NHK’s Washington Bureau Chief), produced several articles and a book on the inter-agency 
problems that stymied decisionmaking during the Persian Gulf conflict.  His book, 1991 nen
Nihon no Haiboku (Japan's Defea  in 1991), is known to be a seminal work on the subject.  It has 
not been translated into English. See also discussion of Persian Gulf conflict and Japan's 
decision-making process in Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Real sm (New York: Palgrave, 
2001) 202-204 and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, ‘Japanese Security Issues’, in Japan: 
A New Kind of Superpower?  Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock, eds.  (Washington, DC: 
The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1994), 60-61.   
310 Armacost, pp. 99-100. 
311 See for example, John B. Judis, ‘Burden Shirking’, New Republic, 4 March 1991, p. 20-23.  See 
also Armacost, 98-127, for his views of the Japan-US relationship during the Gulf War. 
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Closer Working Relationships on Security Issues 
 
During the latter part of the 1980s, the Japan-US security relationship had 
matured to the point that certain middle level officials in the defence 
bureaucracies were helping to facilitate and influence the security and naval 
relationships behind the scenes.   In addition, these officials helped to facilitate 
a more private approach to defence burdensharing during this period.  Since 
many of the key players had naval backgrounds and had established extensive 
transnational naval connections, the naval relationship benefited as well.  These 
officials built on the foundation established by senior leadership in both 
countries.  Their activities would not have been possible without that broader 
political support. 
In the US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(East Asia and Pacific Affairs), the Japan Senior Country Director was a 
particularly influential position, and this office became a key focal point for 
Japan-US security issues.  In the 1970s, Japanese defence bureaucrats did not 
have regular contact with the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  This changed 
in the 1980s, partly due to the US officials who held the Country Director 
position.  They actively reached out to both the JDA and the Self-Defense 
Forces.  In the United States, one of the most effective links between the two 
defence establishments and the two navies was Dr. James Auer.  Auer served as 
Japan Country Director from April 1979 until September 1988.  Prior to that, he 
was a US Navy officer with numerous deployments in the Pacific, including 
Japan.  Auer spoke Japanese, was the first USN graduate of the JMSDF Maritime 
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Staff College and had established himself in the naval and political 
establishments in Japan.312  
In addition to middle-level officials within the Department of Defense’s 
Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, senior Defense and State Department 
officials, such as Richard Armitage, helped influence Japan-US security relations 
in the critical period of the 1980s through the key positions they held.  These 
officials played important roles in encouraging Japan to maintain its 
commitment to develop SLOC defence capability.  Between 1981 and 1989, 
Armitage served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the 
Pacific and then as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs.313  The Japan Senior Country Director reported through these offices.  In 
the early part of the decade, Armitage was very involved in helping Japan craft 
its force structure to respond to the new sealane defence mission.  He was one 
of the key US officials at the conference in Hawaii in June 1981, when the US 
government provided an estimate of the force structure that Japan would 
require in order to effectively defend its air space and sealanes out to one 
thousand miles.314
In Japan, US officials began to foster close working relations with JDA 
senior- and mid-level bureaucrats responsible for implementing the new defence 
build-up and the sealane defence mission.  They met fairly frequently at 
conferences and, with the increased institutionalisation of the security 
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312 As identified in Chapter 1, Auer is the author of the key work on the development of the 
JMSDF, published in 1973:  The Postwar Rearmamen  o  Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71, 
originally his Ph.D. dissertation.  Upon Auer’s departure in 1988, another US Navy officer—
Torkel Patterson--became Senior Country Director and served in this position until 1992.  As 
with Auer, Patterson also had had numerous tours in Japan, he spoke Japanese and had 
graduated from Japan’s Maritime Staff College.  He also maintained strong links with key JDA 
and JMSDF officials. 
313 As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Richard Armitage returned to government during George W. 
Bush’s first term and served as Under Secretary of State—still with a strong interest in Japan. 
314 Reed, p. 50.  See also White House biography of Richard Armitage, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/armitager-bio.htm, accessed 4 December 2006. 
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relationship, had established regular links between bureaucracies.  The 
relationship between the JDA director and the US Secretary of Defense was an 
important one at this time, particularly given the sensitive FS-X discussions, 
according to Yukoh Kurihara, who worked with Secretary Caspar Weinberger.315   
In addition to Japanese officials in the defence bureaucracy, Japanese 
civilians and local government officials played key roles in supporting the naval 
relationship during this time.  To be effective in their relationship with the 
JMSDF and with the Japanese government more generally, US Navy officials 
had to establish a relationship with key civilians such as majors and local 
businessmen, and work these relationships from behind the scenes.  This was a 
key difference in managing the Japan-US naval relationship versus other US 
naval relationships in the world, according to US Navy officers interviewed.  
They noted that the politicians and businessmen ‘knew how to get things done’ 
and as such, US Navy officials made it a point to establish effective relations 
with them.316   
With the forward presence of a large number of US Seventh Fleet assets 
in Japan and in the area around Japan, personal relationships with the local 
communities become very important, according to a former US Seventh Fleet 
Commander.  Japanese mayors, in particular, wield significant power, he stated, 
because the Japan central government generally will not override a mayor.317  
The mayors from Sasebo, Sapporo and Yokosuka—locations of large US Navy 
presence—were particularly notable for their influence.  Key civilian 
                                                           
315 Kurihara notes the importance of being able to speak English and of establishing a 
relationship based on honesty rather than ‘flattery’.  See Yukoh Kurihara Oral History Interview, 
conducted by Koji Murata, 21 December 1996, National Security Archives, George Washington 
University, pp. 5-7.  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/kuriharaohinterview.htm, accessed 27 
July 2004. 
316 See, for example, interviews 8A (28 August 2000), 17E (12 June 2002), 21A (9 May 2005) and 
25A (4 January 2007). 
317 Interview 25A (4 January 2007). 
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businessmen, with strong connections to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
often were some of the first ‘officials’ an incoming Seventh Fleet Commander 
would meet upon arrival in Japan.  These businessmen would be particularly 
helpful during alliance crises because of their ability to provide advice on what 
to do and who to talk with.318  Therefore, cultivating not only a professional 
relationship but a strong personal relationship, which involved attending 
extensive social activities, was very important, according to a former US 
Defense Attaché, who served at the US Embassy in Tokyo.319
Beyond the influence of bureaucrats and civilians in Japan, former Prime 
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone stands out as a figure who influenced the 1986-1991 
period—and ultimately the naval relationship—but whose role in government 
came a few years earlier.  For the navies and for the defence relationship more 
broadly, he provided the support and financial resources for their growth and 
development later in the decade.  The results of his work came to fruition in the 
latter part of the decade, with a formidable ASW force structure.  Nakasone 
served as head of the Japan Defense Agency from 1970-1972 and as Japanese 
Prime Minister from November 1982-November 1987.   
During his early days as Prime Minister, Nakasone announced that his 
primary focus in the area of foreign policy would be to improve the Japan-US 
security relationship and specifically to carry out the Japanese part of the 
Reagan-Suzuki communiqué concerning SLOC defence, to include substantial 
increases in defence spending.  In 1983, 1984 and 1985, the Japanese government 
froze most budget categories except defence as Nakasone increased Japan’s 
defence spending in response to the rising Soviet threat.  Japanese defence 
spending increased in terms of both the ratio to GNP and absolute size in the 
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319 Interview 21A (9 May 2005). 
 202
mid-to-late 1980s, and in 1987, for the first time, the ratio of defence budget to 
GNP exceeded one percent.320
For the naval relationship and its institutionalisation, this increase in 
Japanese defence funding translated into improved operational interoperability, 
as Japan was now able to purchase some of the same platforms, systems and 
equipment used by the US Navy, and increased operational exercises.  It also 
indicated that the United States and Japan were increasingly in agreement on 
the nature of the Soviet threat and what was needed to defeat it.  The navies and 
their respective operational activities benefited from this new coherence in 
strategic perspectives because it meant that dedicated resources and attention 
would be consistently provided.321
 
Economic and Other Pressures 
 
A continuing tension between cooperation and rivalry characterised the Japan-
US relationship in the latter part of the 1980s.  While the United States and 
Japan were cooperating on defeating the Soviet threat, they were at the same 
time engaged in some virulent trade battles.  Michael Armacost notes that 
congressional virulence over trade issues was evident at his confirmation 
hearings for his appointment as US Ambassador to Japan.  In particular, the fact 
that the White House and US State Department were not longer willing to play 
down economic interests in favour of strategic concerns was a significant 
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320 See discussion of Japan’s defence budget and how it changed in Tatsuro Yoda, Recalibra ng 
Alliance Contribu ons: Chang ng Policy Env ronment and Military Alliances, Ph.D. dissertation, 
Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2005, pp. 187-188. 
321 In a 1983 House Armed Services Committee hearing, Admiral Robert L.J. Long, Commander-
in-Chief of US Pacific Forces, stated that Japan and the United States ‘basically agree on the 
Soviet threat’.  The primary difference was the ‘urgency to meet that threat’.  As such, he noted 
that the United States was waiting to see what the new prime minister (Nakasone) would do to 
increase military spending.  See ‘US Pacific Chief Says Japan Shows “Steady” Military Gains’, 
United Press International, 1983. 
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change from the past, according to Armacost.322  In addition, defence acquisition 
issues were now challenging the otherwise cooperative relationship between the 
two defence establishments.  Domestic politics in both countries were fueling 
these battles.  For the broader Japan-US relationship, the crisis over the FS-X 
(Fighter Support Experimental) epitomized the frustrations felt by both 
countries.  While it had its own share of acquisition battles during this period, 
the naval relationship overcame some of the challenges that had affected the 
broader relationship—likely due to the closer and more well developed 
institutional links that existed between the two navies.   Nevertheless, the 
relationship could not avoid being affected by some of these tensions.   
By the mid-1980s, Japan had developed into an economic superpower 
that increasingly challenged and often aggravated the United States.  Japan's 
huge international surpluses, the growing strength of the yen against the dollar, 
and its high savings rate made it the world's leading creditor nation, and the 
United States became the world's leading debtor.  In a biography of former US 
Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, Don Oberdorfer points out that during 
Mansfield's first year in Tokyo in 1977, the US deficit in merchandise trade was 
approximately $8 – $10 billion, which was then seen as a catastrophic figure.  In 
1988, Mansfield’s last year in Tokyo, the US deficit was $52 billion.323  These 
large US trade deficits, combined with high unemployment and weak growth in 
wages led to strong internal pressures in the United States to punish and/or 
contain Japan.  The security relationship did not escape these new pressures, 
despite efforts in the past to protect it from external turmoil.324  
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322 Armacost, pp. 32-33. 
323 Don Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield:  The Extraordinary L fe of a Great Amer can S atesman 
and Diplomat (Smithsonian Books: Washington, 2003), pp. 493-498. 
324 According to Michael Armacost, ‘…the readiness of the White House and State Department to 
play down economic interests in favor of strategic concerns had diminished’.  See Armacost, pp. 
32-34. 
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The year 1988 was a critical time for the Japan-US relationship.  Not only 
were economic pressures building, evidenced by the 1988 Trade Bill that 
established firm deadlines for measuring progress on trade-related matters; 
there was also a key change of the guard in Tokyo.  Michael Armacost, a relative 
hard-liner on economic issues, replaced the long-serving Mike Mansfield as 
Ambassador.  He was determined to change the perceptions that the Tokyo 
Embassy had ‘tilted too far in favour of its host’ and to re-establish the mission’s 
reputation for credible and objective economic reporting, as well as to establish 
a closer relationship with the business community.325  
Armaments cooperation and technology sharing were part of the 
evolution of the Japan-US security relationship during this period.  However, 
they were also part of the trade battles experienced by the broader relationship.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the US Navy was hesitant to provide Japan’s Self-
Defense Forces with sensitive information and technology in the late 1970s, 
fearing that it would fall into Soviet hands.  This gradually began to change in 
the 1980s as the two navies began more extensive cooperation.  US officials 
justified the release of front-line defence systems for licensed production as a 
means of strengthening security relations with Japan, particularly in the light of 
the threat from the Soviet Union.  It also provided better interoperability with 
US forces. However, by the mid-to-late 1980s, the United States began to 
recognize that there were economic implications to US technology transfer 
policies that were not appropriate anymore given Japan’s status as an economic 
competitor with the United States.  These policies and practices provided a way 
for Japan to make inroads into the traditional strongholds of US industry, 
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especially in the high-tech areas, and became a lightning rod for US trade 
officials concerned by the economic implications of military sales and licensed  
production programmes.326   
US dissatisfaction with defence industrial cooperation programmes was 
matched by pressure in Japan for indigenous development as well as production 
of defence systems.327 This situation came to a head in the mid-1980s when the 
Japan Defense Agency wanted to replace its F-1 support fighter with an 
indigenous aircraft based on both domestic and foreign systems—FS-X.  While 
willing to support the FS-X programme, DOD insisted that cooperation take 
place under a government agreement with provisions for protection of 
information and technology flowback.  After several years of contentious 
discussions and cabinet-level confrontations concerning ‘US-based’ versus 
‘indigenous’ options for FS-X, the principals agree to pursue codevelopment 
based on the US F-16 fighter aircraft.328
According to Gregg Rubinstein, agreement on a joint FS-X programme 
triggered an even greater controversy.  FS-X had become a symbol for inflated 






326 See discussions by Gregg A. Rubenstein, ‘Japan-US Armaments Cooperation’, pp. 268-285 and 
Michael Chinworth, ‘The Technology Factor in Japan-US Security Relations’, pp. 286-310 in The 
Japan US A liance: Past, Present, and Future, edited by Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999). 
327 Richard Samuels uses the term ‘technonationalism’ to refer to the belief in Japan that 
‘…technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenized, 
diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong’.  See Richard J. Samuels, Rich
Na on, Strong Army, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. x. 
328 Numerous authors and US government studies have focused on the FS-X experience.  The 
very short summary in the preceding paragraphs and those that follow are meant simply to 
provide a context for the changing taking place in the external environment that would affect 
future naval acquisitions and interoperability.  See for example, Rubenstein, pp. 268-285 and 
Chinworth, pp. 286-310; Michael J.Green, Arming Japan: Defense Produc on, Alliance Politics, 
and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 86-124; 
and Mark Lorell, Troubled Partnership: A History of Japan-US Collabora on on the FS-X F ghter 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995).  In addition, the US General Accounting Office published 
numerous reports on the FS-X as a result of requests from the US Congress for this information.  
See, for example, US General Accounting Office, ‘Japan-US FS-X Codevelopment Program’, 
Statement of Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-31, May 11, 
1989, ‘Japan-US Codevelopment: Review of the FS-X Program’, GAO/NSIAD-90-77BR, 6 February 
1990 and ‘Japan-US Codevelopment: Update of the FS-X Program’, GAO/NSIAD-92-165, June 
1992. 
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Japanese expectations of aerospace leadership, just as it was a target for 
frustration over trade problems and fears for the US industrial base in 
Washington.  In the end, although the United States and Japan agreed to develop 
FS-X based on the US F-16 fighter, the two sides had basically different ideas of 
what codevelopment meant.  For the United States, it was an extension of co-
production.  For Japan, it meant a maximum of indigenous development with 
US support but minimal US oversight.  The approaches were never reconciled 
and continued to complicate the FS-X development programme and broader 
Japan-US relations on this and related acquisition matters.329
Although the FS-X was not a naval system, the aircraft development 
experience had an effect on the JMSDF-USN relationship.  Naval officers 
interviewed for this study stated that as a result of the FS-X experience, the 
Navy—as with the rest of the US government—had no desire to enter into 
further contentious negotiations over systems’ development and more often 
than not acceded to Japanese interests, creating future compatibility and 
interoperability problems.  Senior US Navy personnel expressed their concern 
about future compatibility and interoperability of Japanese systems with the US 
Navy systems.330   
Domestic politics in both countries contributed significantly to these 
developments.  In the United States, the US Congress was probably the most 
vocal critic of the FS-X experience, viewing such programmes as adversely 
affecting US employment and the long-term economic competitiveness in the US 
aerospace industry.  Despite the challenges with the FS-X programme, however, 
in 1988 the US Government agreed to transfer the advanced Aegis radar system  
                                                           
329 Rubenstein, pp. 270-283. 
330 In particular, senior US Navy officers expressed their concern over Japan’s development of a 
follow-on platform to the P-3C Orion, which the JMSDF and USN had used for many years to 
conduct joint anti-submarine operations off the coast of Japan and in the Western Pacific Ocean.  
See interviews 5E (8 April 2007), 5F (10 January 2007) and 26A (15 June 2002). 
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to Japan as a military sale, as discussed earlier in the chapter.331  Although 
foreign military sales posed fewer risks of potential technology loss than co-
development or licensed production, it was still a controversial military transfer 
because no other ally had this advanced radar system.  Congressional concerns 
related to the SPY-1D radar technology and the associated complex real-time 
computer programmes.  Many members believed that the latest US technology 
should not be released to Japan because of concern that it might ‘reverse 
engineer’ the system.  Despite these concerns, Congress eventually approved the 
sale, with US Navy assurance that additional constraints on the transfer of 
technology had been made.332   
At a time when the United States was urging Japan to play a larger 
defence role in Northeast Asia, the Aegis system provided an extremely valuable 
resource for missile defence and for close cooperation with US naval forces in 
the area.  Furthermore, given the substantial trade deficit that existed with 
Japan at the time, congressional officials believed that such a big-ticket sale 
would provide some offsets.  While it is difficult to make a definitive judgement 
on the role that naval institutionalisation played in this decision, behind the 
scenes naval influence—at a time of peak cooperation against the Soviet naval 
threat—helped make this foreign military sale more palatable.333
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simultaneous operations against a multi-mission threat, involving anti-air, anti-surface and anti-
submarine warfare.  See ‘Lockheed Martin-US Navy Aegis Weapon System Guides Standard 
Missiles to Target Intercept’, press release, Lockheed Martin, 11 December 2003.  
332 Under the Arms Export Control Act, Congress has 30 days to block a sale after being notified 
of the intended sale by the Executive Branch. 
333 According to one retired naval official, the Aegis sale was testament to the ‘greatness of the 
Japan-US alliance’ but he also noted that there were likely a number of USN and congressional 
‘visionaries’ who foresaw the potential role of the JMSDF in future missile defence efforts and 
the consequent value of  Aegis.  See interview 16A (4 March 2005).  Also see interviews with 




The end of the 1980s and early 1990s was a unique period for the Japan-
US alliance relationship because of the significant events and changing 
circumstances in the international political, economic and security arenas.  
Despite the growing strength of the naval relationship, it could not avoid being 
affected by some of these factors, such as the change in the threat environment.  
This was also a period of dichotomies.  On the one hand, the security and naval 
relationships were strengthened by the close coordination of defence-related 
activities during the Cold War period.  For example, a new group of security 
relationship ‘managers’ at the US Department of Defense and at the Japan 
Defense Agency helped facilitate better relations between the United States and 
Japan at the working level.   On the other hand, however, bitter trade battles and 
pressures for a more equitable sharing of the defence burden emerged from 
domestic sources in both Japan and the United States.  Economic and security 
issues were no longer isolated from each other in alliance discussions, as was 
the case in the past.   
Despite the domestic political battles waging in Japan and the United 
States over economic issues and the spill-over effect for the security 
relationship in the mid-1980s, naval exercises and other operational interaction 
were relatively unscathed.  With the continued formidable threat from the Soviet 
Union’s Pacific fleet, both countries recognised that it was in their best interest 
for cooperative naval operations to continue.  Once the primary threat to Japan 
abated, JMSDF and USN naval cooperation and exercises suffered.  The effect 
of reduced operational interaction was exacerbated by Japan’s decision not to 
deploy forces to the Gulf.   Driven by domestic politics in Japan, the lack of a 
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Japanese presence in the Gulf stifled the further development of the cooperative 
naval relationship.   
The acrimony associated with the FS-X experience, also driven by 
domestic political factors, never subsumed the naval relationship, but its legacy 
did affect acquisition discussions in the future, including naval.  In this light, the 
foreign military sale of the Aegis system to the JMSDF surprised many 
onlookers.  However, this decision was also a testimony to the cooperative role 
that the navies played in the battle against Soviet naval forces in the region 
during the 1980s and how the successful naval relationship was able to influence 
elements of the security relationship, particularly with respect to defence 
burdensharing.   
The Japan-US naval relationship was increasingly strengthened during 
the Cold War, but the change in the geostrategic landscape combined with 
decisions made by the Japanese government that prevented the JMSDF from 
joining the US Navy in support of new missions in the Middle East ultimately 
curtailed the level of cooperation between the two navies and the continued 




A variety of elements influenced the naval relationship during this diverse 
period in the Japan-US alliance relationship, including factors internal to the 
naval relationship as well as external factors.  However, while external factors 
principally drove the relationship in the earlier period, now the naval 
relationship itself provided the primary momentum for growth.  Naval 
institutionalisation was enhanced considerably during the 1980s due principally 
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to intensified operational cooperation between the two navies in response to a 
mutually recognised external security threat.  Cooperation was recognised as 
being in the best interest of each navy and efforts were made by both the US 
Navy and the JMSDF to improve interoperability.  An alignment of alliance goals 
and objectives was an important part of an increasingly synchronistic 
relationship.  As the key players in the battle against Soviet military activities in 
Northeast Asia, the navies benefited from supportive government policies and 
generous material support.  Enhanced operational cooperation helped drive 
other aspects of institutionalisation during this time period, particularly internal 
coordination and institutional depth, which in turn enhanced further operational 
cooperation and institutionalisation. 
The robustness of naval operational cooperation helped overcome a 
variety of external challenges, such as cultural and language differences and the 
pressures of domestic politics, although these challenges never completely 
disappeared.  The close operations between the two navies during the 1980s and 
the development of personal relationships at all levels bolstered the naval 
relationship and protected it somewhat from the divisiveness of the Japan-US 
relationship at the national level.  As such, during a period of acrimonious 
discussions over the FS-X aircraft development as other trade disputes between 
the two countries, the US Congress agreed to release the advanced Aegis radar 
system to Japan, as a foreign military sale, to improve JMSDF sealane defence 
and the effectiveness of JMSDF-USN operational cooperation in the Northwest 
Pacific.   
The increased technical capability of the JMSDF contributed to the 
improved cooperative relationship between the two navies.  However, although 
technology can help equalise military relationships, it can also drive these 
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relationships in other directions.  Once an alliance partner achieves a certain 
level of technological parity, then some fundamental questions may arise 
concerning the previously perceived value of the alliance.  If, for example, a 
naval force has the capability to patrol the sea lines of communication by itself, 
it may begin to question the role of an alliance partner, particularly if there is no 
formidable threat with which to contend.  This was not an issue of serious 
concern during this time period; however, with the demise of the Soviet threat 
and with the goals and objectives of the two navies diverting, signs were 
emerging during the latter part of this period that the JMSDF was considering a 
broader array of options.  With the changing external circumstances, pressures 
of domestic politics in each country and reduced operational contact, the naval 
relationship was now subject to new challenges that served to weaken the 
relationship and its institutionalisation.  
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CHAPTER 4:  Strengthening Institutional Links: 1996-2001 
 
After nearly a decade of unrest and discord in the Japan-US security 
relationship and a similar but lesser level of discordance in the naval 
relationship, the years 1996-2001 marked a period of greater agreement and 
institutionalisation of Japan-US security relations and naval relations.  By 1996, 
new security threats in Northeast Asia, such as missile tests launched from 
North Korea and tensions in the Taiwan Straits between China and Taiwan, 
pointed to renewed purpose and the need for new structures to help manage the 
security relationship.  In 1997, a revised set of defence cooperation guidelines 
initiated a new era of cooperation between Japanese and US defence forces and 
eventually resulted in better joint planning and regional conflict preparedness.  
Nevertheless, signs of strain were still visible in discussions over host nation 
support, as well as basing and facilities issues affecting US military personnel 
stationed in Japan.  Relations were not what they had been when both nations 
had been cooperating against the Soviet threat, as was the case in the previous 
decade.  As a result, issues that would typically have been viewed as alliance 
‘irritations’ had risen to the surface and had become ‘problems’. 
For the naval relationship, the 1997 Defense Guidelines helped legitimise 
certain naval activities that were ongoing or were being discussed, but they did 
not in and of themselves push the naval relationship to new operational levels 
and institutionalisation.  The emergence of new threats and the consequent need 
to develop joint operational approaches helped facilitate additional 
institutionalisation in the relationship.  Despite the emergence of new regional 
threats, the two navies did not always share similar perceptions of these threats.  
Further, the particular interests of each navy often took precedence over the 
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naval relationship.  It was the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the 
Japanese government’s response with emergency legislation, that facilitated the 
subsequent JMSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean and ushered in a new phase 
in the JMSDF-USN relationship and its institutionalisation.  As with previous 
eras, working together and sharing risks in an operational setting in support of 
mutually recognised interests were key elements in the development of a closer 
naval relationship.  For the purpose of this thesis, however, sufficient time did 
not elapse to study the effect that this series of deployments to the Indian Ocean 
had on the naval relationship. 
Civilian leadership in both countries played an essential role in 
promoting the naval relationship and supporting it during this period as the 
navies developed new missions and adapted to the post-Cold War operating 
environment.  This highlights once again the role of personalities in the naval 
relationship as well as the security relationship and the influence rendering from 
one relationship to another.  While in the late 1970s, Japanese officials took the 
lead in initiating better security cooperation with the United States—fearing US 
abandonment in the face of growing security threats.  In the 1990s, US officials 
were the ones concerned about the state of the relationship and used their 
influence to launch new alliance initiatives that contributed to greater 
institutionalisation.  The naval relationship benefited even more than the other 
military relationships because it became the principal tool for implementing 






MAPPING THE NAVAL RELATIONSHIP:  1996-2001 
 
In 1996, the navies emerged from a period in which they had had less 
operational contact with each other than in the previous decade.  Most 
important, the navies were not engaged, operationally, in a common mission, 
nor did they have a common mission around which to focus and structure their 
exercise program.  The naval relationship no longer had the US Navy’s ‘maritime 
strategy’ as the central unifying force of the operational relationship, as it did in 
the Cold War.  As a result, both navies moved in more independent directions 
than they did in the 1980s.  The continued institutionalisation of the security 
relationship with the 1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines (and other 
associated agreements), helped legitimise ongoing naval cooperation and 
provided ways to make the cooperation more effective.  The JMSDF’s 2001 
deployment to the Indian Ocean began the process to help re-bond the 
operational relationship and demonstrated that the JMSDF could be responsive 




The Japan-US naval relationship took on a different posture during the 
post-Cold War decade, and this shaped the nature and extent of internal 
coordination.  Relations between the two navies had become more distant 
during the early part of the decade, as each navy had its own set of priorities, 
driven principally by their respective governments.  This shaped the nature and 
extent of internal coordination in the relationship.  The US Navy was actively 
engaged in interdiction operations in the Middle East, as part of post-Desert 
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Storm operations.  The JMSDF was moving in another direction and becoming 
more involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations 
throughout the world as part of the Japanese government’s focus on 
‘comprehensive security’.334   Its operations in this regard were generally without 
the participation of the US Navy.  In the 1980s, the coordination of respective 
roles and missions between the two navies was one way in which they 
maintained a close relationship.  However, in the early- to mid-1990s, with the 
divergence of their respective roles and missions, the navies required less 
coordination of their activities.  Conditions gradually changed later in the 
decade as the two navies became increasingly concerned about emerging new 
threats in the region.   
A variety of official ‘navy-to-navy talks’ occurred during this period.  This 
was evidence of the expansion that had occurred in the number of naval 
organisations and levels of representation compared with the first navy-to-navy 
talks held in 1977.  Further, it was an indication of continued growth in 
institutional linkages, despite the challenging alliance relationship in the earlier 
part of the decade.  In addition to senior level navy-to-navy talks, official 
meetings also occurred at other levels on a regular basis, such as between the 
Commander of the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet and the Commander of the JMSDF’s 
Second Fleet, between the US Seventh Fleet and the JMSDF Escort Flotilla, as 
well as between US Naval Forces Japan and the JMSDF’s Maritime Staff Office.   
Despite the unavailability of transcripts, insights concerning the nature 
and tone of various official talks emerged, nevertheless, through discussions 
with naval officers who either participated or observed these talks.  One overall 
theme reflected by these officers was that the candour and confidence of 
                                                           
334 These issues will be discussed further in the second half of this chapter.  
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JMSDF officers had increased significantly over the life of these meetings—
twenty years in the case of the top-level naval talks.  An example of this new 
candour was the admission in these talks of the JMSDF desire to conduct 
confidence building activities in the region, with its neighbours, without 
necessarily the participation of the US Navy.335
As relations between the navies became more diverse, there was 
increased presence of JMSDF officers throughout various US Navy commands.  
While most of the presence was not permanent representation, nevertheless it 
was an indication of interest, on the part of the JMSDF, to maximise its 
relationship with the US Navy.  As with previous decades, personnel 
representation and exchanges heavily favoured Japan.  Outside of the 
educational environment (e.g., the JMSDF Staff College and the National 
Institute for Defense Studies), it does not appear that US Navy personnel 
participated in any other personnel exchange or representation in Japan.  
According to USN officers, the promotion pressure in the US Navy and the 
associated requirement to maximise time spent at sea meant that USN personnel 
generally were not available for such positions in Japan.336
The permanent JMSDF liaison positions, as identified in previous 
chapters (Table 7 in Chapter 2), remained unchanged:  A JMSDF officer served 
on the staffs of US Naval Forces Japan and the US Pacific Fleet.337  In addition, 
JMSDF officers served for shorter periods of time on other staffs and within 
other Navy commands for the purpose of improving JMSDF operations.  
Temporary positions for JMSDF officers existed at various times for various 
                                                           
335 Interviews 3I (April 2000), 15A (August 2000), and 16A (March 2005) with US Navy officers 
who had participated in or observed these senior-level navy-to-navy meetings. 
336 Interviews 17C (September 2004), 3B (December 1999). 
337 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, in 2002 a liaison position for Japan was designated 
on the staff of the US Central Command in Tampa, Florida, given the JMSDF deployments to the 
Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. 
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purposes at the US Naval Doctrine Command (Norfolk, Virginia) the US Naval 
War College (Newport, Rhode Island) and the Afloat Training Group Western 
Pacific (Yokosuka, Japan), as well as other commands.  For example, in the 
1990s, a JMSDF officer was assigned to the Naval War College for the purpose of 
understanding its war gaming centre and associated operations so that 
something similar could be established in Japan for the JMSDF.  A JMSDF 
assignment at the Afloat Training Group Western Pacific was for the purpose of 
translating US Navy training publications into Japanese.  The translation of US 
Navy doctrinal and training publications was important because, according to 
one USN officer who had attended the Maritime Staff College, US Navy 
publications are used as the main guidance for JMSDF planning.338
Of particular interest to this study is that the JMSDF did not have a 
liaison officer on the US Seventh Fleet Staff, the US Navy’s operational 
command for this region, and whose flagship headquarters was in Yokosuka, 
Japan.   US Navy personnel interviewed for this study, who had previously been 
part of the Seventh Fleet staff, indicated that this lack of JMSDF representation 
on the US Navy’s operational staff was evidence that when it came to 
operational issues in the East Asia region, Japan was still only a limited player.  
They noted that given the US Seventh Fleet’s wide geographical responsibilities, 
Australia—which had a liaison officer on the Seventh Fleet Staff—was more 
likely to assist the US Navy than was Japan because of the latter’s operational 
limitations.  They further noted that the Seventh Fleet likely did not want Japan 
to have access to classified information and discussions, since the JMSDF had a 
limited operational focus.339
                                                           
338 Interview 3B and 3C (December 1999). 
339 Interviews 7A (July 2000) and 15A (August 2000). 
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This perspective was contested, however, by a former US Seventh Fleet 
Commander.  In an interview for this study, he stated that with the close 
proximity of the US Navy and the JMSDF in Japan, there was no need to have a 
JMSDF liaison officer on the Seventh Fleet staff.  If he, as Seventh Fleet 
Commander, wanted to convey information to the JMSDF, he would simply pick 
up the phone and contact the appropriate person, given the close proximity of 
the navies.  Communication was not a problem, he said.340
In 1998, Japan and the United States signed the first of several 
agreements concerning their joint participation in cooperative technological 
research on the Navy Theater-Wide Defense (NTWD) system, a marine-deployed 
missile defence system.  Although a formal decision on participation in the 
NTWD program had been expected by the summer of 1997, it was postponed 
indefinitely due to the lack of consensus in Japan and because of pressure from 
Beijing.  However, when North Korea test-fired its new Taepodong missile 
directly over Japanese territory on 31 August 1998, Japan made its decision to 
participate in the program soon thereafter.341  With the selection of a naval 
system, the US Navy and the JMSDF became key players in a process that would 
eventually involve the sharing of sensitive defence information and technology 
between the two countries.  One DOD official noted that the two navies exerted 
much effort behind the scenes to influence the decision in favour of a naval 
launching platform.  He stated that the strong naval relationship had much to do 
with keeping the discussions going forward, despite some political difficulties.  
It was the navies’ initiative to take on the missile defence mission, he said.342   
                                                           
t,
340 Interview 25A (January 2007). 
341 Patrick M. Cronin, Paul S. Giarra, and Michael J. Green, ‘The Alliance Implications of Theater 
Missile Defense’, in The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Presen  and Future, edited by Michael J. Green 
and Patrick M. Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 172-173. 
342  Interview 11A (January 2007). 
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While the focus of the late 1990s was on missile defence research 
cooperation, the navies, as well as their respective defence establishments, 
knew that in the very near future the alliance would need to turn its attention to 
operational cooperation—a much more difficult endeavour given the lack of 
joint command and control arrangements in the defence relationship.  
Interviews with naval officers in both navies and key civilians who had been 
involved in the development of missile defence systems acknowledged that for a 
successful defence system, all parties would have to share key information and 
intelligence.  An integrated operational system involving US and Japanese 
defence personnel would have to exist, and most importantly senior 
policymakers in both the United States and Japan would have to demonstrate 
the political will to facilitate this arrangement.343   
From 1998 onwards, coordination and interaction occurred extensively 
between the navies, and between the US Department of Defense and the Japan 
Defense Agency in preparation for what was anticipated to be a difficult 
coordination task as the navies eventually moved to operational testing.  As of 
2001, there was no such system to manage naval operations or broader defence 
operations.  According to US and Japanese defence officials, the Japanese 
government's reaction to the 11 September 2001 terrorist events demonstrated 
that the precedent existed for such political will and for meaningful naval 
cooperation.  At the time, however, no one was quite sure whether this level of 
                                                           
343  Similarly, Cronin, Giarra and Green point out that fielding theatre missile defence in Japan 
will necessitate significant changes to the mechanics of bilateral cooperation and Japanese self-
defence.  They note that given the very short warning times, ‘it will be absolutely necessary to 
achieve effective, seamless, and unimpeded command and control of disparate sensors and 
weapons, commanded by both nations, and controlled by a variety of interconnected military 
organizations that are doctrinally interconnected’.  See Cronin, Giarra, Green, ‘Theater Missile 
Defense and the Japan-US Alliance’, pp. 181-182. 
 220
cooperation and support could be replicated in the case of missile defence—
without an impending threat.344
In addition to the agreement concerning cooperation on missile defence 
research, Japan made important changes to its procedures for protecting 
sensitive defence information during this period.  These changes were necessary 
given the alliance agreement to proceed on missile defence, as well as 
outstanding deficiencies in the Japanese system compared with other US allies.  
Over the life of the security alliance, one of the key constraints to sharing 
sensitive defence information between the United States and Japan had been the 
lack of sufficient laws and regulations in Japan for handling sensitive defence 
information.  The NATO alliance, for example, and each of its member 
countries, had a process for handling sensitive defence information and for 
punishing those that mishandle or release this information to those not 
authorized to receive it.  Japan, however, had only minimal rules and 
procedures, and minimal punishment for the unauthorized release of sensitive 
defence-related information. 
According to US and Japanese defence officials, the rules and regulations 
governing the protection of sensitive defence-related information were 
deliberately weak and limited in coverage because of concerns about secrecy in 
Japanese government in the aftermath of World War II.    Furthermore, only 
Japan's Self Defence Forces were subject to these regulations.345   This is a key 
difference between the US-Japan security alliance and NATO.  In 2000, a 
bipartisan working group of well known US scholars, senior security specialists, 
and former US government officials wrote a report that advocated changes in 
the Japan-US security alliance, including the establishment of an improved 
                                                           
344 Interviews 5F (January 2006), 11A (January 2007), 15A (August 2000) and 69 (February 2002). 
345 Interviews 11A (January 2007), 15A (August 2000) and 69 (February 2002). 
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system in Japan to protect sensitive defence information.  The report identified 
the deleterious effect that the lack of a sufficient infrastructure for the 
protection of classified information had had on establishing a strong security 
relationship between Japan and the United States. 
Prior to the mid-1970s, Japan had no set procedures for handling 
sensitive defence information, including punishments for mishandling this 
information.  In 1978, as part of the move to institutionalise the Japan-US 
defence relationship, Japan developed a minimum level of regulations to help 
protect classified information provided to Self-Defense Force personnel.  The 
regulations stated that the punishment for unauthorized disclosure would be 
one year or less imprisonment, or a fine of under 30,000 Japanese yen.346
US defence officials were not satisfied with this arrangement for several 
reasons.  Firstly, the regulations covered only Self-Defense Force personnel, not 
the civilian defence establishment or defence industry personnel.  Secondly, the 
punishment for breaking the regulations was minimal and the leaking of 
classified information was not considered a criminal offence.  Without a 
rigorous system for protecting classified information and prosecuting offenders, 
US officials did not want to share sensitive defence information with Japan out 
of concern that it would be leaked.  In addition to the hesitancy to share 
information, US officials also tended not to discuss sensitive defence-related 
information with Japanese civilian officials, limiting these discussions to 
uniformed personnel, because civilian defence officials were not covered under 
these regulations.347   
According to US and Japanese defence officials, Japan's Self-Defense 
Forces sometimes had sensitive information provided by US forces that they did 
                                                           
346 Japan Defense Agency, Defence Japan 2002, p.301. 
347 Interviews 5F (January 2006), 11A (January 2007), 15A (August 2000) and 69 (February 2002). 
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not share with their civilian leadership.  This had implications for the broader 
defence relationship because the civilian leadership sometimes did not have the 
information it needed to make effective decisions and it created a divided 
defence establishment.  Combined, the implications put Japan in a category 
apart from the United States' other alliance relationships.348
 Many US and Japanese officials believed that the lack of a free exchange 
of information between the United States and Japan, and the lack of trust that 
this generated, contributed to an alliance relationship that was considerably 
weaker than other alliance relationships, such as NATO and the US-Australia 
security arrangement.349  In the mid-to-late 1990s, as attention focused on 
strengthening the Japan-US alliance, the upgrading of Japan's system for 
protecting classified information was one of the issues addressed in numerous 
meetings and discussions.   
This process changed in late 2001 as a result of an incident involving the 
unauthorized release of defence information by a JMSDF officer in September 
2000.  The officer was arrested after he delivered two confidential documents to 
a military attaché from the Russian Embassy in Tokyo.350 Since the incident 
involved a JMSDF officer, the JMSDF was under particular scrutiny at this time.  
As a result of the incident, the Japan Defense Agency established the Committee 
for Measures to Protect Classified Information and improved procedures for 
handling classified information with a view to preventing future leakage.  In 
October 2001, amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law passed the Diet and 





348 Interviews 5F (January 2006), 10A (December 2006) and 69 (February 2002).  In addition, see 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, The Un ted States and Japan: Advancing Toward a 
Ma ure Partnership, National Defense University, 11 October 2000. 
349 Interviews 10A (December 2006), 11A (January 2007), 69 (February 2002) and 7A (July 2000). 
See also, The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Par nership.   
350 For a more detailed discussion of this incident, see Japan Defense Agency, De ense of Japan 
2002, pp. 299-301.  
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resulted in the imposition of tougher criminal punishment for the leakage of 
certain classified defence information.   
Table 14 provides a comparison of the new defence secrets system in 
Japan and the provisions that existed prior to that time.  According to US 
defence officials, the new system is better than what existed before, but it 
contains many weaknesses, such as relatively light punishments (up to 5 years' 
imprisonment) for anyone who discloses classified information.351  Since these 
changes only occurred in late 2001, it will take additional years before one can 




Table 14:  Japan's Provisions to Protect Sensitive Defence Information:  
        1978 and 2001 
 
 1978 Provisions   2001 Defense Secrets System 
Positions 
subject to the 
provisions 
SDF personnel who 
obtain information 
through the course of 
their duties 
Those whose duty requires them to handle 
defence secrets.  This includes: 
1. Defense Agency personnel 
2. Central Government officials who engage in 
national defence-related administration 
3. Those who provide equipment or services 
associated with defence secrets based on a 
contract with the Defense Agency 
Punishment 
provisions 
Imprisonment of one 
year or less or a fine 
under 30,000 yen (note: 
attempted and negligent 
leaks will note be 
penalized) 
Imprisonment of 5 years or less (note: attempted 
and negligent leaks will be penalized; negligent 
leaks will be penalized with less than a year of 




Planning, instigating or 
aiding and abetting 
(imprisonment of one 
year or less or a fine 
under 30,000 yen) 
Conspiring, instigating or agitating 





None Provisions related to Japanese nationals for 
offences committed outside the country 
Source:  Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2002, p. 301. 
                                                           




Some types of JMSDF-USN training and exercises increased during the 
1996-2001 time period, as new security challenges emerged globally and in the 
region.  In general, however, training and exercises were a mixed review.  The 
navies’ participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multilateral exercise 
expanded as well.  The influence of the 1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines 
was evident in the nature of some of the exercises, which focused on the 
potential for naval activity in the ‘areas surrounding Japan’—a primary focus of 
the new Guidelines.  Significantly, Japan’s defence forces had become more 
multilateral during this period.  They participated in peacekeeping and 
humanitarian assistance operations as well as confidence building exercises 
with neighbouring countries and many of these missions and activities were 
conducted without USN participation.  The Self-Defense Forces, including the 
JMSDF, was gaining a degree of independence from the United States, and this 
affected the nature of the naval relationship during this period.   
Anti-submarine warfare had been the focus of JMSDF-USN training and 
exercises during previous periods.  This remained, even though the Soviet 
submarine threat had diminished, in large part because the JMSDF wanted to 
continue this training focus.352  In addition, other interaction during this period 
involved anti-surface warfare training and tactical coordination, which 
corresponded with the emerging regional threats.  Table 15 provides a summary 
of some of the training and exercises that occurred between the JMSDF and US 
Navy between 1996 and 2001.  Given the similarity of the exercise data over 
these five years, a sample of two years (1997 and 2001) is identified below.  As is 
                                                           
352 Interview 5A (March 2000) and 15A (August 2000). 
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evident in the table, the size and complexity of training and exercises during this 
period resembled the training that took place during the 1976-1981 period.  For 
example, most training objectives have just one element, e.g., ASW or 
minesweeping training.  This change, compared with the middle period (1986-
1991), can likely be attributed to the different priorities of the navies and the 
relative inattention to the naval relationship. 
 
 




Date Participating Forces 
from Japan 
Participating 
Forces from US 
Training 
Objective 

































35 personnel from the 
Maritime Staff Office 
About 50 personnel 

































ASW Training Sept. 14-
16, 1997 
































19 vessels  
15 aircraft                         
2 vessels 


















290 personnel from 
SDF Yokosuka 
Hospital 
730 personnel from 
US Navy Yokosuka 
Hospital 
Training in joint 
operations 
 
ASW Training 22-26 
June 2001 











ASW Training 23 July – 
1 Aug. 
2001 











Source:  Japan Defense Agency, Defense o  Japan 1997, p  334, 1998, p. 391, 2001, p  333  2002, p
396. 
f . . . 
* Given the similarity of the training between 1996 and 2001, only two years were highlighted in 
this table (1997 and 2001). 
Some of the exercises during this period focused on elements of the 1997 
Defense Cooperation Guidelines, and specifically on potential contingencies in 
the ‘area surrounding Japan’.  For example, the exercise Keen Edge 2000--a 
biannual command post exercise--was the first time that Japan and the United 
States had conducted training that was based on a contingency outside of 
Japan.353  Keen Edge tests how well US and Japanese forces work together in a 
military operation, the effectiveness of joint operations amongst Japan’s three 
services, and some political elements involving Japanese leadership 
decisionmaking.  With the passage of implementing legislation for the 
Guidelines by Japan’s Diet in May 1999, Keen Edge 2000 provided the first 
opportunity to exercise new areas of cooperation. Training involved 5,000 
Japanese personnel and 1,350 Americans. It included Japanese rear-area support 
for US forces and practice of noncombatant evacuation operations of Japanese 
                                                           
353 As discussed in previous chapters, command post exercises are computer simulated.  In this 
exercise participants use the computerized joint theater level simulation system which simulates 
movement of forces and equipment in the field. 
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citizens abroad.  Operation Keen Edge took place at US Forces Japan 
headquarters at Yokota Air Base and Japanese Self-Defense Force headquarters, 
both near Tokyo.  
In addition to the Keen Edge command post exercise in 2000, the 
RIMPAC multilateral exercise was still ongoing and Japan’s participation had 
expanded considerably since its first participation in 1980.  1998 marked the 
tenth year that Japan had participated in RIMPAC—a large-scale multinational 
power projection and sea control naval exercise conducted by the US Third 
Fleet, in the vicinity of Hawaii.  While this is a multinational exercise, Japan still 
participated bilaterally with the US Navy.  Of the three RIMPAC exercises held 
during this period (RIMPAC 1996, 1998 and 2000), RIMPAC 2000 represented the 
JMSDF’s largest contribution and a mission expansion.  The JMSDF dispatched 
8 ships, including an Aegis-type destroyer, a submarine and 8 P-3C aircraft.  The 
exercise also included use of new communication technologies and new 
exercise scenarios involving the provision of humanitarian assistance.  Despite 
the improvements over the years, one DOD official who participated in RIMPAC 
1998 noted that in this exercise, Japan was not integrated into the broader 
RIMPAC command organisation.  Rather, JMSDF staff officers were located 
outside of the operational centre.  The official also noted that language 
difficulties complicated some of the liaison responsibilities of these staff 
representatives.354
In interviews with numerous US and Japanese naval officers, all 
emphasized the importance of RIMPAC exercises for the Japan-US naval 
relationship but particularly for the JMSDF.  Operating in a sophisticated and 
technically challenging environment with other navies increased the confidence 
                                                           
354 Interview 10A (December 2006).  
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and technical capabilities of the JMSDF.  Even though the JMSDF ‘officially’ 
operated just with the US Navy, through the years the JMSDF increased its 
opportunities during the exercise to work outside of the bilateral arrangement.  
One JMSDF officer stated that the RIMPAC experience was an important factor 
in helping the JMSDF transition to a multinational operating environment during 
its deployment to the Indian Ocean in November 2001.355
Despite the progress made over the three time periods, interviews with 
US and Japanese naval officers revealed that besides the pre-planned and 
organised training and exercises, not much other operational interaction occurs 
between US and JMSDF forces.   Spontaneous interaction for training purposes 
rarely if ever occurs, they said, unlike the case with other naval allies.  US 
officers whose ships had been homeported in Japan noted that communication 
is very rare between USN and JMSDF ships off the coast of Japan, even between 
JMSDF and US ships that are berthed close to each other in Yokosuka, Japan.356  
Both the USN and JMSDF were to blame, they said, for not looking for and 
making better use of opportunities—often relatively small—to improve 
cooperation in the relationship.  The US Navy generally had other operational 
priorities and these ‘alliance development’ opportunities with Japan did not 
figure high on that list.  The JMSDF generally approached interactions with the 
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t
355 Assessment of the RIMPAC exercise was a standard question posed to all USN and JMSDF 
officers interviewed for this thesis project.  See, for example, interviews 10A (December 2006) 
and 19E (March 2002). 
356 Interview 3I (April 2000).  A similarly serious indictment of the operational relationship came 
from the 1997 National Defense University’s Strategic Assessment which stated that US forces 
and Japan’s Self- Defense Forces ‘seldom operated along-side each other, much less together’.  
See Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997 Stra egic Assessment: Flashpoints and Force 
Struc ure (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1997), p. 62.  Although this statement 
applied to all relationships—ground, air and sea, the ground forces faced the greatest challenges 
given the conditions and environment in which they operated. 
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US Navy in a more formalised manner and was not as comfortable at initiating 
interaction of a more informal nature.357
Another characteristic of this period is the increased independence of the 
JMSDF and the US Navy and the increased tendency of each one to conduct 
operations without the presence of its respective alliance partner.  This 
perspective emerged in many of the interviews conducted during this period, in 
public and private discussions between the JMSDF and US Navy and in press 
articles.358  As discussed earlier, in the early and mid-1990s, the US Navy 
participated in interdiction operations in the Persian Gulf and surrounding area, 
and also in the Adriatic Sea in response to problems in the Balkan region during 
this same time period.  The JMSDF did not participate in these operations. The 
JMSDF, too, increased its international activities and participated in a variety of 
humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations in the 1990s given the 
passage of a law to facilitate peacekeeping operations.  Until the passage of this 
legislation—an effort by the Japanese government to improve its reputation in 
the international community after its non-participation in the 1991 Gulf War—
these types of operations outside of Japan would not have been conducted.   
Japan and the United States did not participate together on these 
operations due to a lack of coordination and priority on the part of both 
governments.  One former Defense Department official and a specialist on 
Japan-US security alliance issues, emphasised in a 1999 article that as a matter 
of both ‘principle and practice’, Japan and the United States needed to be more 
consistent with these operations.  He stated that ‘how we work together in small 
but consequential ways will set the course for much more important missions in 
                                                           
357 Interviews 2A (March 1999), 7A (July 2000), 10A (December 2006), 18A (July 2004) and 20A 
(May 2000). 
358 Interviews 3I (April 2000), 5C (March 2000), 23A (August 2000). 
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the future’.359  This was a point that was made continuously in discussions with 
US Navy officials, who noted that both the JMSDF and US Navy had some share 
in the blame for these conditions, as discussed above.   
Table 16 provides a list of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance 
operations conducted by the Self-Defense Forces during the 1990s.  Most of 
these operations had JMSDF participation.    
 
Table 16:  Japan Self-Defense Force Participation in Peacekeeping and 
Humanitarian Assistance Operations (as of May 2001) 
 
Date Operation 
Sept. 1991–Sept. 1993 (periodic 
deployments) 
United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) 
May 1993- Jan. 1995 UN Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) 
Feb. 1996 onwards UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 
Nov.–Dec. 1998 International disaster relief activities in Honduras 
(Hurricane) 
Sept. – Nov. 1999 International disaster relief activities in Turkey 
(Earthquake) 
Nov. 1999 to Feb. 2000 Humanitarian Assistance to East Timor  
Feb. 2001 International disaster relief activities in India 
(Earthquake) 
Source:  Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2001, pp. 337-338. 
 
In addition to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations that 
the JMSDF and other Self-Defense Forces were conducting on their own, the 
JMSDF undertook—for the first time—naval confidence-building exercises with 
its neighbours. As with peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the unique 
element once again was that confidence building activities did not involve US 
Navy units.  Certain ‘Japan-watchers’ in the United States were concerned that 
Japan was moving away from the alliance.  Table 17 provides a list of the 
                                                           
359 Paul Giarra, ‘Peacekeeping: As Good for the Alliance as It Is for Japan?’  PacNet, Number 6, 
Pacific Forum CSIS, 12 February 1999.  Two of the examples Giarra uses as lack of effective 
coordination and support from the United States involved Japan Self-Defense Force assistance 
activities in the 1994 Rwanda refugee crisis and the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras in 
1998.    
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confidence building exercises, as well as ship visits, between Japan and Russia 
and between Japan and South Korea during the 1990s. 
 
Table 17:  JMSDF Confidence Building Activities and Ship Visits with the 
Russian and ROK Navies (as of May 2001) 
 
Date Activity Participants 
Sept. 1996, Oct., Aug. 1998  JMSDF ships visit ROK JMSDF and ROK Navy 
Dec. 1996, Dec. 1998, Aug. 
1999, Jan. 2001 
ROK ships visit Japan JMSDF and ROK Navy 
August 1999 Joint search and rescue  JMSDF and ROK Navy 
July 1996, July 1998, Sept. 
2000 
JMSDF ships visit Russia JMSDF and Russian Navy 
June 1997 and Sept. 1999 Russian ships visit Japan JMSDF and Russian Navy 
July 1998, Sept. 1999, Sept. 
2000 
Joint search and rescue 
operation 
JMSDF and Russian Navy 
Source:  Japan Defense Agency, Defense o  Japan 2001, p.338. f
 
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States generated 
new cooperation between the JMSDF and US Navy.  As stated throughout the 
thesis, the most valuable interactions between navies contributing to 
institutionalisation occurs when they are operating together in response to 
mutually recognised security challenges, in which they share risks and the 
defence burden.  The US Navy helped prepare the JMSDF for its deployment to 
the Indian Ocean to service, support and refuel US ships operating in the area.   
Beyond the mission itself, the JMSDF knew its ships would be operating in a 
high threat environment and as such needed the ability to defend themselves 
and communicate in a secure environment with the USN and other navies 
operating in the region.  The pre-deployment and en route training provided by 
the US Navy covered some of these operational requirements, and the rest was 
incorporated in theatre, according to USN officers who provided some of the 
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training.  The training was not new to the JMSDF, but it often involved different 
equipment and different operational scenarios and rules of engagement.360   
The JMSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean in 2001 initiated certain new 
operational guidelines, doctrinal changes, new tactics, techniques and 
procedures and established new precedents for close operational relations 
between the two navies.  While the significance of these changes may not have 
been evident in 2001, and for the purpose of discussion in this thesis, the JMSDF 
deployments continued for a number of years afterwards and the effect on the 
naval relationship likely became more permanent.  Future researchers will need 
to more fully examine this new JMSDF-USN cooperation and the full extent to 
which it resulted in institutional changes in operating procedures, doctrine, and 
in the nature and extent of information, intelligence, systems and equipment 
provided to the JMSDF from the US Navy.  
While preparation for the Indian Ocean deployment occupied a large part 
of the USN and JMSDF time in 2001, training at JMSDF and USN defence 
colleges and training institutions continued in 2001 and in the years that 
preceded the deployment.  Table 5 in Chapter 2 provides a summary of JMSDF 
training in the United States, and Table 6 in Chapter 2 summarises USN training 
in Japan for the years covered in this thesis.  There is no indication that the rate 
of attendance was significantly different than the previous period, based on 
interviews with the JMSDF officers who compiled this data.  They noted that 
participation in training likely increased most significantly during the 1987-1991 
period when technical training associated with new weapon systems and 
equipment was most predominant.  Following those years, participation in 
overseas training remained generally constant.361
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As a consequence of the different paths taken by the US Navy and the 
JMSDF after the 1991 Gulf War, the naval relationship encountered several 
challenges that ultimately affected the depth of the relationship itself and 
ultimately its continued institutionalisation.  In the earlier part of the decade, 
the two navies interacted less and shared fewer common missions.  In addition, 
the two navies did not necessarily share similar goals and threat perceptions, 
and they spent more time operating independently rather than together on 
missions of mutual agreement.  This ultimately affected the depth of the naval 
relationship.  Gradually, with new security challenges in the latter part of the 
decade and in 2001, and with increased opportunities for operational 
cooperation, the navies began to reorient their relationship.  The 2001 JMSDF 
deployment to the Indian Ocean was important in this regard.   
Nevertheless, the naval relationship could not avoid being affected by 
some of these external factors. As will be discussed in the second half of this 
chapter, the US-Japan security alliance was experiencing a variety of challenges 
during this period and was characterised as ‘drifting apart’.362  This was the case 
even in the latter part of the decade.  Despite new defence cooperation 
initiatives and new emerging threats in the Northeast Asia region, there 
appeared still to be a degree of disharmony in the naval relationship and in the 
security relationship.  A sign of such disharmony was the emergence of alliance 
‘housekeeping’ and facilities management issues that were becoming priority 
agenda items at alliance meetings.  Some of these issues directly affected US 
naval forces located in Japan and served to detract from operational priorities.  
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(April 2005). 
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They included, for example, pollution generated by an incinerator facility near 
the Atsugi US Navy facility, discussions concerning a replacement for the 
Futenma Air Station from which US Marine Corps air forces operated, and 
negotiations on host nation support to subsidise the stationing costs for US 
forces in Japan.  In a healthy alliance relationship, these types of issues should 
not assume centre stage.363  
The sentiment of an ‘alliance adrift’ was highlighted by Yoichi Funabashi, 
a prominent Japanese journalist, in a January 2000 article for the Asahi Shimbun 
as an apt description of what had transpired in the alliance since the end of the 
Cold War.  In the article he quotes a US official who was participating in host 
nation support discussions as saying that, ‘on the surface, it appears that the 
Japan-US alliance is going well but I was made to realize how strained it really is 
underneath’.364  At the naval level, thoughtful senior officers in both the US and 
Japanese navies were expressing similar concerns and provided further 
evidence of a naval relationship that was not necessarily moving together in the 
same direction.  Threat perceptions, goals and missions were no longer in synch.  
One of the results of spending less time training together was that the JMSDF 
and the US Navy began to develop more independent approaches to their 
operations.  For the JMSDF, an indication of this independence was its desire to 
build its own aircraft carrier, for example, as discussed in Chapter 3.  The 
JMSDF looked for US Navy support for this initiative but did not get it.  This 
issue never fully went away—even later in the decade.   
US Navy officers—active and retired—who had served in Japan identified 
what appeared to be a ‘brake’ when it came to increased bilateral cooperation.  
                                                           
363 Email perspectives from mid-and senior level military and civilian personnel working in the 
Asia-Pacific region (See document 17A, February 2000). 
364 Yoichi Funabashi, ‘Time to Take Japan-US Talks to the Next Level’, Asahi Shimbun, 31 
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These officers stated that the brake appeared to be a combination of 
institutional and psychological misgivings across the Government of Japan and 
the Self-Defense Forces about deepening cooperation with US forces.365  The 
theme in several interviews with JMSDF officials tended to be that the US Navy 
and the US government more broadly, did not trust Japan.366  This was 
particularly the case in regard to JMSDF confidence building activities in the 
region. US Navy officials expressed concern that the JMSDF wanted to pursue 
activities in the region without USN participation.  JMSDF representatives, on 
the other hand, equated this US reaction to a lack of trust in the JMSDF in its 




While a number of defence conferences and symposia were held during 
the 1996-2001 time period, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) stands 
out as particularly notable because the JMSDF hosted the Fifth WPNS, held in 
Tokyo in 1996.  As discussed in an earlier chapter, the WPNS is a unique forum 
for multi-national naval cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.  It was initiated 
originally as a regional version of the International Seapower Symposium, which 
the US Navy hosts during alternate years at the Naval War College, in Newport 
Rhode Island.  Since the first symposium in 1988, the WPNS gradually shifted 
from Cold War-era issues to broader topics such as maritime security, rescue at 
sea, maritime pollution prevention, and contributed to increasing the 
transparency amongst navies, with the continued goal of promoting mutual 
understanding and naval cooperation.  
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 Malaysia hosted the pivotal 1994 Symposium that refocused the 
participants’ efforts on Confidence Building Measures in the new post-Cold War 
era.  In the 1996 Symposium, which was hosted by Japan, the JMSDF admiral in 
charge paid tribute to the role the US Navy played not only in this particular 
naval gathering but also in strongly supporting Japan to be received back into 
Asia in the post-World War II era.  And just as notable, he also stated that Japan 
had been conveying the views of Asian nations to Americans.367  The confidence 
exhibited in the remarks is indicative of the transformation the JMSDF had 
undergone over the previous two decades.  The WPNS provided an opportunity 
for the JMSDF to excel not only in front of its alliance partner but also its 
neighbours and peers in the region.  This new experience contributed to its 
increased self confidence and likely to the JMSDF’s desire to pursue cooperative 




The period began in 1996 with recognition by both navies that the lack of 
a central focus for the relationship, after the demise of the Soviet threat, had 
weakened the operational links that had been established in the 1980s during 
extensive JMSDF-USN cooperation in sea lane defence against Soviet 
submarines.  The security alliance was being characterised as ‘adrift’ and to 
some extent so was the naval relationship.  The incident in 2000 involving the 
leaking of classified information by a JMSDF officer demonstrated the need for 
a significant revision of procedures in Japan for handling sensitive defence 
information.  The lack of sufficient procedures continued to raise questions 
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about the institutional strength of the Japan-US naval relationship at this time, 
compared with other naval relationships.   
New security challenges served to alert the navies of increased danger in 
the region but they did not necessarily serve as a rallying point for increased 
Japan-US naval cooperation.  The 1998 North Korean missile launch did 
galvanize research cooperation on missile defence.  All acknowledged, however, 
that missile defence cooperation would be complicated in the future by the lack 
of joint command and control arrangements.  The JMSDF deployment to the 
Indian Ocean in 2001 to provide logistical and other support to the US Navy as 
part of Operation Enduring Freedom helped to re-energize the naval relationship 
and encouraged further institutionalisation as both navies recognised that the 
establishment of certain organisational structures and procedures helped to 
further facilitate navy-to-navy cooperation when faced with operational 
challenges.   
The 1997 Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines provided some 
direction in terms of new roles and missions for the forces, and the Guidelines 
influenced the nature of some training and exercises during this period.  They 
also helped ease some of the bureaucratic irritations that the navies faced in 
operating with each other and provided legitimacy to certain ongoing naval 
activities and preparation for ballistic missile defence, which is discussed 
further in the second half of this chapter.  Preparation for the JMSDF 
deployment to the Indian Ocean introduced new requirements and new 




OTHER FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE JAPAN-US NAVAL 
RELATIONSHIP (1996-2001) 
 
The years immediately following the end of the Cold War were 
tumultuous ones for the security relationship and the naval relationship as a 
result of different national priorities, new international security challenges and a 
growing division between the United States and Japan on how best to handle 
these challenges.  In addition, domestic economic challenges in each country, 
combined with continued bilateral trade battles, exacerbated other security-
related factors.  Signs of strain were visible in discussions over host nation 
support, as well as basing and facilities issues that affected US military 
personnel stationed in Japan. 
Eventually, the interests and objectives of Japan and the United States 
began to converge once again, in large part because of certain regional security 
challenges that created incentives for renewed security cooperation and 
domestic political forces in each country.  As in the past, this convergence 
benefited the naval relationship.  The navies became the principal tool for 
implementing new security initiatives, such as missile defence, as was the case 
in the Cold War.  Changes were reflected in the navies’ joint exercises and in 
other interactions.  The events of 11 September 2001 served to reorient the 
security relationship and once again defence cooperation was recognised as 






Divergence of Interests and Policy Priorities 
 
For Japan, the 1991 Gulf War had been a wrenching wake-up call to 
engage in and indeed contribute more fully to the international community.  
While it had deployed minesweeping vessels to the Gulf after the war's 
conclusion and provided $13 billion in support of the war effort, Japan had 
repeatedly turned down US requests before and during the war for rear-area 
support in the form of minesweeping, refugee and humanitarian assistance and 
non-combatant materiel support.368  Despite the financial contribution, Japan 
recognised it had to do more and respond more quickly to a future international 
crisis.  In 1991, Japan enacted legislation that enabled it to participate in 
international peacekeeping operations in a non-combatant role.  Between 1991 
and 1996, Japan deployed forces to several humanitarian and peacekeeping 
operations, often away from the US forces to which they had become closely 
attached in the previous decade.   Some analysts in the United States saw this as 
evidence that Japan was adopting a more independent foreign and defence 
policy.  Others saw this as a missed opportunity for US forces to work alongside 
Japan as it began to deploy outside its territory.369
In 1994, a blue-ribbon advisory group of Japanese intellectuals, appointed 
by Prime Minister Hosokawa, examined the future of Japanese defence policy in 
light of the dramatic changes in the international political and economic 
environment over the previous decades since  the 1976 National Defense 
Program Outline—the policy framework for defence planning in Japan—had 
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369 Interviews 11A (January 2007), 5E (April 2005), 3K (September 2004) and 3B (December 
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been issued.370   The eventual report that was issued in 1994, known as the 
Higuchi Report, did not recommend major departures from current policies, but 
it did attempt to frame these policies in a new way.  For example, it suggested 
moving from a ‘cold war defence strategy’ to a ‘multilateral security strategy’. 371  
Although Japan's own defence capabilities and cooperation with the United 
States would remain important pillars of Japanese security policy, the report 
recommended that these elements now be viewed more from the vantage point 
of cooperative security.   
The report caused a stir in Washington because it identified ‘multilateral’ 
interests as one of a number of priorities for Japan.  Of particular concern to 
certain analysts in the United States was the fact that in the report's table of 
contents, the section of the report concerning multilateral issues came before 
the section concerning the Japan-US alliance.372  For some in Washington, this 
was further evidence that the alliance was beginning to drift apart and that 
Japan was hedging against a worsening of Japan-US relations.373  One of the key 
authors of the report—Akio Watanabe—stated that from his perspective the 
issue involved the necessity of redefining the Japan-US security relationship 
within the new international conditions of the post-Cold War, and did not 
involve choosing one framework or another.374







370 Mike M. Mochizuki, "A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance," pp. 8-10. 
371 Mike Mochizuki, "A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance," pp. 8-10 and 37.   
372 According to Mike Mochizuki, the original Japanese phrase for multila eral security stra egy is 
akakuteki anzen hosho senryaku.  Although the Japanese government's translations of 
akakuteki into English is multilateral, the word can also be translated as multidimensional.  If it 
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gradually move away from a policy focused on bilateral Japan-US security to one focused on 
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Bargain for a Stronger Alliance," p. 37.  Note that Mike Mochizuki acknowledges Akihiro Magara 
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373 See Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Rede ning the Japan-US Alliance: Tokyo's 
Na onal De ence Program (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National 
Defence University, 1994), pp. 7-10. 
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After the 1991 Gulf War, the United States reoriented its security policies 
to focus on new global security challenges—particularly in the Middle East and 
Southeast Europe.  The United States had withdrawn a large number of forces 
from the Pacific region for the Gulf War, and some had not returned to the 
region.  In the case of the Navy, ships returning to the region remained there for 
shorter periods of time—often on the way to the Middle East.375  The US military 
was now focused on new global challenges in regions outside of Northeast Asia.  
The US Navy was maintaining a continued force presence in the Middle East, 
with an intensive interdiction mission ongoing in the Persian Gulf and Arabian 
Sea in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm.  By the mid-1990s, the US Navy 
was also maintaining a significant force presence in Southeastern Europe, as 
problems in the Balkans began to ignite.  
For both Japan and the United States, economic challenges were present 
in the early 1990s.  This affected naval relations because funding shortfalls 
influenced opportunities for interaction, and in particular costly exercises.  In 
Japan, all government programs were facing severe scrutiny as the Japanese 
economy began to decline.  By 1991, Japan's economic ‘bubble’, which had 
grown over the past decade, eventually burst.  Therefore, not only was Japan 
facing the challenges associated with a new and unfamiliar security landscape 
after the demise of the Soviet threat and Japan’s foreign policy ‘failings’ during 
the Gulf War, its self-confidence was significantly diminished as its reputation as 
an economic superpower began to fade.376  In addition, the Japanese people, 
including certain politicians, began questioning the cost of maintaining the 
alliance relationship, and in particular the continued presence of US forces in 
Japan after the tragic incident in 1995 involving the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl 
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by US servicemen stationed in Okinawa.377  While the economic conditions in the 
United States were not as severe as in Japan, by 1992 the United States found 
itself in a recession in the aftermath of the Gulf War and had to prioritize 
government spending.  Consequently, the focus of the US defence community, 
was on regions of likely or actual conflict—principally the Middle East and the 
Balkans region. 
 
Mutual Security Challenges 
 
In the middle of this tumultuous period, key officials in both the United 
States and Japan realized that changes needed to be made in both countries to 
preserve the security relationship and to ensure that it was capable of coping 
with post-Cold War security challenges.  In 1995, in the aftermath of the 
Okinawa rape incident, Japan revised its 1976 National Defense Program Outline 
to better reflect the new expectations for its Self-Defense Forces and reaffirm 
the importance of the Japan-US security arrangements.  These sentiments grew 
stronger as the nature and frequency of regional threats increased.  In and 
outside of Japan, pressure was mounting for the Self-Defense Forces to 
participate in activities that would help build a more stable international 
security environment.378
In April 1996, US President Bill Clinton and Japan Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto signed the US-Japan Declaration on Security, which marked the 
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culmination of a series of consultations on the state of the Japan-US alliance and 
its role in the post-Cold War era.  Of particular applicability to the naval 
relationship, Japan and the United States also agreed to review the 1978 Defence 
Cooperation Guidelines in light of situations that might emerge in the areas 
surrounding Japan, promote logistical cooperation, strengthen technology and 
equipment exchange, cooperate in ongoing ballistic missile defence studies and 
in UN peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian relief activities and 
arms control and disarmament.379
While the Japan-US security relationship was experiencing a number of 
challenges and each country was refocusing its efforts, security threats were 
growing in the Northeast Asia region.  This proved to be a key element that 
refocused the security relationship and the naval relationship, although not 
initially.  Indeed, these new threats did not spark increased naval interaction 
until later in the decade, due in particular to the domestic politics in Japan.  As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, these new security challenges were of 
particular concern to the two navies, who began discussions of mission 
preparation before these challenges became a concern to the political 
leadership—as was the case in the mid-1970s when both navies together grew 
concerned over Soviet submarine developments in the western Pacific, before 
Japanese civilian leadership.   
In May 1993, North Korea conducted a ballistic missile test with a 
Nodong-1 SCUD-type missile in the direction of the Sea of Japan.  Evidence of 
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North Korea’s developing nuclear program emerged later that year.  This 
however, did not promote increased interaction on the part of the two navies as 
one would have thought.   According to Michael Green, with Prime Minister 
Tsutomu Hata’s coalition government having lost its majority in the Diet, 
political conditions in Japan at the time constrained the activities of the JMSDF.  
Green points out that despite the nuclear and missile developments in North 
Korea, the JMSDF informed the US Navy that Japan probably could not provide 
ships for surveillance and minesweeping unless Japan was directly attacked or 
the United Nations provided an appropriate mandate.380   In addition to the North 
Korean missile tests, China launched a series of missile tests across the Taiwan 
Straits beginning in 1995 and held military exercises in March 1996 in an effort 
to intimidate Taiwan before elections and indicate the People's Liberation 
Army's readiness to use force if necessary to prevent Taiwanese independence. 
Japan did not significantly change in its approach to security matters 
until August 1998, when North Korea test launched a Taepodong-1 ballistic 
missile directly over Japanese territory.  It was the Taepodong-1 launch, in 
particular, that created heightened concern in Japan, as the population realised 
its vulnerability to missile strikes.  The launch resulted in improved defence 
cooperation with the United States and eventually contributed to the passage of 
laws in Japan, despite previous political opposition, to implement the 1997 US-
Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines.381 Prior to the Taepodong-1 launch, 
domestic support for theatre missile defence was limited to certain government 
ministries, but this expanded in December 1998 when Japan agreed to fund joint 
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missile defence research with the United States.  By August 1999, the United 
States and Japan had signed a five-year agreement for joint research on 
advanced sea-based, upper-tier technologies that could eventually be integrated 
with US programs.382   
This agreement, and Japanese domestic support, brought about changes 
in Japan-US naval interactions, including an increased number of exercises and 
new exercise scenarios, some of which were related to the new cooperation 
over theatre missile defence.  For the naval relationship, the close involvement 
of the US Navy and the JMSDF in promoting a sea-based missile defence 
program, using existing Aegis ships, helped to further empower the relationship.  
Greater interoperability using high tech systems and a common operational 
focus contributed to an enhanced exercise program and further 
institutionalisation.   
In general, Japanese and US defence officials interviewed for this thesis 
shared similar perspectives concerning regional security challenges.  However, 
in some cases differences emerged.  For example, Japanese officials were more 
reticent than US officials in identifying the potential threat from China as one of 
the reasons why missile defence was needed.  Yet in other discussions, senior 
JMSDF officials expressed greater concerns than US Navy officials about 
potential future challenges from China as a result of its overall development—
economic, political, and  security—and its long-term effect on Japan’s security 
and potential vulnerabilities.  According to one senior Japanese official, these 
differences in threat perceptions were due to Japan’s close proximity to China.  
These differences in threat perceptions could pose challenges to the Japan-US 
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naval relationship in the future, he said.383  These views are consistent with those 
identified by others in Japan.  For example, Euan Graham cites Yoichi Hirama, a 
retired JMSDF admiral, as saying that what is feared most in Japan is that 
China’s ‘strategic genius’ rather than its brute military strength will effectively 
identify and exploit Japan’s political and economic vulnerabilities.384  
Graham also points out that although Japanese attitudes towards China 
since the end of the Cold War have been marked by ambivalence, the rise of a 
new political generation and the demise of ideology as a significant factor in 
China-Japan relations have combined more recently to open up political debate 
on China and to weaken political taboos in Japan against criticizing the country.  
Further, he notes that the retrenchment of LDP politicians regarded as broadly 
sympathetic to China has helped to shift the balance of political opinion towards 
more nationalist platforms within the controlling party.385
 
New Institutional Frameworks 
 
One of the most important contributions to institutionalisation during the 
1997-2001 time period was the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense 
Cooperation.  The Guidelines were created as a tool to deal with new alliance 
challenges in a changing security landscape.  It was a step to further 
institutionalise the Japan-US security relationship, particularly in light of the 
emergence of new regional security challenges.  The 1997 Guidelines defines the 
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role of the Japan-US alliance in the post-Cold War era as consisting of three 
parts:  1) cooperation under normal circumstances, 2) action in response to an 
armed attack against Japan, and 3) cooperation in situation in areas surrounding 
Japan that have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.386 While 
the essence of the old Guidelines concerned the response to a military attack on 
Japan, the core of the new Guidelines related to ‘a situation in areas surrounding 
Japan’—a more likely scenario in the post-Cold War environment.   
Until 1997, the United States and Japan relied on the 1978 Defence 
Cooperation Guidelines, which provided a basic structure for military 
cooperation, the beginning of an institutionalised security relationship and a 
layer of legitimacy to the defence relationship.  The 1978 Guidelines had many 
shortfalls, however, particularly in the area of operational planning.  US and 
Japanese officials acknowledged the shortfalls in the 1978 Guidelines and knew 
that these shortfalls would prevent the alliance from responding effectively to a 
crisis on the Korean Peninsula.  The 1997 Guidelines were not perfect and 
numerous problems still existed in implementation, but they went much further 
in creating an effective framework for cooperation than did the 1978 Defense 
Cooperation Guidelines. 
On operational issues, the navies did their best to build their relationship 
using the institutional foundation of the 1978 Guidelines, but numerous 
challenges existed.  During the Cold War, the navies worked together to pursue 
the Soviet submarine threat and both navies hoped that if the Soviets ever 
attacked Japan, all operational restrictions from the Japanese government 
would be lifted, according to senior US and JMSDF officers.  However, they all 
admitted that this was an extremely inappropriate way to plan for naval 
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operations.387  As with the 1978 Guidelines, the new Guidelines did not obligate 
either the US or Japanese governments to take legislative, budgetary or 
administrative measures.  This had particularly significant implications in Japan, 
where the cooperation of local governments was essential for the movement 
and support of troops and troop movement through and around the country.  
Japanese government efforts to correct this were made at a later time, aided to a 
large extent by the changing nature of the external environment and in 
particular, the 1998 Taepodong missile launch. 
The 1997 Guidelines also included a number of other provisions, such as 
a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two 
countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal 
circumstances and during contingencies. The Guidelines provided for 
conducting bilateral defence planning and mutual cooperation planning and also 
covered areas of cooperation that were not part of the 1978 Guidelines, 
including United Nations peacekeeping activities, international humanitarian 
relief and emergency relief operations.388   
For the naval relationship, the Guidelines even laid out how ship 
inspections would be conducted to ensure the implementation of economic 
sanctions under United Nations resolutions, and it specified the conduct of 
search and rescue operations and that they would take place in non-combat 
areas.389  More significantly, however, the 1997 Defence Guidelines provided 
additional institutional ‘legitimacy’ for the activities of the two navies, including 
more overt planning.  This is not an insignificant element.  Japanese government 
support for the naval relationship, as well as the defence relationship, had 
always been essential, since so much in the security relationship depended on 
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387 Interviews 14A (December 2000) and 15A (August 2000). 
388 See Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperat on. 
389 Ibid., pp., 11-12. 
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the Japanese government.  In addition, increased emphasis on specific roles and 
missions for the forces was also noteworthy, since the JMSDF would be 
assuming rear-echelon support during national security emergencies in the 
‘areas surrounding Japan’.  Significantly, this was the first time since the early 
1980s that a discussion of roles and missions for the naval forces were re-
visited.  Still, however, for day-to-day operational issues, the new Guidelines 
were no panacea.390  As discussed below, it would take a new security crisis, 
further legislative changes in Japan, and a subsequent out-of-area joint 
deployment for the Japan-US naval relationship to make significant operational 
gains. 
 
Problems Still Remained 
 
Despite these initiatives, all still was not well with the inner workings of 
the alliance, and this affected the naval relationship.  The state of the 
relationship was reflected in some of the more basic ‘housekeeping’ issues that 
emerged.  For example, discussions had stalled over host nation support to 
subsidise the outlay of funds to support US forces stationed in Japan, as well as 
the 15-year time limit on the US military use of a replacement for the Futenma 
Air Station on the island of Okinawa.  Similar problems existed regarding dioxin 
pollution generated from an industrial waste incinerating facility that stood next 
to the Atsugi US naval facility.  Relations between the two countries had 
become strained, despite the decorum on the surface, according to those on the 
inside of the relationship and outside commentators, such as Yoichi Funabashi.  
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390 James Auer and Robyn Lim discuss the benefits of the 1997 Guidelines for the naval 
relationship and refer to the changes as representing ‘only modest improvements’.  See James E. 
Auer and Robyn Lim, ‘The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia,’ Naval War Co ege 
Review, Winter 2001, pp. 12-13. 
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They noted that the strain was visible in the distrust displayed in some of the 
working level discussions.  An example of this growing distrust involved the US 
Navy facility at Atsugi.  According to Funabashi, some US officials seemed to 
suspect that the Japanese government deliberately ignored the situation to make 
it uncomfortable for the US military to stay.  This, and other elements of distrust 
from the local population, was weakening the foundations of Japan-US security, 
according to Funabashi.  He warned of a new ‘soft nationalism’ developing in 
Japan if US policymakers did not pay closer attention to the complex national 
sentiments emerging in Japan.391   
It is difficult to determine the specific effect these disagreements had on 
Japan-US naval relations, including operational interaction, during this period.  
US Navy training, such as night aircraft carrier landings, was curtailed on many 
occasions because of disturbances to the local population, which had domestic 
political implications and ultimately affected US military activities.  According 
to US Navy officials interviewed, these basing-related problems grated on US 
Navy commanders because they needed to make alternative arrangements for 
training—often outside of Japan.  The JMSDF was not responsible for these 
decisions from the Japanese government, and in fact faced many of the same 
restrictions with their own operations.  Nevertheless, US officials noted that 
military-to-military relationships could not help but be affected by the 
acrimonious alliance relations during this period on working level issues.392
 
                                                           
391 Yoichi Funabashi, ‘Time to Take Japan-US Talks to the Next Level’, Asahi Shimbun, 31 
January 2000.  Similar sentiments were expressed in a February 2000 email exchange between 
senior-level bureaucrats within the US military structure in Japan and in the Pacific, indicating 
that without the threat from the Soviet Union to keep the US-Japan relationship in check, 
environment problems, crimes by US military personnel, obtrusive training operations, land-use 
hassles, and other base-related issues had created a more dynamic atmosphere filled with 
numerous political problems. (Email exchange on 1 February 2000, document 17a). 
392 Ibid. 
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Japan's ‘Special Measures’ Legislation and New Security Cooperation 
 
The 11 September 2001 terrorist events in the United States cast a new 
light on the security relationship and the naval relationship.  The events 
themselves and the high-level cooperation between President George W. Bush 
and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, put a new priority on the alliance 
relationship.  All elements of the relationship benefited from this reorientation, 
but the navies likely benefited the most because they became the principal tools 
to demonstrate new security cooperation. 
Japan’s absence in the 1991 Gulf War took a heavy toll on Japan’s 
international reputation, and therefore after the terrorist attacks in the United 
States on 11 September 2001, Japan took swift action to demonstrate support 
for the United States.  Junichiro Koizumi, as Prime Minister of Japan, had a keen 
understanding that during this crisis, Japan needed to respond with its Self-
Defense Forces.  As was the case during the Cold War, naval assets became a 
key tool for US-Japan cooperation.  In a press conference on 19 September 2001, 
Prime Minister Koizumi announced ‘Japan's Measures in Response to the Series 
of Terrorist Attacks in the United States’.393  This extensive statement provided 
the Japanese government's basic policy and measures for the immediate future 
that helped facilitate the JMSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean where it 
provided support and services to the US and other armed forces participating in 
anti-terrorism activities.  The Special Measures Law was passed by the Diet on 
29 October 2001, but by then, plans were already in motion for JMSDF 
assistance in the Indian Ocean.394   
                                                           
393 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2002, pp. 108-121.   
394 See Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the 
Passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law by the Diet of Japan’, 29 October 2001: 
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As discussed in previous chapters, one of the realities of dealing with 
Japan and its defence forces over the previous decades was the extensive 
planning and discussions that occurred before actions were taken.  This 
continued to be the case in the late 1990s, according to US naval officers who 
had served in Japan during this period.395  The action by the Japanese 
government was particularly significant because of the speed at which decisions 
were made within the Diet, the government bureaucracy and within the JMSDF 
itself.  Of the seven Measures identified in the statement, four were of direct 
applicability to the defence forces, and one was JMSDF-specific.396  The JMSDF-
relevant measure concerned ‘the dispatch of JMSDF vessels to carry out 
information-gathering operations for anticipated activities, under the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law, in seawaters from Japan to the Indian Ocean’.  
The Japanese government developed a plan to implement the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Law, based on input from the JMSDF information-gathering 
mission, and Prime Minister Koizumi approved it on 20 November.  The 
implementation plan identified the types of support activities that the JMSDF 
could perform in the seas between Japan and the Indian Ocean.  This included 
supply of fuel, water, and other requirements for ship support; transportation of 
fuel for ships; and repair, maintenance, medical activities and general sea port 
services.  In addition, the JMSDF was to assist with search and rescue when 
called upon in the areas deployed and provide assistance to people in need.397   
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Many behind-the-scenes discussions went on between the navies and 
their respective bureaucracies to influence the wording of this legislation.  
According to a senior DOD official, as a result of very ‘forward-leaning’ US 
officials at the National Security Council, Department of Defense and 
Department of State, along with the Defense/Naval Attaché at the Japanese 
Embassy in Washington, and key JMSDF admirals in Japan, the naval 
relationship was invoked.  Key officials were in place to influence 
decisionmaking and to help avoid a repeat of the 1991 decision by the Japanese 
government not to deploy the JMSDF to the Gulf War.398  
On 9 November 2001, 11 days after the passage of the Special Measures 
Law, the Defence Agency dispatched two destroyers and a supply vessel to the 
Indian Ocean for the purpose of gathering information for a future mission.  On 
25 November 2001, satisfied with the results of the information-gathering 
mission, the JMSDF sent an additional destroyer, a supply vessel and a 
minesweeper tender to join the vessels already dispatched.  This was the start of 
a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean for the JMSDF.  The JMSDF provided 
support services to the US Navy in November and December 2001.  In January 
2002, it expanded its support to include naval forces from the United Kingdom.  
Support to additional countries was added in later months—beyond the scope of 
this thesis.399
The United States and Japan were again cooperating on matters of shared 
mutual interests and using their military forces to do so.  At another level, 
however, each participant had its own reasons for cooperating on this mission, 
beyond the alliance relationship.  The Japanese government, for example, while 
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sympathetic to the effects of terrorism, particularly after 11 September, wanted 
to be viewed as a ‘player’ in the international arena and a dependable ally to the 
United States, so not to be caste aside and further shut out of alliance benefits, a 
similar theme reflected nearly 25 years earlier.  For the JMSDF, the mission got 
them out of Japanese waters where they were competing for missions with the 
Japan Maritime Safety Agency (coast guard).  In addition, the mission allowed 
the JMSDF to demonstrate that it had the capability and skills to conduct 
missions, along side other navies, in areas beyond Japanese waters.400  For the 
US Navy, particularly the forces in the Pacific, the JMSDF deployment provided 
fuel and other assistance, hence reducing the burden of the US Navy.  Other 
officers recognised that the deployment helped the JMSDF become a more 
effective alliance partner.  Further, the deployment satisfied the US Congress 
and demonstrated that Japan was doing its part to assist the United States in 




 As with the previous two time periods, a combination of domestic 
politics, security challenges and political leadership in both countries influenced 
the security relationship and the naval relationship during the 1996-2001 period.  
The naval relationship was not a force on its own but was integrally connected 
to the broader geo-political environment.  During this period, the divergence of 
US and Japanese domestic and foreign policy priorities and interests played a 
part in defining both the security and naval relationships.  It was the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks combined with recognition on the part of the 
                                                           
400 Interviews 19F (April 2004) and 22F (August 2005). 
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Japanese government that it needed to take substantive action and demonstrate 
its commitment to the security relationship, given its experience during and 
after the 1991 Gulf war that pushed both the security and the naval relationships 
into greater defence cooperation.  Ultimately, Japan was looking after its own 
interests, and the navies were direct beneficiaries of the mission.  The navies 
were influenced by institutionalisation from the security relationship and at the 
same time they created additional institutionalisation once they increased their 
interaction and cooperation. 
Prior to the 11 September incidents, the alliance had been suffering from 
a certain element of indifference—particularly in the mid-1990s.  With each of 
the navies focusing on their own priorities, the alliance relationship did not 
receive the same degree of attention it had received in the 1980s.  Even with a 
new series of security challenges, threat perceptions were not always consistent 
between Japan and the United States.  Eventually, a number of events, such as 
the 1998 Taepodong missile test launch, demonstrated that Japan was 
vulnerable.  As was the case in the past, Japan had to weigh the cost and 
benefits of pursuing a more independent stance or binding itself closer to the 
United States, as it eventually did in the case of missile defence.  As such, a 
series of new defence cooperation agreements in the late 1990s further 
institutionalised the security relationship and enhanced legitimacy for new joint 
naval activities. 
 
Chapter Conclusion   
 
The 1996-2001 period was one of dichotomies.  Coming immediately after 
a lethargic period in both the naval relationship and the security relationship, 
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the period included new threats and security challenges that served to motivate 
civilian leadership in both countries to initiate greater cooperation on defence 
matters and to take steps to further institutionalise the alliance relationship.   In 
many ways, the two navies had made greater progress in building cooperation 
and institutionalisation than had the broader security relationship.  For 
example, while a ‘strategic dialogue’ was just being established for the Japan-US 
security relationship in the late 1990s, the US Navy and the JMSDF had 
established a navy-to-navy dialogue and other forums for exchange and 
discussion with senior naval officials relatively soon after the approval of the 
1978 Defense Cooperation Guidelines, as noted in Chapter 2.  Also, early on, the 
two navies appeared to have a better appreciation of the implications of the 
emerging threat than did the security relationship, but this was not necessarily 
reflected in the nature and extent of naval exercises at the time. 
On the other hand, many US Navy officers—active and retired—
identified what they believed were less than optimal relations between the 
navies and an inherent ‘brake’ on a closer alliance relationship and increased 
institutionalisation.  Certainly in practical terms, the lack of a satisfactory 
Defence Secrets Act and other similar structural weaknesses affected the nature 
and extent of sensitive data and information passed to Japan from the United 
States.  But the sentiments expressed concerning the naval relationship were of 
a deeper nature.  The institutional and psychological misgivings about 
operational cooperation with US forces were likely due to a combination of 
complex forces in Japan emanating from political, cultural and historical 
factors. 
Japanese national security policy changes, and the nearly overnight 
decision to deploy JMSDF forces to the Indian Ocean in the fall of 2001, were 
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significant to the naval relationship.  The policy shift came not as a result of a 
direct attack or danger to Japan but appears to have been more a reflection of 
shrewd calculations on the part of the Japanese Prime Minister, who above all 
was concerned about Japan’s national interests.  In addition, a very active 
Japan-US ‘naval relationship’ with a strong support structure in both Japan and 
the United States helped make this shift possible.    
Evidence presented in this chapter, based on interviews in 2002, indicates 
that some threat perception differences existed between the two navies, 
particularly concerning China.  Over time, some of these perspectives may 
change and naval views may become more consistent.  How the two navies—
and the two countries—reconcile their differences will be instrumental in the 
development and implementation of an effective missile defence programme, 
and for the continued institutionalisation of the naval relationship. 
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CHAPTER 5:  Conclusions 
 
In the Asia-Pacific region, the Japanese and US navies have worked 
together in an alliance relationship for fifty-some years, and in the post-Cold 
War period have expanded the nature and extent of their cooperation.  Although 
the naval relationship is unique in certain regards compared with other US 
military relationships, nevertheless, lessons from its development will be useful 
as international military forces initiate new cooperative relationships in support 
of security and stability throughout various regions in the world.  As such, this 
thesis has shed new light on an understudied topic. 
The thesis pursued two interrelated objectives.  First, it identified and 
discussed the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained the 
development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship during 
the period 1976 through 2001.  Second, it examined the relationship between 
cooperation and institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship.  The 
proposition advanced by this thesis is that when the US Navy and the Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force operate together against a mutually acknowledged 
security threat or challenge, sharing risks and the defence burden, a dynamic is 
created in which cooperation encourages institutionalisation, which in turn 
facilitates improved cooperation.  The research confirms this proposition and 
also indicates that sustaining this bilateral naval relationship was difficult once 
there were no longer mutually acknowledged security challenges around which 
to organise joint naval operations.  Although one cannot say that the Japan-US 
naval relationship is an institutionalised relationship, it does exhibit many of the 
attributes of institutionalisation.   
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Institutionalisation served as the focal point for the thesis.  Just as there 
are advantages to institutionalised alliance relationships, similarly, military 
relationships also benefit from institutionalisation because it can contribute to 
improved bureaucratic coordination, interoperability of systems, equipment and 
doctrine and coordination of procedures and operations.  Inevitably, this leads 
to more effective military operations.  In this thesis, the progress toward 
institutionalisation highlighted the key dynamics in the Japan-US naval 
relationship over a 25-year period (1976-2001).  These dynamics were captured 
through a systematic ‘mapping’ process that tracked the institutional changes in 
the relationship and the various factors that influenced its institutional 
development over three different periods during this 25-year time span.  The 
mapping technique and the analytical framework employed in the thesis helped 
facilitate analysis of the naval relationship, the institutionalisation process and 
the various internal and external factors that influenced the relationship.   
The navies were integrally connected to the broader political and security 
environment, including the Japan-US security relationship.  Naval cooperation, 
which helped drive institutionalisation in the naval relationship, depended in 
large part on political decisions—particularly from the Japanese government.  
Although all navies are subject to decisions from their national governments, 
this naval relationship was particularly sensitive given the unique domestic 
political environment in Japan.  
Institutionalisation is characterised in the thesis by internal coordination, 
operational interaction, external linkages and by the institutional depth of the 
relationship.  As the activity level increased within one or more of the four 
elements, institutionalisation was enhanced.  However, not all the elements had 
an equal effect on institutionalisation, as demonstrated in the thesis.  
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Operational interaction, for example, influenced other elements of 
institutionalisation, such as internal coordination and the depth of the 
relationship, and hence had an overall greater effect on institutionalisation than 
any of the other elements. 
The thesis shed new light on the Japan-US naval relationship—a 
relatively under-studied topic in the academic community.  In general, the 
growth and development of the Japan-US naval relationship is unique compared 
with other naval relationships because of Japan’s restrictive defence policies 
and the extent to which these policies have affected operational interaction 
between the navies.  While all militaries are subject to the restrictions imposed 
by their respective national governments, Japan’s constitutional restrictions on 
the use of force and associated policy decisions by the Japanese government 
reduced the flexibility of naval interactions and the extent of operational 
cooperation, particularly outside of Japanese waters.  This curtailed the 
development of the relationship, cooperation between the navies and ultimately 
its institutionalisation.   
  
Institutionalisation and Cooperation 
  
Academics and others have written extensively about the connection 
between cooperation and institutionalisation in the context of international 
organisations and security alliances, but they have not addressed the unique 
dynamics of military-to-military relationships—particularly those outside of 
NATO.  This thesis addressed the gap in the literature by providing a new 
perspective on the relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation—in 
a naval context.  The thesis showed that in the Japan-US naval relationship, 
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operational cooperation in which both navies were operating together against a 
mutually acknowledged security threat or challenge, sharing risks and the 
defence burden, was the key driving factor that influenced institutionalisation.   
This finding differs from what certain scholars have identified concerning 
international organisations, such as the European Union, in which 
institutionalisation, the independent variable, drove cooperation.401  The thesis 
attributes these differences, in part, to the nature of naval relationships, 
compared with other international organisations, and the uniqueness of this 
particular naval relationship.  Further research will need to be conducted to 
determine whether these patterns exist for other military relationships. 
The behaviour exhibited by the US Navy and the JMSDF over the 25 years 
examined in this study is consistent with what has been noted by naval scholars 
and practitioners concerning naval relations.  Elements of institutionalisation 
emerged once a level of trust was established between the two navies, and this 
occurred when the navies operated together and shared risks to support mutual 
interests.402  These conditions likely account for the causality differences when 
comparing institutionalisation in this naval relationship to the development of 
institutionalisation in international organisations.  Since the thesis did not 
explore other military relationships, it cannot assume that the experience of the 
Japan-US naval relationship is necessarily transferable.   
Although the US Navy and the JMSDF became more institutionalised in 
the 1980s, it wasn’t enough to hold the navies together once they were not 
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 262
operating consistently together.  Sustaining this naval relationship was difficult 
once there was no longer mutually acknowledged security challenges around 
which to organise naval operations and the roles and missions of the navies.  
While renewed security challenges and policy support from the respective 
governments helped reinvigorate the relationship later in the decade, it does 
bring into question the sustainability of this particular relationship.  In the case 
of NATO, for example, when the threat from the Soviet Union dissipated, the 
alliance adopted new functions and partnerships and ultimately redefined itself 
based on a new security environment.  The navies followed suit.  This was not 
the case with the Japan-US security relationship, which faltered after the demise 
of the Soviet threat as Japan and the United States pursued different national 
interests, and it was not the case with the naval relationship.  
This observation is consistent with research on bilateral and multilateral 
security relationships.  Kristin Rafferty, for example, maintains that bilateral 
alliances in general are not as institutionalised as multilateral alliances, and as 
such, not as resilient.  However, in her work on the Japan-US security 
relationship, she does not go so far as to say that the challenges the alliance 
encountered after the Cold War were due to the bilateral nature of this bilateral 
alliance relationship.403  Neither Rafferty nor other scholars discuss military 
relationships.  Based on the empirical evidence in this thesis, it is fair to say that 
the Japan-US naval relationship made definite strides in institutionalisation in 
the 1980s, but this progress did not seem to have been enough to bind the navies 
together and sustain them, particularly when the national interests of both 
nations translated into different operational priorities for the navies.  For this 
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naval relationship, operational cooperation was key in binding the navies 
together.  The lack of a strong institutional base in the naval relationship likely 
was due to erratic operational cooperation between the navies, and this likely 
contributed to their inability to sustain their relationship once mutually 
acknowledged security challenges no longer existed around which to organise 
joint naval operations.  As noted throughout the thesis, the development of this 
institutional base was influenced by a variety of internal and external factors. 
 
External and Internal Influences on the Naval Relationship 
  
A variety of factors were responsible for influencing the Japan-US naval 
relationship during the period 1976 through 2001.  The analytical framework 
used in this thesis, combined with the archival research and interviews, brought 
together a unique approach that highlights the range of factors influencing the 
growth and institutionalisation of the naval relationship from 1976, the start of 
formalised defence cooperation discussions in the security relationship, through 
2001, when the JMSDF began its deployments to the Indian Ocean.  The 
research indicates that the internal dynamics within the naval relationship, 
combined with external influences such as threat perceptions, national 
leadership influence and domestic politics drove and/or constrained the 
relationship at various times.  The navies were integrally connected to the 
broader political and security environment, including the Japan-US security 
relationship, and as such external influences were critical to the development of 
the naval relationship.  
Determining internal and external influence can be difficult given the 
multiple factors that may have affected a particular time period.  This is the 
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case, for example, with the years 1986-1991, which covered critical periods of 
the Cold War and the post-Cold War and therefore were subject to many 
different influences.  Further, an unavoidable element of subjectivity is often 
associated with making such determinations.  Nevertheless, taking these 
qualifications into consideration, the trends that emerged from this analysis are 
useful when considering the various forces that influenced the Japan-US naval 
relationship. 
One of the key trends when assessing the nature and extent of influence 
during these three periods is whether the influence comes primarily from 
outside the relationship or inside.  In this regard, each period was slightly 
different.  As the naval relationship matured, it was no longer as dependent on 
the security relationship and on other external factors for its own growth.  
However, the naval relationship could not remove itself completely from 
external support and influence.  National leadership support, in particular, 
continued to be important throughout the time periods because of its impact on 
naval budgets and policies.  Further, Japan’s constitutional limitations and 
defence policies—although less restrictive in later periods—continued to be one 
of the significant external constraints for the naval relationship.  The key 
external and internal factors that helped to influence the naval relationship and 




The influence rendered in 1976-1981 comes primarily from outside the 
relationship.  This is logical, because 1976 marked the start of formal 
discussions between Japan and the United States on defence cooperation.  Prior 
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to that time, the naval relationship was not promoted and had little visibility, 
particularly in Japan, despite the fact that the two navies had been in 
operational contact with each other for over 20 years.  Senior leadership in 
Japan and the United States played key roles in pushing forward the security 
relationship and with it, the naval relationship.  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Japanese officials, in particular, were responsible initially for encouraging 
defence cooperation with the United States because they saw it in Japan’s best 
interests to do so, in light of the growing Soviet threat and Japan’s vulnerability. 
The dominant external influence during this period for the security 
relationship and for the naval relationship was the growing threat from the 
Soviet Union.  It was important because it also drove several other external 
influences such as leadership support, domestic politics, public opinion, and 
compatible national goals and objectives.  For example, the immediacy of the 
threat, demonstrated by frequent intrusions from Soviet MIG aircraft into 
Japanese air space, provided a strong incentive for Japanese officials to make 
the necessary domestic political changes and appeal to the Japanese public for 
support.  By locking in US support in the form of a more cooperative defence 
relationship, Japan—recognizing its vulnerability—was fending off the 
possibility of ‘abandonment’.  Japan made many changes to its own policies that 
endorsed a closer security relationship with the United States, such as the 1976 
Defense Program Outline, and soon after Japan and the United States opened 
discussions on defence cooperation.  Similarly, in the United States, with its 
defence commitments growing after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US 
officials recognised that financial and operational assistance from allies was 
needed in order to meet its worldwide commitments.   
 266
In general, factors generated from within the naval relationship itself did 
not significantly drive the relationship and contribute to institutionalisation 
during this period.  The naval relationship was just emerging as a more publicly 
acknowledged defence relationship.  As with the broader security relationship, 
the naval relationship was influenced by the Soviet threat.  The navies were very 
aware of the growing Soviet naval activity in the region and took advantage of 
the changes taking place in the broader security relationship to initiate 
cooperative activities.  This included the 1977 Navy-to-Navy Talks and the 1980 
Rim of the Pacific multilateral exercise, in which the JMSDF participated for the 
first time.  While the growing Soviet threat helped boost elements of the 
relationship during this period, it constrained certain other elements.  The 
unwillingness of the US Navy to share sensitive acoustic data concerning Soviet 
submarines with the JMSDF demonstrated that a lack of trust still existed 
between the navies at this time.  Personal relationships between the navies were 
not yet strong enough to override these difficulties.   Further, force capability 
differences still existed and constrained operational interactions between the 
two navies, as did culture and language differences.  As such, while external 
factors served to promote navy-to-navy relations, several elements within the 




This second period saw a reversal of sorts in the factors influencing the 
naval relationship.  Now, the two navies played the key role in driving their 
relationship forward. This was in large part due to the close operational 
relationship that had developed between the two navies, particularly in anti-
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submarine warfare, against Soviet naval forces in the Western Pacific.  As a 
result of this more intensive interaction, the navies’ joint operational capabilities 
had increased considerably, roles and missions had been defined, personal 
relationships grew stronger, information sharing increased and the navies began 
to more closely align their operational strategies and doctrine.  The 
unprecedented steps by the JMSDF in the mid-1980s to align elements of its 
doctrine with that of the US Navy helped to further bind the two navies and 
increased institutionalisation.  These factors served to strengthen and reinforce 
the naval relationship and contributed to growth in institutionalisation.  In 
addition to its own development, the success of the naval relationship and its 
accomplishments against Soviet naval activity in the Northwest Pacific helped 
temper congressional rancour over trade and burdensharing issues in the 
broader Japan-US relationship.   
When the Soviet threat began to diminish toward the end of the decade, a 
wider range of security challenges emerged on the international horizon for 
which there was reduced consensus between the two countries on how to 
handle them.  Although the naval relationship was still strong, certain external 
factors began to constrain the relationship beginning in 1990.  The Japanese 
government’s decision not to deploy the JMSDF to the Middle East during the 
1991 Gulf War or during the build-up to the war prevented the JMSDF from 
continuing the trend of cooperating with the US Navy on security challenges 
that affected the national interests of both countries.   
Leadership support for the naval relationship, which had been strong 
during earlier years and served to promote the naval relationship, now 
constrained it.  Mutual resentment at the national levels affected the naval 
relationship.  The United States resented Japan’s lack of participation in the Gulf 
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War, and Japan resented that its large financial contribution to the war effort 
was essentially unacknowledged.  Although the naval relationship itself was still 
strong, the JMSDF’s inability to continue high-visibility cooperation with the US 
Navy was the start of new challenges in the naval relationship and a decline in 




During the 1996-2001 period, both external and internal naval factors 
influenced the naval relationship, but the primary drivers were the external 
influences, such as security challenges, national leadership influence, domestic 
politics and the Japan-US security relationship.  This was a period of renewal, of 
sorts, for the security relationship and the naval relationship, both of which 
experienced difficult relations in the early to mid-1990s, at the start of the post-
Cold War era.  In the later part of the decade, new security challenges served as 
the impetus for renewed joint discussions on defence cooperation between the 
two countries and for the creation of new policies and agreements, such as the 
1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines.  As with the 1976-1981 period, key senior 
officials played leadership roles in steering the security relationship, and 
through it, the naval relationship.   
The Taepodong-1 missile launch by North Korea over Japan in 1998 and 
various activities by China provided incentives for Japan to strengthen defence 
cooperation with the United States.  Not all the external and internal influences 
during this period were positive, however.  Despite the new regional threats and 
the new Defense Cooperation Guidelines, the security alliance exhibited signs of 
stress and was a constraining force on the naval relationship.  However, the 
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decisions by the Japanese government to assist the United States in anti-
terrorism operations after the events of 11 September 2001, helped facilitate 
new maritime cooperation which, for the first time, involved long-term 
deployments of JMSDF forces.  The Indian Ocean logistics support operations 
helped to re-ignite the JMSDF-USN operational relationship and set in motion a 
new set of joint operations. 
 
Summary of external and internal influences 
 
From this discussion, it is clear that the development and 
institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship was a complex process 
and was influenced by many different factors.  In the naval relationship, 
institutionalisation ebbed and flowed, depending on internal and external 
factors of influence.  External factors played particularly important roles in 
influencing the development and institutionalisation of the naval relationship 
and as such demonstrated that navies are not independent entities but are 
integrally linked to the national interests of a country and to the policy decisions 
made by the respective governments.   The US Navy and the JMSDF influenced 
events behind the scenes to its own favour, particularly in the 1980s, but once 
relations at the national level declined and national interests diverted, 
operational interactions were affected and the naval relationship began to 








In this thesis external influences came principally from four sources:  
external threats and security challenges, national leadership influence, the 
Japan-US security relationship, and domestic politics in the respective 
countries.  Although other sources provided some influence, the elements 
identified above were the key drivers.   
1.  External Threats and Security Challenges:  Mutually acknowledged 
external threats and security challenges were instrumental in facilitating a 
greater consensus between the policymakers in Japan and the United States on 
issues concerning the Japan-US security relationship and the naval relationship.  
In international relations, the effect of security challenges on alliance cohesion 
is a well understood phenomenon, as discussed in Chapter 1, but the effect that 
threats and security challenges have on the institutionalisation of naval 
relationships has not been as effectively examined.  As this naval relationship 
demonstrates, cooperation and institutionalisation grows when the navies share 
similar threat perceptions.  Further, threats and security challenges drove 
several other external factors that contributed to institutionalisation, such as 
leadership support, domestic politics, public opinion and national policy goals 
and objectives. 
2.  National Leadership Influence:  The thesis demonstrated that national 
leadership can provide either a supportive influence on the naval relationship, 
as was the case in Japan after the events of 11 September 2001, or a constraining 
influence, as was the case during the 1991 Gulf War when the Japanese 
government decided not to deploy JMSDF forces and only later agreed to do so 
once the conflict was over.  Naval literature acknowledges the important role of 
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external factors in a naval relationship, such as the personality of leaders and 
their attitudes to naval matters.404  Senior leadership support was particularly 
important in this naval relationship because of the operational restrictions 
associated with Article 9 of the Constitution and its interpretation.  The thesis 
shows a progressive loosening of the associated restrictions, due in large part to 
the direction of senior leadership in Japan.  Key examples of this include Prime 
Minister Suzuki’s 1981 announcement that Japan would defend its sealanes out 
to 1,000 nautical miles, which drove a closer operational relationship with the 
United States, and Prime Minister Koizumi’s 2001 commitment, through 
emergency legislation, to assist the US Navy in the Indian Ocean with refuelling 
and other logistical assistance after the events of 11 September 2001.  Middle-
level US and Japanese bureaucrats in the 1980s and 1990s also were critical 
elements in the promotion of both the security relationship and the naval 
relationship.  
3.  Japan-US Security Relationship:  In addition to security threats and 
leadership support, the Japan-US security relationship was a key influence for 
the naval relationship.  First, the institutionalisation efforts undertaken by the 
security relationship, such as with the Japan-US Guidelines for Defense 
Cooperation, helped to legitimise efforts often already underway by the navies 
or operational desires that had not yet been undertaken.  As such, the naval 
relationship encountered institutionalisation at two levels: through the security 
relationship and through its own internal processes.  Also, the JMSDF 
sometimes used the security relationship as a way to justify requests for 
                                                 
i
404 See, for example, Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1977) pp. 
202-204.   James Tritten discusses several of these factors as they apply to the formation of naval 
doctrine.  See James J. Tritten, ‘Doctrine and Fleet Tactics in the Royal Navy’, in A Doctrine 
Reader: The Navies of United States, Great Br tain, France, Italy, and Spain, Newport Paper 
Number Nine, edited by James J. Tritten and Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, US Naval War College, 
1995, pp. 30-32. 
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increased joint activities with the US Navy and for increased resources.  The 
United States used its influence through the security relationship to pressure 
Japan to increase its defence capabilities and its alliance contribution.  The 
naval relationship often was the beneficiary of this pressure, as was the case 
with sealane support during the 1980s.  Less overt pressure for increased 
operational contributions and intelligence sharing occurred behind the scenes, 
through navy-to-navy contacts and through other close contacts in the security 
relationship. 
4.  Domestic Politics:  Domestic politics, particularly in Japan, greatly 
influenced the Japan-US naval relationship as well as the broader alliance 
relationship.  As noted throughout the thesis, the Japan-US naval relationship 
was unique compared with other naval relationships due to the operational 
restrictions the JMSDF faced in its interactions with the US Navy.  Political 
forces in Japan were instrumental in providing new opportunities for the JMSDF 
and in removing some of the roadblocks that limited its activities with the US 
Navy.  At other times, political decisions restrained the JMSDF which, in many 
cases, curtailed the further institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval 
relationship.   
The shifts in Japanese public opinion during the 1970s concerning 
security and defence issues, combined with other political changes such as the 
alignment of factions within the ruling LDP to support security cooperation with 
the United States, enabled the two navies to interact more openly together and 
began to change the nature and frequency of their exercises.  Of particular 
significance was the role played by senior Japanese officials in initiating and 
promoting defence cooperation with the United States, which was only possible 
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once there had been a shift in Japanese public opinion to more positively 
acknowledge Japan’s defence forces and the Japan-US security relationship. 
JMSDF participation in 1980 in the Rim of the Pacific multinational naval 
exercise, known as RIMPAC, is another example of the important role of 
Japanese domestic politics in the JMSDF’s ability to exercise with the US Navy.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, although the JMSDF was technically capable of 
participating in RIMPAC prior to 1980, the JMSDF was not able to do so because 
advance political groundwork had not been laid in time.  The Guidelines for US-
Japan Defense Cooperation was a key element in the ‘political persuasion’ that 
was necessary before the JMSDF was able to participate in this exercise.405   
In the mid- to later 1980s, despite the domestic political battles waging in 
Japan and the United States over economic issues and the spill-over effect for 
the security relationship, naval exercises and other formal interactions 
remained relatively unscathed.  With the continued formidable threat from the 
Soviet Union’s Pacific fleet, both countries recognised that it was in their best 
interest for cooperative naval operations to continue.  In the mid-1980s, the 
Japanese government froze most budget categories except defence.  Under 
Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan’s defence spending actually increased.  These 
additional defence resources helped facilitate an increased number of exercises 
with the US Navy, using platforms and equipment that were technologically 
more sophisticated than they had been in the past and as such, more 
interoperable with US Navy assets.  
In 1991, the Japanese government’s decision not to send the JMSDF to 
the Persian Gulf was a turning point for the alliance and for naval cooperation.  
Political decisions made in Japan prevented a more intense level of operational 
                                                 
405 Ohmori Oral History interview, p. 8 and Maruyama Oral History interview, pp. 18-19. 
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cooperation between the JMSDF and US Navy during the years leading up to the 
1991 conflict and afterwards.  As Japanese and US interests began to divert, and 
with the US Navy’s operational priority focused on the Middle East, the navies 
spent less time exercising together.   
The mid-1990s was a particularly difficult period for Japan politically, and 
this affected support for naval cooperation.  With Prime Minister Tsutomu 
Hata’s coalition government having lost its majority in the Diet in 1994, political 
conditions constrained the activities of the JMSDF, despite growing concerns 
over North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programs.  North Korea’s 
1998 test launch of a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile directly over Japanese 
territory was the event that finally activated the Japanese political 
establishment.  The Japanese government’s concerns about its vulnerability to a 
missile strike contributed to improved defence cooperation with the United 
States and eventually to the passage of laws in Japan to implement the 1997 
Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation.  Political support in Japan also 
helped facilitate closer cooperation between the US Navy and the JMSDF in 
promoting a sea-based missile defence program, including exercises that 
reflected this cooperation.    
 
Internal Navy Influences   
 
While external influences played important roles in driving the Japan-US 
naval relationship, influences from within the naval relationship became 
particularly important once the navies had received the necessary external 
support and after they had begun operating together.  Once this occurred, the 
relationship appeared to support itself, and indeed, in certain cases, influence 
 275
the broader security relationship, such as during the 1980s when defence 
burdensharing issues challenged the relationship.  Influences from within the 
relationship included force capability; internal navy politics; culture, language 
and other societal factors; and operational interaction. 
1.  Force Capability:  The JMSDF’s high quality systems and equipment, 
which began to emerge in the 1980s, helped facilitate improved navy-to-navy 
operational cooperation and helped bolster the naval relationship in the context 
of the overall alliance relationship.  As pointed out frequently by naval 
practitioners and academics, technology can unite and/or challenge naval 
relationships.  In the case of the JMSDF-USN relationship, technology did both.  
In the early days of the relationship, the lack of compatible systems and 
equipment created operational challenges and rifts in the navy-to-navy 
relationship when certain technologies were not shared.  These challenges 
began to diminish once there was greater sharing of systems and technology and 
greater equality in the technical expertise of both navies.   
2.  Navy Politics (between and/or within the navies):  The disagreements 
within the US Navy in the late 1970s and early 1980s concerning whether or not 
to share certain classified information and technology with the JMSDF was a 
key constraint in the development of a more cooperative naval relationship in 
the early days and demonstrated that a lack of trust still existed between the 
two navies.  Similarly, the JMSDF’s desire for an aircraft carrier and its 
unsuccessful strategy to obtain the support of the US Navy was evidence that 
this was unlike any other naval relationship in terms of the JMSDF dependency 
on the US Navy.  The JMSDF’s desire for more independent operations raised 
concerns in the US Navy—concerns that did not exist with other US naval 
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relationships—and demonstrated the complexity associated with the JMSDF-
USN relationship. 
At times, the JMSDF would use their US Navy and other US contacts to 
help achieve their own operational goals, which might be considered politically 
unacceptable if pursued only through Japanese channels.  Requests from US 
officials would be couched as ‘good for the security relationship’.  This included, 
for example, requests for operational deployments outside of Japan’s territorial 
waters, access to US systems and technology—such as Aegis, and certain 
tactical engagements that likely would not have been possible if they had not 
been requested by the US government.   
3.  Culture and language:  The differences in culture, language and other 
society-related issues had a constraining effect on the naval relationship in the 
early years.  This was mitigated somewhat in the years that followed, after the 
Soviet naval threat required increased cooperation between the US and 
Japanese navies.  The empirical evidence shows that culture and language 
differences were increasingly less important as a defining element of the 
relationship during the latter time periods: 1986-1991 and 1996-2001.  This was 
due principally to the increased operational contact between the navies.   
Interviews with JMSDF and USN personnel indicated that the more the USN and 
JMSDF operated together, cultural differences became less relevant.  In addition 
to operational contact, the JMSDF members were spending increased amounts 
of time in the United States in technical training and education programs during 
the 1980s and 1990s, given the JMSDF purchases of US systems and equipment 
(e.g., the P-3C and the Aegis radar system) and an expansion of attendance at 
US universities.  This provided additional opportunities for interaction between 
members of the two navies and other Americans.  JMSDF English language 
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training and capability increased as well during these decades in response to 
increased operational contact and training programs. 
Despite the efforts of the JMSDF to adapt in various ways to USN 
practices, the US Navy officials who have been the most effective in their 
relationships with Japan and its navy, according to a former US Seventh Fleet 
commander, are those who have understood the uniqueness of the relationship.  
American naval officers went through certain protocols to establish personal 
trust, recognising that even small gestures were very important.  This is not the 
case in relations with other western navies, he said. 406   
Alfred Thayer Mahan promoted Japan’s westernisation and distinguished 
it from other Asian nations.407  However, despite the improvements in cultural 
understanding by the JMSDF and USN, and language improvements by the 
JMSDF during the 1980s and 1990s, the Japan-US naval relationship never 
developed the closeness that exists between the United States and English-
speaking allies, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand.   
In terms of the overall effect on the naval relationship, however, 
interviews with US Navy officers indicated that ultimately, external political 
constraints and domestic politics played a bigger role in constraining the naval 
relationship than culture, language and other societal differences. 
4.  Operational Interaction:  Of all the elements, operational interaction 
was most responsible for helping to drive the naval relationship forward, bind 
the navies more closely together and help institutionalisation to occur.  As the 
navies shared operational risks in support of mutual security interests, they 
                                                 
:
406 Interview 25A, 1/2007.    
407 Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan  The Man and His Letters (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1977), pp. 502-505. 
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developed new organisational procedures and mechanisms to facilitate more 
effective cooperation.   
Japan-US cooperation in the 1980s against Soviet naval forces in the 
Pacific is the best example of how effective operational cooperation pushed the 
relationship forward and drove other aspects of the naval relationship.  As 
cooperation increased there was a need for more effective internal coordination, 
to include navy-to-navy meetings and improved information and intelligence 
sharing.  The JMSDF deployments to the Indian Ocean in response to the 11 
September terrorist events drove the relationship further ahead, as both navies 
recognised that they had to upgrade and improve equipment, interoperability of 
systems and equipment, communications and operating procedures in order to 
be operationally effective in the new environment. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Mapping as a Methodological Tool 
 
The thesis employed a mapping technique, as part of the methodology, to 
track the changes in the Japan-US relationship over a 25-year period and identify 
trends or other occurrences of a recurring nature that may exist throughout the 
time period.  The technique facilitated an assessment of the relationship at the 
beginning, middle and end of this time period, using a structured approach, 
which helped identify the external and internal influences and the extent of 
institutionalisation in the relationship.  The four elements constituting 
institutionalisation, along with quantifiable and non-quantifiable indicators, 
served as the ‘map’ from one time period to another and provided a useful way 
to compare progress between periods.  The trends that emerged from this 
analysis are useful when considering the various forces that influenced the 
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Japan-US naval relationship.  It was particularly useful in helping to order these 
factors and to establish a foundation for analysis. 
Despite the strengths of this methodology and approach, there were 
some weaknesses.  Firstly, by focussing just on three particular periods during 
this 25-year span, the thesis did not capture activities and accomplishments that 
may have occurred at other times during these years.  For example, the JMSDF-
USN relationship progressed considerably between the first period (1976-1981) 
and the second period (1987-1991), and there were many factors responsible for 
this progression.  While the thesis summarized these inter-period changes and 
the factors responsible for them, it did not conduct a more extensive analysis.  
Secondly, certain time periods saw more diverse naval activity than others 
periods and hence this made it somewhat difficult to discern the overall ebb and 
flow of institutionalisation.  The 1986-1991 period in particular was a diverse 
period, as it covered critical years of the Cold War and the start of the post-Cold 
War.  Determining the progress towards institutionalisation required taking into 
consideration multiple and varied influences in a relatively short period of time.  
Thirdly, in some cases, it was difficult to obtain complete data for each of the 
elements of institutionalisation, and as such, small holes in the map may exist.  
This was mitigated, however, by the strength of the overall trends that emerged 
from the mapping process. 
 
The Future of the Japan-US Naval Relationship and Related  
Future Research 
 
The US Navy and the JMSDF shared a unique naval relationship during 
the Cold War and post-Cold War years due in large part to the legal and political 
constraints that affected the nature of JMSDF operational interactions with the 
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US Navy.  The thesis demonstrated how a variety of influences, within and 
outside of Japan, contributed to institutional and political changes that 
eventually helped facilitate new missions for the JMSDF and new opportunities 
for cooperation with the US Navy, including the JMSDF deployments to the 
Indian Ocean beginning in 2001. 
While the thesis did not go beyond 2001 in its analysis of the relationship, 
future researchers will have new opportunities to explore the evolution of this 
naval relationship and its institutionalisation, given the political and other 
institutional changes in Japan and in the Japan-US security relationship since 
2001.  Will these changes encourage greater independence on the part of the 
JMSDF, or growth and development within the structure of the security 
relationship?   
Further, how will threat perception differences affect the future naval 
relationship and its institutionalisation, particularly as China assumes a greater 
role in the region?  Evidence presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis indicates that 
some threat perception differences existed between the two navies concerning 
China.  One indication of Japan’s concern about security challenges from other 
countries is the amount of space devoted to these challenges in its Defense 
Agency annual reports.  The 2002 report, for example, devoted nine pages to 
China and nine pages to North Korea.  The 2003 report increased its China 
coverage to a total of twelve pages and North Korea remained at nine pages.408  
China will likely be the most important challenge facing Japan’s security in the 
future, and as such, to the Japan-US alliance relationship as well. With the 
advancement of the missile defence initiative, the need to manage any 
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408 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 2002, pp. 39-48 and pp. 55-64; Defense of Japan, 
2003, pp. 45-54 and pp. 58-70.  As a comparison, the Defense Agency devoted twenty-one pages 
to the Soviet Union in its 1980 report.  See De ense of Japan, 1980, pp. 15-36. 
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differences concerning regional threats and security challenges will become 
ever more important.  
In Japan, the approval of the 2004 National Defense Program Guideline, 
which provides a greater emphasis on the Self-Defense Forces’ participation in 
international security efforts and the reconsideration of certain constitutional 
and other restrictive provisions and principles in Japanese security policy, are 
examples of several important changes that occurred since 2001.  In addition to 
these changes in Japan, new developments in the Japan-US security relationship 
include new potential missions for Japan-US defence cooperation, such as 
missile defence. The Defense Policy Review Initiative, launched by the United 
States and Japan in 2002, and the subsequent Security Consultative Committee 
document, Japan-US Alliance: Transforma on and Realignment for the Future, 
provide the basis for new levels of cooperation in the Japan-US security 
relationship for the future.
ti
                                                
409  Eventually, researchers will want to conduct 
further work concerning how changes in the security relationship have affected, 
if at all, the naval relationship, and determine whether trends identified in this 
thesis are still valid.  Will increased institutionalisation in the security 
relationship strengthen the naval relationship?  Likewise, will increased 
institutionalisation in the naval relationship decrease the extent to which it is 
influenced by the security relationship? 
Despite the uniqueness of this naval relationship, the movement towards 
increased cooperation and institutionalisation between the US and Japanese 
navies during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods can provide many useful 
lessons for emerging bilateral and multilateral military relationships in East Asia 
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409  See Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, ‘Japan’s Evolving Defense Establishment’, and Yuki 
Tatsumi, ‘Self-Defense Forces Today—Beyond an Exclusively Defense-Oriented Posture?’ in 
Japan’s New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities, and Implica ions, edited by Yuki 
Tatsumi and Andrew L. Oros, The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 2007, pp. 17-21and 23-29. 
 282
and elsewhere in the world, particularly in the aftermath of the 11 September 
2001 terrorist events.  While the East Asia region lacks an integrating security 
mechanism, there are indications that regional nations, including China, see the 
benefits of security cooperation to protect their economic interests.410  For 
example, the protection of sea lines of communication is a high priority for all 
nations.  However, in many cases, these countries have different cultural 
backgrounds, national politics and have had little prior experience working or 
operating together.  Operational doctrine, institutional structures and 
compatible systems and equipment amongst the navies generally do not exist.  
In addition, the forces are often subject to operational restrictions imposed by 
their respective national governments, as was the case with Japan’s navy, which 
can inhibit operational interaction. The US and Japanese navies encountered 
many of the same challenges over the course of their relationship and as such 
can provide a useful guide to other navies—even those that are not part of an 
alliance relationship. 
One observation, consistent with current research and with this thesis, is 
that institutionalisation may occur less frequently in new arrangements 
organised after 11 September 2001 in response to anti-terrorist operations.  
These operations are most effective when the coalitions are stable and when 
there are strong institutional links to help facilitate the sharing of sensitive 
information and intelligence.  However, stable military relationships in which 
trust is a key component are not easy come by, as identified in this thesis, given 
differences in culture, language, politics and threat perceptions amongst 
                                                 
410 See Eric A. McVaden, ‘US-PRC Maritime Cooperation: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?’, China 
Brief from the Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 7, Issue 12 (13 June 2007).   The author, a retired US 
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coalition partners, as well as the sometimes short-term nature of these 
coalitions.411  
Finally, although the thesis focussed exclusively on the US and Japanese 
navies, the causal relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation in 
other military relationships is worth exploring.  This would broaden the 
understanding of what drives and constrains ground and air forces when 
operating in combined operations with other international forces and in alliance 
relationships.  For navalists, research on other military services would also help 
confirm whether navies are unique in terms of what motivates them to 
institutionalise their relationships with other navies.  If indeed navies are unique 
in requiring operational cooperation before institutionalisation, this is a 
significant finding that fills an otherwise unexplored aspect of 




Operational cooperation between the US Navy and the JMSDF in 
response to a mutually acknowledged threat promoted institutionalisation in the 
relationship.  While a number of different factors influenced the JMSDF-USN 
relationship, the nature and strength of the relationship rested on the ability of 
the two navies to operate together against a common threat.  The hypothesis 
turns on its head international organisation theories that view 
institutionalisation as a requirement for cooperation.  When the two navies 
worked together and shared risks, familiarity increased, trust grew and the 
                                                 
411 For a broader discussion of the effect of terrorism on the development and sustainment of 
coalitions and alliances, see Daniel Byman, ‘Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism’, The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 5, October 2006, pp. 796-807.  See also Nora Bensahel, 
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effect of culture and language differences was reduced.  As the navies 
cooperated in an operational setting, they recognised the need to establish 
structures to facilitate more effective cooperation.  As such, a dynamic was 
created in which cooperation encouraged institutionalisation, which in turn 
facilitated additional cooperation.  While this thesis focused on the Japan-US 
naval relationship, likely the central proposition of the thesis and many of the 
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14. Rear Admiral Harry Harris, Joint Chiefs of Staff and formerly, P-3C Wing 
Commander in Japan 
15.  Rear Admiral Michael Haskins, Commander, US Naval Forces Europe and 
formerly, P-3C Wing Commander in Japan 
16. John Hill, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
17. Dr. Hank Kenny, Center for Naval Analyses and formerly, Special Assistant 
to Ambassador Mike Mansfield at the US Embassy, Tokyo 
18. Captain Peter Leenhouts, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
19. Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt (USN-ret), Center for Naval Analyses and 
formerly, Director, East Asia Policy Office—Office of the Secretary of 
Defense 
20. Dr. Mike Mochizuki, George Washington University 
21. John Niemeyer, US Naval forces Japan, and retired US Navy officer 
22. John F. O’Connell, formerly Defense and Naval Attaché at the US Embassy, 
Tokyo 
23. Torkel Patterson, Raytheon, and formerly, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Japan Affairs, and retired US Navy officer 
24. Dr. Jonathan Pollack, US Naval War College 
25. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Shigley, US Pacific Command 
26. Commander Mark Staples, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Japan Desk, 
and later US Embassy, Tokyo 
27. Commander Richard Suttie, US Embassy, London, and formerly P-3C pilot in 
Japan 
28. Michael Tansey, formerly US Pacific Fleet staff and retired US Navy officer 
29. Commander David Titley, formerly Fleet Oceanographer, US Pacific Fleet 
30. Dean Vaughn, US Pacific Fleet and retired US Navy officer 
31. Lieutenant Colonel Rick Weir, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
32. Commander John Yi, EP-3C pilot and student at National Institute for 
Defense Studies in Tokyo 
_________________________________________ 
* The titles and positions associated with each official were those held at time of the interview.  In 
some cases, previous positions are noted if relevant to the thesis topic.  Most interviews were 





1. RADM Kazumine Akimoto (JMSDF-ret) 
2. Admiral Toru Ishikawa, Chief of Staff, JMSDF 
3. RADM Sumihiko Kawamura (JMSDF-ret) 
4. RADM Yoji Koda, Director, Operations and Plans Department, Maritime Staff 
Office, JMSDF 
5. Captain, Kenji Nakanishi, Maritime Staff College, JMSDF 
6. Vice Admiral Fumio Ota, Director, Defense Intelligence Headquarters 
7. Captain Umio Otsuka, Maritime Staff Office, JMSDF 
8. Commander Ryo Saki, Maritime Staff Office, JMSDF 
9. Captain Toshiya Sato, Naval and Assistant Defense Attaché, Embassy of 
Japan (Washington, DC) 
10. Captain Takamichi Takahashi, Visiting Fellow, Stimson Center, Washington, 
DC 
11. Captain Gojiro Watanabe, Visiting Fellow, Stimson Center, Washington, DC 
 
 
Other Japanese Officials *
 
1. Kimihiro Ishikane, Minister, Head of Chancery, Embassy of Japan 
2. Ken Jimbo, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo 
3. Taro Kono, Parliamentary Secretary for Public Management, Japan Diet, 
Lower House 
4. Takaaki Mizuno, Asahi Shimbun 
5. Chiharu Mori, Yom uri Shimbun i
6. Akihisa Nagashima, National Security Advisor, Democratic Party of Japan 
7. Masatoshi Shimbo, Japan Defense Agency 
8. Atsuo Suzuki, Japan Defense Agency 
9. Kuniichi Tanida, Asahi Shimbun 
10. Hideshi Tokuchi, Office of the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary 
11. Yoshio Uchiyama, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
12. Dr. Akio Watanabe, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo 
















* Interviews were also conducted with the principal scholars at the National Institute for Defense 
Studies, Tokyo, Japan, during research fellowship in 2002. 
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